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Abstract 
Virtue responsibilist epistemology (hereafter, virtue epistemology) is a philosophical 
thesis: it claims epistemic virtues and epistemic vices play essential roles in 
understanding the normative dimension of inquirers and inquiries, and help solve 
epistemological problems. The theory has developed over the past few decades, yet 
the approach suffers from some difficulties. My thesis addresses problems virtue 
epistemology faces and responds to each issue. In the first chapter, I would discuss 
the situationist critique. Epistemic situationists are skeptical about the explanatory and 
predictive power of our epistemic character traits. I address self-determination theory 
and argue that our motivation is causally efficacious: self-determined motivation 
predicts desirable behaviors contributing to our good life in a way that favors the 
position of the virtue epistemology. In the second chapter, I criticize the newly 
developed personalist virtue epistemology. Personalism relies on attributability 
responsibility, and dismisses the acquisition condition of virtue: i.e., the moral 
responsibility is defined by what we care and value synchronically. I defend the 
traditional responsibilist view of virtue on the ground of the narrative self-constitution 
view. The third chapter considers the impact of the epistemic partiality of friendship. I 
argue that friendship is dynamic: it is true that epistemic partiality is important for our 
care-relationship. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which our friendship is compatible 
with evidences, i.e., via epistemic partisan affiliation with our friends. I show that the 
value of friendship competes with other values such as epistemic justice in the exact 
same way as friendship competes with evidences. Thus, the argument given by the 
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proponents of epistemic partiality of friendship is shown to be not as convincing as it 
first appears. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the value of receptivity (the value 
against control and perfection) into virtue epistemology. The value of intellectual 
autonomy is often highly regarded among virtue epistemologists, but I argue that the 
value of intellectual receptivity will help explain what is wrong with the agent with 
excessive desire for knowledge first hand, and will help explain some key intellectual 
virtues like humility and open-mindedness. The fifth chapter is devoted to the problem 
of subjectivity in virtue epistemology. Oppressive social structures shape our 
standpoints: the oppressed are privileged in knowing about their oppressed life. I 
argue that virtue epistemologists should take this insight from standpoint 
epistemology into thinking about how some of our intellectual vices are socially 
formed, and institutionally remedied. In the sixth chapter, I propose some revisions to 
exemplar-based virtue education. Our imitative and learning behaviors are influenced 
by our perceived social distances between the self and the model, according to 
construal level theory. It is argued that the promotion of diverse intellectual exemplars 
in society would help us emulate exemplars and cultivate intellectual virtues more 
effectively. In this way, virtue epistemologists have often failed to take human 
psychology and the social nature of our inquiry into account. They also have not 
addressed how other aspects of human flourishing are intertwined with epistemic 
goods. My thesis aims at providing a down-to-earth account of how we should pursue 
epistemic virtues and avoid epistemic vices.  
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Lay Summary 
Virtue epistemology is a philosophical position: it claims that good character traits in 
relation to knowledge acquisition, such as being humble and open-minded plays 
essential roles in solving epistemological problems. This theory has developed over 
the past few decades, yet the approach suffers from some difficulties. My thesis 
addresses problems virtue epistemology faces and responds to each issue. In the 
first chapter, I address the situationist critique. Situationists are skeptical about the 
empirical adequacy of character traits. I argue that our motivation is causally 
efficacious based on self-determination theory. In the second chapter, I criticize the 
view called personalism. Personalist believes we can be responsible for our 
characters that we have not cultivated in the past (in other words, we are responsible 
for our characters reflecting on our present values). I defend the traditional view: a 
view of responsibility that cares both our past and the present. I also defend such a 
view on the grounds of a theory of self, called the narrative self. The third chapter 
considers the impact of the epistemic partiality of friendship. We are prone to believe 
in our friends more so than the strangers. This appears to contradict with the following 
epistemological thesis: we ought to believe in accordance with evidence. I argue that 
friendship is dynamic, and hence, friendship can be interpreted both in line with the 
former view and the latter view. I show that the argument given by the proponents of 
epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as it first appears by appealing to the 
concept of epistemic justice. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the value of receptivity 
into virtue epistemology. The value of intellectual autonomy, in other words, aiming at 
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becoming epistemically self-reliant has been an essential value among 
epistemologists. I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity: having a positive 
attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such 
things as they are, and integrating them into our epistemic self is as important as the 
value of epistemic autonomy. The fifth chapter is devoted to the standpoint 
epistemology. Oppressive social structures in society shape our standpoints. The 
oppressed are privileged in knowing about their oppressed life. I argue that the insight 
offered from standpoint epistemology should help virtue epistemologists think about 
how our intellectual vices are institutionally formed and treated. In the sixth chapter, I 
consider how we emulate intellectual exemplars in society. Relying on construal level 
theory, it is argued that promoting diverse exemplars in society might help us cultivate 
intellectual virtues more efficiently. In this way, I address some of the problems virtue 
epistemology faces. Virtuous agent (vicious agent) are traditionally understood and 
portrayed as individualistic. Virtue epistemology often failed to take human 
psychology and the social nature of our inquiry into account. My thesis provides a 
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Virtue responsibilist epistemology (henceforth, virtue epistemology, for short) is a 
philosophical thesis: it claims the concept of intellectual virtues and vices are useful 
where epistemological problems are concerned (Baehr 2011). Virtues are understood 
as excellent character traits: in Zagzebski’s famous term, virtue is “a deep and 
enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to 
produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end” 
(Zagzebski 1996, 137). Intellectual virtues are excellences of our mind as an inquirer, 
and on the other hand, intellectual vices are bad character traits that get in the way of 
our inquiry. 
 
    The theory of intellectual virtues and vices I address throughout my thesis is 
broadly in line with the influential work by Linda Zagzesbki (1996) and Jason Baehr 
(2011). I am on board with their idea that there is the distinctly an epistemic dimension 
in our life of flourishing. Acquiring intellectual virtues and avoiding intellectual vices is 
necessary for such an epistemic part of flourishing. In other words, virtue 
epistemology is committed to the belief that becoming a good inquirer is a necessary 
part of a good life. Virtue epistemology has developed in the past thirty years. The 
study of individual epistemic virtues and vices are representative as such. Yet, the 
approach suffers from some difficulties. Broadly speaking, virtue epistemology suffers 
from a number of problems I could term as problems of individualism. In the standard 
way of understanding intellectual virtues, a virtuous agent is portrayed as 
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individualistic. The virtuous person is motivated by the love of epistemic goods (such 
as truth, knowledge, understanding, wisdom), and she develops distinctive epistemic 
dispositions grounded in her love of knowledge. This is called the two-tier  
psychological model of intellectual virtues (Baehr 2013). Take an example of open-
mindedness: “to be open-minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and 
to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, it is 
possible that one is wrong” (Riggs 2010, 180). It is not very clear how our social 
environment, our social identity impacts on the pursuit of such an intellectual virtue. 
    The questions lurking in this debate are: can we really acquire such an admirable 
intellectual disposition flown from our love of knowledge at all (Chapter 1)? Even if it 
is a feasible option to pursue intellectual virtues, can we cultivate such virtues solely 
by our efforts? If not, to what extent, are environmental helps compatible with our 
intellectual virtue acquisition and treatment of vices (Chapter 2)? What if intellectual 
virtue cultivations are systematically in conflict with the pursuit of other values and, 
what can virtue epistemologists say about such conflicts (Chapter 3)? Becoming more 
epistemically self-reliant, i.e., intellectual autonomy is demonstrably an epistemic 
value, but in the majority of cases, our epistemic enterprises are socially embedded 
and reliant upon other’s testimony. What kind of epistemic value are we to promote, 
say, when we cultivate intellectual humility (Chapter 4)? Are our epistemic vices 
always constructed individually? If there are vices primarily constructed by social 
oppressions then, do we need any different treatments to the vices of the socially 
oppressed from the non-oppressed and do we need any institutional interventions to 
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socially constructed vices (Chapter 5)? Exposure to exemplars is promoted as a 
representative way in which we could teach intellectual virtues to novices. But do 
people feel motivated to emulate the exemplar in the same way (Chapter 6)? In each 
chapter of my thesis, I will address these issues accordingly.  
    In the first chapter, I address the situationist critique with reference to empirical 
work in psychology. Situationists criticized the predictive and explanatory power of 
character traits and on this basis have criticized the empirical adequacy of moral virtue. 
Alfano (2013) has extended the situationist critique from virtue ethics to virtue 
epistemology. Virtue epistemology is criticized as empirically inadequate in light of the 
extent to which individuals are shown to be susceptible to seemingly trivial and 
epistemically irrelevant situational influences. I argue that Alfano’s attempted 
redeployment of the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology is on closer 
inspection not as straightforward as he claims. Various psychological studies (known 
as self-determination theory) which situationists have overlooked, suggest that 
virtuous motivation is causally efficacious in a way that favors the position of the virtue 
epistemology over the situationist. I will defend the empirical adequacy of virtue theory 
based on self-determination theory. When we afford closer attention to studies on the 
orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation 
have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: how much they 
influence upon whether we live a good life. 
    In the second chapter, I will address the problem of how we should consider our 
environmental influences on our virtue cultivation in relation to the concept of self and 
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responsibility. As shown in the chapter 1, the view that virtues are traits cultivated 
merely by one’s control has been criticized; instead, more theorists are inclined to 
hold that being in a well-designed environment is necessary for obtaining virtues. In 
her recent paper, Heather Battaly goes further, arguing that such a friendly 
environment is not only necessary but sufficient for virtue possession; her view is 
called personalist account of virtues and vices (Battaly 2015, 2016). I go against such 
a radical move. After demonstrating why establishing a friendly environment is now 
widely accepted as an essential element in virtue cultivation among virtue 
epistemologists, and reformulating Battaly’s argument for the personalist account of 
virtue and vice, I will first demonstrate that what Battaly has pointed out about vice 
could be consistent with the traditional view (responsibilist view) supplemented with 
other moral considerations. I argue that personalist vice overlooks the success 
component of virtue, and it contradicts the essential part of virtue understood as an 
achievement. I will show that some manipulation cases that personalists accept as 
responsible in line with attributability responsibility are problematic on the ground of 
attributability responsibility. I also argue that personalism contradicts the concept of 
self embedded in virtue epistemology. I believe that the concept of self now known as 
narrative self would help us understand the proper relation between our virtues and 
our environment. 
    In the third chapter, I will address the problem of the epistemic partiality of 
friendship. We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, more so than those who 
are not our friends. This imbalance in our doxastic attitude towards friends and non-
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friends is often called the epistemic partiality of friendship. The epistemic partiality of 
friendship is widespread and commonly observed in our daily lives, but whether or not 
it is a good practice is far less clear. Philosophical dialogue on the epistemic partiality 
of friendship for the past fifteen years has shown us that the solution to this puzzle 
cannot be straightforward. First, I will lay out the standard picture of the epistemic 
partiality of friendship. Second, I will summarize the arguments proposed by the main 
opponents of epistemic partiality, Jason Kawall (2013), Sanford Goldberg (2018), and 
Katherine Hawley (2014). I will analyze the nature of friendship as a dynamic process 
and point out that the current debate ignores some important aspects of friendship. I 
will outline potential arguments from epistemic injustice against epistemic partiality of 
friendship that I believe are as strong as the argument from friendship against 
evidentialism. I will provide three interpretations of my arguments. I will show that the 
argument from epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as it first appears. I 
will argue that this point leads us to an even more complicated debate about value 
pluralism. Finally, I will come back to the implication of this argument for virtue 
epistemology.   
    The aim of the fourth chapter is to apply the value of receptivity into virtue 
epistemology. I will first portrait what it means to know something first hand. I do this 
by way of addressing Elizabeth Fricker’s argument against the autonomous knower 
(E. Fricker 2006) and Duncan Pritchard’s argument on seeing things for oneself 
(Pritchard 2016). I address the social nature of our inquiry. Then, I ask the question 
of where we need to pursue epistemic autonomy. I will discuss how our “interests” 
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calls for first hand knowledge. In the final section, a value of intellectual receptivity will 
be introduced. I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity helps us realize the vice 
that the value of epistemic autonomy could not solely explain and better articulate 
some essential intellectual virtues. 
    In the fifth chapter, I introduce feminist standpoint theory (henceforth, standpoint 
theory, for short) into virtue epistemology. I will first briefly explain the core thesis of 
standpoint epistemology and suggest the complexity that the theory implies. If 
standpoint theory were on the right track, what can we say about virtue epistemology? 
Then, I will provide a schematic view of standpoint virtue epistemology. I will portray 
a possible scenario where social oppression promotes vices in different ways for the 
oppressed as for non-oppressed. I will address some institutional interventions to our 
cognition called “nudge” theory (especially, nudge-enhanced exemplar stories). 
Nudges might help cure our vices. However, I will leave some cautionary remarks on 
how to set up nudges considering social oppression. 
    In the sixth chapter, I aim to give suggestions in relation to emulation-based virtue 
theories which enable greater sophistication in our understanding of them, based on 
the study of imitation and emulation in psychology; second, I aim to engage with a 
diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in philosophy. To initiate the 
discussion, I first define emulation-based virtue theory. Then, the recent study of the 
influence of psychological distance on copying and learning behaviors will be 
addressed. Why diversification of exemplars is an attractive option for emulation-
based virtue theory will be presented. My view will be applied to the problem of 
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diversity and inclusion in philosophy. I argue that philosophers who endorse 
emulation-based virtue theory must also accept and promote diversification of those 
models that are emulated in society. Particularly in philosophy, this leads to the 
promotion of hiring people from underrepresented groups in the community. 
    In this way, in each chapter, I address different issues that virtue epistemology 
suffers from. Intellectually virtuous agents have been portrayed as too individualistic 
that the theorists have often failed to take human psychology and the social nature of 
our inquiry into account. They also have not addressed how other aspects of human 
flourishing are intertwined with epistemic goods. My thesis hopes to provide a more 
realistic and down-to-earth account of how we should pursue epistemic virtues and 





Chapter 1 Situationism, Virtue Epistemology, and Self-Determination Theory1 
0. Introduction  
Virtue ethicists believe that acquiring praiseworthy character traits like honesty and 
kindness is necessary if we are to flourish (e.g. Hursthouse 1999, 185). This position 
is often contrasted with other normative ethical views, in that it focuses on processes 
rather than consequences or rules. Recently, the notion of intellectual virtue has 
gained popularity in epistemology, especially with those epistemologists who regard 
intellectual virtues as offering new possibilities for addressing traditional 
epistemological problems within the theory of knowledge (e.g. Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 
2007, 2010; Greco 2010, 2012).2 The virtue-based approach in epistemology, known 
as virtue epistemology, is divided into two main camps: virtue reliabilism, and virtue 
responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists (e.g. Sosa 2010, 2015; Greco 1999, 2003, 2012) 
view intellectual virtues as reliable abilities or faculties, which qualify as intellectual 
virtues in so far as they predominantly issue epistemic goods such as knowledge, and 
allow one to achieve truth.3 Representative examples include perception, inference, 
and memory. Whereas virtue responsibilists (e.g. Axtell and Carter 2008; Baehr 2011; 
 
1 This chapter is an adapted version of my paper of the same name (Iizuka 2018), 
published in Synthese. 
2 To be more precise, intellectual virtues (or, epistemic virtues) were first introduced 
in epistemology by Sosa(1980). In this thesis, I focus on virtue responsibilism, with 
reference to Zagzebski’s (1996) ground-breaking book on virtue responsibilism. Virtue 
responsibilism traces its roots earlier, to Montmarquet (1992) and Code (1987) 
3 Recent work by Sosa places agential virtues in the reliabilist framework (Sosa 2015). 
The distinction between reliabilism and responsibilism becomes ever subtler; however, 
it is beyond the purview of this thesis.  
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Montmarquet 1992; R. C. Roberts and Wood 2007) regard intellectual virtues as 
intellectual character traits, typical examples of which include open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage and tenacity. Virtue responsibilists share the ideal that research 
on intellectual virtues will help us elucidate non-traditional epistemological problems; 
problems such as what kind of epistemic agents we ought to aim at becoming.4 
    The resurgence of virtue ethics has prompted criticism based on social 
psychological data. These data consist of a vast range of experimental results, which 
purport to show that our behavior is influenced to a significant extent by morally 
irrelevant factors.5 For instance, it was discovered that among bystanders hearing 
an epileptic seizure over earphones, subjects who believed that they were among 
other witnesses were less likely to seek help for the victim than were subjects who 
believed they were the only person in the experiment (Darley and Latané 1968). We 
believe it is morally right to help a person suffering from a seizure regardless of the 
fact there is a bystander close by. Such a factor is understood as “morally irrelevant” 
 
4 Virtue responsibilist Linda Zagzesbki goes further, using the study of intellectual 
virtues to answer traditional epistemological problems such as analysis of knowledge 
(Zagzebski 1996).  
5 The representative examples of situationist data are as follows: mood effects, 
bystander intervention, good Samaritan experiments, honesty and deception 
experiments in schoolchildren, Milgram experiments, and the Stanford prison 
experiment (Alzola 2008). See also (Darley and Batson 1973; Isen and Levin 1972; 
Latané and Rodin 1969; Milgram 1963; Zimbardo et al. 1973). Also, in this chapter, 
“situationist data” includes an even wider range of experimental results from social 
science in general. Such data also imply our behavior is widely and easily influenced 
by the subtle environmental factors surrounding us.  
 19 
by the experimenters; however, that is exactly what predicted people’s subsequent 
moral behavior.  
    This aforementioned group of philosophers, now known as situationists (e.g. 
Harman 1999; Doris 2002), argue that the psychological data according to which our 
behavior is significantly influenced by morally irrelevant factors is incompatible with 
the virtue ethicist’s description of moral virtues as cross-situationally coherent 
character traits (also known as global traits). They appeal to psychological data in 
combination with a particular interpretation of virtue theory and a particular 
methodological constraint on ethical theorizing to support skepticism about virtue. 
This constraint is called psychological realism: the idea that ethical reflection should 
be “predicated on a moral psychology bearing a recognizable resemblance to actual 
human psychologies” (Doris 2002, 112). If you are a psychological realist, then your 
normative ethical view should be constructed on well-entrenched psychological 
studies.6 Complying with this methodology, these philosophers claim that virtue ethics 
is empirically inadequate.7 If virtue responsibilism is an epistemological counterpart 
of virtue ethics, then it might be thought that the situationist critique of virtue ethics 
naturally extends to virtue responsibilism mutatis mutandis: if virtue ethics is 
empirically inadequate in light of the psychological data, then so is virtue 
responsibilism. As Mark Alfano (Alfano 2013) has recently argued, there are social 
 
6 Gilbert Harman argues against virtue ethics in a similar fashion (Harman 1999).  
7 In this thesis, I am not going against situationism simpliciter; rather, I aim to argue 
against the conclusion that the situationist data could invalidate virtue ethics. It is my 
view that situationist data and virtue theory are compatible.  
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psychological data implying epistemic virtues are rarely observed. In an experiment, 
subjects are asked to fix a candle to a corkboard in such a way that wax does not drip. 
They are given three items: a box of thumbtacks, matches, and a candle. Subjects 
who saw a comedy film or were given some candy before engaging in the task were 
more likely to give a proper and creative answer to the question: to empty the match 
box and tack it to the cork board (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki 1987). In this 
experiment, creative behavior was linked to mood elevators, and so our apparent 
intellectually virtuous behaviors are more aptly explained by situational factors than 
personal quality. Alfano infers from such data that virtue responsibilism is empirically 
inadequate.89 
    Is it really the case that virtue theory—I’ll use this term hereafter to refer to both 
responsibilist virtue epistemology and virtue ethics—is empirically inadequate? I will 
argue that the problem of this situationist debate lies in the fact that both camps hold 
 
8 In his book, Alfano criticizes virtue responsibilism as empirically inadequate, whilst 
also admitting that, with the help of appropriate environmental scaffoldings, people 
can act according to virtues (Alfano 2013, chapter 7). I agree with that virtuous acts 
are facilitated and inhibited by social environments (Alfano 2014b); what I am 
objecting in this chapter is his overly negative conclusion on intellectual virtues 
(inquiry responsibilism in his terminology) based on social psychological data. He 
takes this experiment as suggestive of how people behave under the influence of 
trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational factors such as mood; it shows how 
people tend to be swayed by emotional elevators. He generalized his critique so as 
to apply to various kinds of epistemic virtues, not just intellectual creativity. I explain 
why his objection to responsibilist epistemology is too strong, and not convincing in 
the later sections. 
9 Alfano also attacks the empirical adequacy of virtue reliabilism (Alfano 2014a), but 
it is beyond the purview of this thesis to go in depth with this debate. 
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different assumptions concerning the hard core of virtue theories: what makes virtue 
theory a virtue theory. Section 2 will address what the hard-core of virtue theory really 
amounts to. The hard-core involves motivational requirements and an inherent 
relation between virtues and a good life. Further, it is often claimed by situationists 
that virtue theory requires a commitment to a few theoretical assumptions such as 
explanatorism, egalitarianism, and consistency. They argue that situationist data 
invalidates these assumptions. In section 3, I will discuss the existing debate over the 
aforementioned theoretical assumptions shared by situationists. I will show that these 
assumptions do not have the strong theoretical implications on the hard-core of virtue 
theories that situationists claim they do, as well as showing what is missing in their 
argument. This first part of my thesis (Sects. 2 and 3) is aiming at articulating why the 
current debate is indecisive, and also at motivating why a further empirical data to 
support virtue theory is necessary. One way of doing this is to offer an empirically 
plausible theory supporting virtue theorists. The second part (Sect. 4, 5, 6) of my 
thesis introduces some empirical data supporting the virtue theoretical camp. One of 
my counter-arguments draws from recent psychological research on our motivation 
and passion, now known as self- determination theory. The group of psychologists 
working on this theory, believe that the orientation of our motivation predicts and 
explains some dispositions of our behavior and they believe that such orientation is 
inherently tied to our good life. Section 4 will introduce this theory and Sects. 5 and 6 
will focus on its implications for virtue theory and situationism respectively. My defense 
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of virtue theory leads to the conclusion that virtue theorists can be psychological 
realists in a different way to situationists.  
 
1. The hard core of virtue theory?  
Before scrutinizing the situationist debate, some clarification on the nature of virtue 
would be helpful. While it is impossible to pin down the common features shared by 
all virtue theorists, the virtue theories developed in the past few decades share a few 
core ideas about the psychology of our good character and the relation between virtue 
to our good life. In this section I will illustrate what the hard core of virtue theory 
amounts to in neo-Aristotelian virtue theories, broadly construed.  
    Virtues are known as excellent personal character traits; they are the traits that 
show our values, purposes, and motivations. As Linda Zagzebski famously put: 
virtues are “a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a 
characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in 
bringing about that end” (1996, 137). This definition reveals virtues are not just 
behavioral patterns. One characterization shared by virtue theorists is proper 
motivation. As virtue responsibilist Jason Baehr remarks:  
 
all intellectual virtues have in common something like a ‘love of truth’ or desire 
for knowledge, but that (b) each individual virtue has its own distinctive and 
more immediate focus or motivation-a focus or motivation on account of which 
it can be individuated from other intellectual virtues. But [...] the immediate focus 
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or concern characteristic of particular intellectual virtues is ‘grounded in’ or 
‘flows from’ the more basic concern with truth, knowledge, or the like. (Baehr 
2013, 100).  
 
For instance, in order for a subject to cultivate open-mindedness, she must be 
motivated by epistemic goods, e.g. knowledge. Because of this love of knowledge, 
the person forms an individual disposition of a cognitive detaching from a default 
cognitive standpoint (Baehr 2011,152–62). 1011  Therefore, according to virtue 
responsibilism, our psychological reason-responsiveness is the key for the acquisition 
of our intellectual virtues.  
    Along similar lines, virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) has emphasized 
the importance of being appropriately motivated by goods in moral virtue acquisition.12 
She maintains that the virtuous choose virtuous actions for their own sake. She 
elaborates on this idea:  
 
‘The virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions “for their own sake” means ‘the 
virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions for at least one of a certain type or 
 
10 “Love of knowledge” is here understood as a theoretical concept, rather than sheer 
attachment with our epistemically praiseworthy states. Our psychological states, that 
are being motivated by epistemic goods (knowledge, truth, wisdom, understanding, 
cognitive contact with reality) for their own sake, are important in a virtue 
epistemological light.  
11 See also Carter and Gordon (2014), for further discussion of open-mindedness.  
12 See also Adams (2006). 
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range of reasons, X’, where ‘the type or range X’ is typical of, and differs 
according to, whichever virtue is in question. What are reasons ‘typical of’ a 
virtue? They will be the sorts of reasons for which someone with a particular 
virtue, V, will do a V act. (Hursthouse 1999, 127–28).  
 
Let us call this condition, the motivation requirement. Unsurprisingly, the details of 
how to articulate this motivation requirement vary amongst virtue theorists. Settling 
this issue is beyond the purview of this thesis, however it is important to show some 
examples to see what is at issue among them.  
    First, it is helpful to describe what is not required by the motivation requirement. 
It is widely recognized that it is not necessary for the virtuous person to consciously 
deliberate the values of the traits in question when she acts. Virtue theorists regard 
such a requirement as too strong and psychologically overdemanding to be a 
necessary condition (Baehr 2013, 102). In addition, Hursthouse (1999, 132–36), 
points out there are some cases where apparent virtuous action (actions that appear 
to be what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances) fail to be genuinely 
virtuous. This will be the case when children, severely mentally handicapped people, 
and also, the case of people who act with an appropriate reason for virtue, yet in an 
uncharacteristic way (not from their dispositional character, they fail to be genuinely 
virtuous actions because their action is not their characteristic way of life). She 
summarizes what it is missing in these cases, namely the agent’s being “really 
committed” to the value of her V acts (Hursthouse 1999).  
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    In relation to this point, some virtue epistemologists detail further requirements for 
virtue. To be genuinely virtuous, the traits in question must be integrated into the 
person’s character in a relatively deep, enduring, and personal way (Baehr 2013, 103). 
Precisely, she ought to take a positive view of the trait, be aware of its value, and thus 
identify with the trait.13  
    One way of characterizing this integration is having a positive or negative attitude 
toward the actions. This last point reveals genuine virtue comes with emotional 
reactions. A genuinely kind person would help people in need not only because she 
wants to, but because she is also happy to do it. A virtuous person would be angry at 
unjust behavior in his society, and rightly so. The motivational requirement not only 
tracks the proper reasons for virtuous action, it also tracks our proper emotional 
reactions.  
    Another important point of agreement amongst virtue theorists is a broader 
theoretical aim. It is often claimed that virtue theory is primarily aimed at answering 
how one should live, in reference to virtues. Merritt believes this is the principal 
normative claim shared by virtue theorists: “[Virtue theorists believe] the life that offers 
the surest chance of being, from the point of view of the person who lives it, a very 
good life, is the life of having the virtues” (Merritt 2000, 370). Virtues are a necessary 
 
13  Furthermore, Baehr emphasized the importance of a person becoming the 
significant part of the explanation of her possession of the traits in question (Baehr 
2013, 104). In this way, if an apparent virtuous trait T turns out to be merely infused 
by her community or parents, and the possession of the traits are solely explainable 
by these external factors, Baehr thinks that we rightly dismiss this case as not virtuous 
because the trait is not creditable to the person.  
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component for attaining the good life, and there is an inherent relation between the 
two. All the luck and contingency in our lives aside, from an agent’s point of view, 
pursuing virtues is a necessary part of living a good life. This view is widespread in 
virtue theory broadly construed (Hursthouse 1999; Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011).  
    As we have seen, the hard core of virtue theory is to have both a rich motivation 
requirement, and a commitment to the inherent relation between virtue and a good 
life. The existing situationist debate seeks to invalidate these core commitments, both 
through appeal to the situationist data and by calling on some assumptions they 
believe we as virtue theorists have. In the next section, I’ll address these issues and 
show how the situationists’ argument is not convincing enough to reach their 
conclusion.  
 
2. Implication of situationists arguments  
According to situationists, virtue theories have the following theoretical commitments: 
explanatorism, egalitarianism, and consistency (Doris 2002; Alfano 2013). It is true, 
as the situationist presents, that these three theoretical commitments make virtue 
theorists extremely vulnerable to situationist attack; however, it is not clear if virtue 
theorists are in fact agreed upon these commitments, nor if such commitments 
necessarily follow from the hard core of virtue theory. In this section, I will give a closer 




What sort of roles are virtues supposed to serve in virtue theories? Alfano emphasizes 
that the apparent advantage of virtue ethics is its “empirically adequate moral 
psychology” (Alfano 2012, 231). Situationists maintain that virtues are supposed to 
play an important part in the explanation and prediction of human behavior. As Doris 
puts it:  
 
Attributing a quality of character invokes a depiction of behavior and 
psychology: The brave person acts distinctively, with distinctive motives, affects, 
and cognitions. Attributions also underwrite explanation and prediction: 
Knowing something about a person’s character is supposed to render their 
behavior intelligible and help observers determine what behaviors to expect 
(Doris 2002, 5).  
     
Let us call this view explanatorism: virtues are supposed to serve as an explanation 
and prediction of our behavior. The above line of reasoning, together with the 
psychological data introduced earlier, can be reconstructed in the following manner.14  
i. Virtue theory is correct only if virtue is to serve as the primary explanation and  
prediction of human behavior in general;  
 
14 Alfano also made this explicit: “Extrapolating, I will suggest that if similar arguments 
apply to the other global virtues, then much of our epistemic conduct can be explained 
without reference to such dispositions. If this is right, inquiry responsibilism cannot 
claim empirical adequacy” (Alfano 2012, 241).  
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ii. Social psychology gives us a genuine explanation and prediction of our 
behavior in general, which is not compatible with the properties involved in 
virtue;  
iii. Thus, it is not the case that virtue theory is correct.  
It is true that the psychological data implies the general dispositions of people’s 
behavior, and, as a result, our behavior might be more aptly explained and predicted 
by situational factors than by appealing to virtue theory. To put this differently, 
situationists believe that, according to the virtue theorist, virtues are supposed to 
explain and predict general human behavior.  
    Virtue theorists could answer such a worry in two ways: first, the simple response 
would be to claim that virtue theory has a different theoretical target than situationists 
have demonstrated. Virtues are aiming at describing and predicting the behavior of 
those who are admirable, but not normal human beings. However, the actions and life 
of the virtuous can tell us something about the non-virtuous (e.g. what non-virtuous 
ought to look into.) So, in this sense, predictions and explanations of non-virtuous 
people is what this theory is trying to achieve. Virtues explain the dispositions of the 
virtuous; they give us some understanding of why a virtuous agent would behave in 
a certain way in a certain situation, or why a non-virtuous agent ought to act in a 
certain way, in a certain situation. Explaining virtuous behavior through virtue is 
compatible with most of us not exhibiting this behavior.  
    Situationists might not be convinced by such simple reply. They emphasized the 
fact virtues and virtue-related terms are widespread in our languages, and we do have 
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practices of praising and blaming normal people with such terms. Hence, based on 
situationist findings, they claim that our virtue and vice attribution are systematically 
erroneous (because in many cases where we make such attribution, it is situational 
factor that primarily explains our behavior, not our character traits). And from such 
errors, situationists think we ought to disregard the virtue paradigm all together. The 
problem of this kind of criticism is that there is a huge gap between the ideas that our 
moral practice is in error and that the moral theory is in error. What situationists have 
so far demonstrated is support for the former, not the latter.  
    Secondly, the sort of explanatory and predictive power at issue is very short-
sighted; research focuses on our immediate behavior influenced by the environment 
close to it. It is underdeveloped if virtues have explanatory and predictive power in a 
long run. If the hard core of virtue psychology was shown to make a difference in 
people’s behavior, the strength of the situationist critique regarding explanatorism 
would be substantially weakened. I will revisit this point in the second half of this 
chapter.  
Egalitarianism  
Closely related to explanatorism, is a view called egalitarianism, which is the thesis 
that virtues are instantiated by many ordinary people (Doris 2002). According to the 
characterization of virtue theory offered by Alfano, egalitarianism is widespread 
among virtue theorists (Alfano 2011, 2012, 2013). This point, I believe, is doubtful, 
and so suggests an uncharitable reading of virtue theory on behalf of the situationist. 
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Egalitarianism is not necessary for the hard-core of Virtue Theory; and virtue as an 
ideal does not suffer from the problems posed by situationists.  
    The first problem related to the egalitarianism assumption relates to the difficulties 
of virtue acquisition. It is hard to deny the difficulties of virtue cultivation. Prominent 
virtue theorists have in various places explicitly conceded that genuine virtue is hard 
to come by. On this point, Aristotle first noted that becoming genuinely virtuous is 
extremely difficult (NE 1106b; 1109b). Heather Battaly also summarized that the 
egalitarian view is not at all widespread among virtue epistemologists (Battaly 2008, 
660).  
    Being egalitarian in Alfano’s sense may not be necessary for advocating virtue 
theory; we could maintain the hard core of virtue theory without committing to 
egalitarianism. A representative case by Zagzebski is exemplarist virtue theory. 
According to this paradigm, virtues are assumed to be possessed by a few exemplars 
in a society, and individuals refer to these exemplars when they emulate virtues. (It is 
even possible for a fictional character to take this role.) (Zagzebski 2010). It may be 
true that some virtue theorists take for granted that virtue is realized often by normal 
individuals [such as MacIntyre (1981)]; but it is entirely within the purview of available 
options for a virtue theorist to simply revise, rather than abandon, this theory in the 
face of situationist critique.  
    Given that virtue possession is a matter of degree, it is possible to hold 
simultaneously that genuine virtue is hard to come by and that virtue is at least partly 
instantiated by some ordinary people. This moderate view is compatible with Alfano 
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and Doris’ supposition. It is far from clear that virtue theorists should be understood 
as egalitarian in Alfano’s sense.15  
    The second problem with the egalitarian assumption can be subsumed under a 
more general and typical reply on behalf of the virtue theorist camp; which is that 
virtues are what we should aim at, or our ideals, not what we usually achieve. Doris 
and Alfano are skeptical about this style of reply.  
    Alfano questions the adequacy of virtue theory by making reference to the ought-
can implication. He maintains, “if virtue is rare and exceedingly difficult to attain, it 
might be that they[people] really cannot” (Alfano 2014a, 108). According to 
Sreenivasan, there is a way we could understand the hidden assumption of 
situationism, which is as follows: “an ideal of virtuous character has normative 
purchase only if it is easy for the average human being to acquire the relevant 
character trait” (Sreenivasan 2013, 297). It is not clear why situationists hold this 
hidden assumption, and situationists need further supports to make this case.  
 
15 King recently explicitly opposes the situationist conclusion by proposing that “even 
in some of the most ‘situationist-friendly’ studies, 13–20% of the subjects were 
reported to exhibit the relevant behavior. If we take the studies at face value, and their 
results as representative of the population at large, there may still be hundreds of 
millions of people who exhibit responsibilist virtues” (King 2014, 252). If virtue theories 
describe the properties of the disposition of those 13–20% of human beings, there is 
no reason to doubt that the descriptions might help the rest of us who are striving for 
virtues. The more precise descriptions of virtues we find, the better the possibilities of 
appreciating those virtues. Thus, we might be able to encourage further investigation 
on virtues, rather than giving up on this endeavor.  
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    This hidden assumption turns out to be even more questionable, when we realize 
being virtuous and acquiring virtue are two distinct processes, which need distinct 
attention. The acquiring process is generally regarded to be as important as the 
acquired state in virtue theory; consider that virtues are often described as habituated 
character traits. It is articulated that virtue is an acquired trait as opposed to an innate 
ability (Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). In the situationist debate, the static side of virtue 
has been at the heart of the argument. It remains mysterious as to how situationist 
data mostly showing that “we are not virtuous” could invalidate the cultivation of 
virtues; in other words, the empirical inadequacy of striving for virtues is yet to be 
achieved.  
    It is true that virtues are exceedingly difficult to attain, and that this appears to 
contradict the ought-can implication. This is however, a common predicament shared 
by any normative theory; it is also exceedingly difficult to comply with what 
consequentialist or deontic ethicists tell you to do. In so far as the criticism at issue is 
just an expression of this ubiquitous kind of pessimism, it is not a serious worry for 
the virtue theorist in particular that virtue theory falls prey to a general skepticism 
about moral theory.16  
    Related to this point, another situationist Doris (2002, Chap. 6–7) would argue 
that virtue as a deliberate ideal is not a welcoming revision for virtue theorists because 
 
16  This is, in fact, similar to a famous objection to utilitarianism known as the 
demandingness objection: that it is too demanding by Bernard Williams (Williams 
1985). See also Singer (1972).  
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it would undermine the advantages of virtue theory over other normative ethical 
theories. This problem is called “theoretical mediation”. Doris states:  
 
“worries about theoretical mediation” (see Railton 1984) are reintroduced on the 
idealized conception. One attraction of character-based approaches is that they 
appear to escape worries about what we might call the “creepiness” of theory- 
driven moral reflection; the decreased authenticity and increased alienation that 
are supposed to afflict theoretical approaches to morality (Doris 2002, 152).  
 
Fair enough, if virtue theory falls back to deliberate ideal, and requires people to reflect 
on a virtuous exemplar when they behave, then it reintroduces the problem of 
theoretical mediation other normative ethics have suffered from. As Stocker famously 
noted, visiting a friend in hospital because it is your duty does not sound quite right 
(Stocker 1976); as does the case in which you visit because that is what morally 
virtuous people would do.  
    This criticism is, on closer inspection, not entirely clear. It involves another hidden 
assumption: if virtue is an idealized concept, virtue would be only acquired through 
deliberation on the theory. Remember here that virtue involves both cognitive and 
emotional factors. In a recent paper, virtue epistemologist Battaly introduced an 
“emotional contagion” as the key phenomena in rehabilitating our vices (Battaly 2016). 
Emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process that enables us to catch 
emotions from other people. Her suggestion is to put vicious people in a friendly 
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environment so that they can catch the virtuous emotions of exemplars via contagion. 
Her suggestion of rehabilitating vicious people through the emotional (anti-
intellectual) part of virtue is illuminating; it implies many options are available in our 
virtue cultivation. It is entirely within the purview of virtue theory to start cultivating 
virtue in a non-cognitive way, as well as to simultaneously pursue virtue as an ideal 
in a cognitive way. The strength of the argument of theoretical mediation is much 
weaker than Doris has assumed.  
Consistency  
It is assumed by situationists that virtuous people respond the same way whenever 
they have the same reason (Alfano 2012, 230).17 As we have addressed earlier, this 
point is widely agreed upon by virtue theorists. However, the situationist position on 
this issue has not been sufficiently addressed, which has caused tremendous 
confusion in the debate. The situationists’ statement that virtue ethics is empirically 
invalidated was based on the data showing many people do not act morally in a cross-
situationally consistent way (Doris 2002; Sreenivasan 2002, 2008; Webber 2006). 
Much of the discussion over the consistency of our behavior was about the 
interpretations of situationist data, such as whether those situationist data with one-
 
17 As a part of criticism on the consistency of virtues, it could be argued that virtue 
theorists admit of the unity of Virtue. In believing this, Doris states that the virtue 
theorists commit to an evaluative integration (Doris 2002, 20–22). However, the unity 
thesis is a highly controversial claim that not every virtue ethicist advocates. I do not 
go into this debate here, as I believe it is entirely within the purview of available options 
for a virtue theorist to simply abandon it (Sreenivasan 2009).  
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time performance are sufficient for the claim that there are no such thing as cross-
situational character traits (Sreenivasan 2008, 2013).  
    Yet not enough attention has been paid to the theoretically rich notion of the 
motivation requirement of virtues. Though behavioral consistency is important even 
among virtue theorists, the stronger emphasis is rather put on the fact that virtuous 
people choose their acts for the right reasons and hence, they act consistently. In 
such a frame-work, consistent actions are only the result of the reason-
responsiveness of the virtuous. Whether the situationist empirical data on our actions 
reveals the empirical inadequacy of virtues is, on closer inspection, not as clear as it 
appears, because they always suffer from a “masking problem”. Sreenivasan points 
this out through reference to classic situationist experiments on honesty conducted 
by Hartshorne and May (1928). He argues, students in these experiments were given 
multiple “honesty-related” tests. Two actions were fixed as cases of dishonest 
behavior by the experimenter: taking change left on the table in an empty classroom, 
and a situation presenting an opportunity to make a false report. However, in laying 
out the concrete situations, reasons for action can be masked: it might have been the 
case that some people had a policy of “finders keepers” in the former scenario, and 
that making a false report could serve to prevent another child from getting into trouble 
in the latter. In which cases, subjects are not necessarily agreed that the situations 
are “honesty eliciting” (Sreenivasan 2013, 301–3).  
    If showing the empirical inadequacy of virtue theory is what situationists are 
ultimately trying to achieve, the fruitful outcome should come from the empirical study 
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of our reason-responsiveness, rather than from single-pass behavioral differences.18 
In saying this, I do not disagree with situationists in that situationist data implies that 
the majority of us are not acting morally in certain situations. Rather, what I would like 
to emphasize is that these data remain ambiguous due to the nature of the empirical 
setting; it is always open for virtue theorists to interpret the study charitably, thereby 
making the debate indecisive.  
    In sum, the situationist’s criticism of the empirical adequacy of virtue was based 
on an uncharitable reading of virtue theory. Egalitarianism is not a necessary 
component of advocating virtue theory and it is not entirely clear explanatorism is 
shown to be threatening for virtue theorists. It is true that people behave morally and 
epistemically in a non cross-situationally consistent way, but it is yet to be shown how 
this fact undermines the validity of the process of acquiring virtues.  
    The first part of this chapter has shown that the situationist debate is perplexed 
due to the ambiguity of interpretation and theoretical implication of the data, as well 
as strong assumptions of virtue theory by situationists. It is also true that there was 
no positive empirical data from the virtue theorists; all we could hope for from them 
was the reinterpretation of situationists’ data and arguments, making the whole debate 
 
18 Candace Upton also identifies this problem when she writes: “empirical research 
would have to establish either that most humans are not in a virtuous frame of mind, 
or that while many humans are in a virtuous frame of mind, they also possess 
additional adverse mental features that would preclude their virtuous behavior” (Upton 
2009, 182). 
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indecisive, at best. In the second part of this chapter, I will introduce some recent 
developmental psychology as support for the empirical adequacy of virtue theory.19  
 
3. Self-determination theory  
We have seen in the earlier section that the proper motivation is widely accepted as 
a necessary condition of virtue. What virtue theorists need is empirical support for 
such a commitment: namely that character traits are responsive to our motivation. If 
it turns out that our motivation is causally ineffective in our character cultivation, then 
this accordingly counts against the empirical adequacy of virtue theory.  
    An important question becomes: how has it been proven that we form our dis- 
positions based on our motivations? Many virtue theorists implicitly take this as a 
prerequisite for their theory. However, if it is not feasible to show that this is the case 
on any justificatory ground, then an important assumption of the view is mistaken. In 
 
19  There is also a situationist debate over the Big Five: five scores (openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) that are given to 
us that tell us a great deal about the ways we behave through our lives (Nettle 2007). 
(Seee also, Judge et al. 1999; Mendiburo‐Seguel, Páez, and Martínez‐Sánchez 2015). 
Miller argues the Big Five contradicts virtue theory because those personality traits 
implied by the data are relatively fixed, tied to our genetic makeup, and variations in 
traits are produced as a result of natural selection (Nettle 2006; Cravchik and 
Goldman 2000), hence, such traits are not suitable for our ethical evaluation as virtue 
theorist assume (Miller 2014). While settling this ongoing debate is beyond the 
purview of this thesis, even if we are born with natural temperaments, based on such 
temperaments, the actual behaviors are up to us. Outlets of our actual behaviors, 
together with our goals and values in life is what matters when we judge ourselves to 
be morally, or epistemically, praiseworthy, and this crucial part of virtue theory seems 
unscathed in the face of their critique (See also, Nettle 2007).  
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this section, empirical support for this assumption of virtue theory will be introduced, 
and in particular, I will engage with the psychological study of our motivation.  
    The series of works on self-determination theory (henceforth, SDT; also known as 
the study of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation) initiated by Ryan and Deci (e.g. Ryan and 
Deci 2000), suggests that it is not the quantity or magnitude of our motivation, but the 
quality of motivation which matters with respect to predicting action and the outcome 
of our behavior. This quality of motivation is more commonly identified as the 
orientation of our motivation. The most basic distinction made with regards to the 
orientation of our motivation is between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic 
motivation is motivation to do something because it is inherently interesting or 
enjoyable, whereas extrinsic motivation is motivation to do something because it 
leads to some further desirable outcome. SDT proposes that our performances are 
significantly enhanced when intrinsically rather than merely extrinsically motivated 
(Ryan and Deci 2000).  
    Already, in the early stages of motivation studies, the empirical results indicated 
that those who are extrinsically motivated to solve certain puzzles (e.g. under the 
threat of punishment, or having the payment of money contingent upon their 
performances), are less likely to perform puzzle solving activity than subjects who 
solved the same puzzles without threats or rewards but who were motivated by pure 
interest in its activity (Deci 1972, 220). According to Deci, when subjects are 
extrinsically motivated, their interest in the activity (the inclination of engagement of 
the activity) is diminished.  
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    A more recent study on the orientation of our motivation indicates that extrinsic 
motivations can issue very different results depending on how far the motivation for 
one’s behavior emanates from one’s self.20 For instance, when an individual has 
identified the importance of the activity, integrating this importance fully to herself, this 
type of extrinsic motivation is called integration. And integration together with intrinsic 
motivation, are grouped as “autonomous”, “self-determined” motivation. Empirical 
studies have shown that the qualitative differences between the extrinsic motivations 
also explain the different outcomes of extrinsically motivated behavior.  
    The latest study on SDT extends to our passion. Vallerand defines passion as a 
strong inclination toward a self-defining activity that one likes, finds important and 
meaningful, and in which one invests time and energy (Vallerand et al. 2003, 757). In 
this paradigm, researchers found that our passion could be shaped into different 
forms. One of these forms is called harmonious passion; it results from an 
autonomous internalization of the activity into the person’s identity and self (Vallerand 
2012, 47–48). According to Vallerand, the difference between self-determined 
motivation and harmonious passion comes down to how the activity is self-defining. 
 
20 It is known that external motivation constitutes five different kinds: amotivation, the 
state of lacking intention to act; external regulation, behaviors performed to satisfy an 
external demand or to obtain an externally imposed reward; introjection, behaviors 
with a type of internal regulation yet quite controlling—performing actions upon feeling 
the pressure to avoid guilt or anxiety, or to attain ego-enhancement or pride; 
identification, behaviors in which a person has identified with its personal importance 
and has accepted its regulation as being his or her own; and integration: behaviors in 
which identified regulations have been fully assimilated to the self (Ryan and Deci 
2000, 61–62).  
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Passion is directed particularly towards identity-defining activities such as 
professional sports and music (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand 2011; 
Vallerand et al. 2008), while self-determined motivation is not.  
    Empirical results suggest that when people have a harmonious passion toward 
certain activities, they are more inclined to achieve high-level performances. 
Bonneville-Roussy conducted a study on 187 professional musicians, mostly from 
Canada and America (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand 2011). The subjects 
answered a questionnaire to determine if their passion toward music is harmonious 
(e.g. “playing my instrument is in harmony with the other activities in my life”) or not 
(e.g. “I have difficulties controlling my urge to play my instrument”). They were also 
asked what their goals of engagement in playing an instrument are (e.g. “it is important 
for me to develop my skills as thoroughly as possible”), and how often they 
deliberately practice (e.g. “when I do my practice, I slowly repeat difficult excerpts”). 
What this suggests is that musicians with harmonious passion were more inclined to 
have a goal of improving their ability and master new skills (mastery goals). Such 
goals were associated with the type of training in which the explicit aim is to improve 
performance, such as repeating the difficult part of the song (deliberate practice), and, 
such training predicted the numbers of solo concerts given by the subjects, which 
implied a higher level of performance.21 Generally put, harmonious passion leads to 
 
21 In order to avoid the performance variable being solely a reflection of the number 
of years of music involvement, the numbers of concerts given by participants was 
divided by the numbers of years of experience (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and 
Vallerand 2011, 130).  
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mastery goals: people aim to learn and eventually master new skills. Mastery goals 
then predict deliberate practices, which are positively associated with higher 
performance over time (Vallerand 2012, 49).22  
    What this suggests is that SDT has theoretical implications which support the 
motivational requirement of virtue theory. The experiments designed and conducted 
on SDT are feasible only if it is possible that our behavioral outcomes change in a 
way that is sensitive to the orientation of our motivation. In other words, it shows our 
behavior is influenced in a systematic way by our evaluations of our activities. SDT 
shows that our motivation plays an important explanatory and predictive role in terms 
of our behavior. As Vallerand states: “motivational process matter greatly with respect 
to living a meaningful life” (Vallerand 2012, 49).  
    It is our behaviors, and the dispositions of our behaviors, that are significantly 
affected by the orientation of our motivation. The fruitful results of the SDT research 
paradigm are suggestive of empirical support for the motivational requirement. The 
relation between the two theories will be addressed in more detail in the next section.  
  
4. SDT and virtue theory  
In this section, theoretical implications of SDT for virtue theory will be addressed. Both 
SDT and virtue theory are theories of meaningful life. There is strong empirical support 
for SDT that also lends weight to virtue theory. The SDT research program has 
 
22 Obsessive passion predicts mixed achievement processes; some are adaptive and 
others are maladaptive (Vallerand 2012). 
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produced data showing self-determined agents experience high performance in 
important domains of our lives. In the last part of this section, some critical evaluation 
of SDT will be also provided.  
SDT as a formal theory of good life  
First, it should be noted that the structural similarity between SDT and virtue theory is 
beyond appearance. Ryan and his colleagues have explicitly noticed the intimate 
relationship between SDT and Aristotelian ethics (eudemonism), and they accordingly 
depict SDT as a formal theory of eudaimonia. They maintain:  
 
“[Many of the] elements in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia [living well, 
being actively engaged in excellent activity, reflectively making decisions, and 
behaving voluntarily toward ends that represent the realization of our highest 
human natures] are at the core of self-determination theory’s (SDT’s) 
conceptions of wellness”(Ryan, Huta, and Deci 2008, 145–47).  
 
Therefore, SDT is trying to construct an empirical theory of eudaimonia. The 
connection between virtue theory and SDT I have proposed is not just superficial, but 
rather embedded in the SDT framework.23 As addressed in the first section, the hard 
 
23 This point implies the possibility that SDT might be able to shed some theoretical 
light on virtue theory, especially on the nature of the motivational requirement; and 
that virtue epistemology can in turn suggest that moral goods and epistemic goods 
might be truly worthwhile and are of inherent or intrinsic human worth. In future 
research, virtue theory will go hand in hand with SDT.  
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core of virtue theory was the shared belief that virtue is necessary for leading a good 
life; this inherent relation between virtue and a good life is also found in SDT. This 
implies the more positive outcomes we obtain from SDT, the more likely that virtue 
theoretical assumptions are shown to be on the right track.  
    Secondly, as a formal theory of eudaimonia, SDT places a focus on subjects who 
engage in desirable behaviors in a variety of contexts. SDT is applied to domains such 
as sports, subjective-wellbeing, healthcare, and education (Ryan and Deci 2000).24 
The importance of achievement in these domains is commonly acknowledged. Here 
education is particularly salient. The SDT literature on education suggests the virtue 
acquisition process (cultivation of certain attitudes, abilities, dispositions and 
motivations) is one that runs parallel to education. Virtue acquisition is comprised of 
the cultivation of various abilities, and education shares this ideology.25 Moreover, our 
understanding of successful or ideal agents in education is commonly shared, with 
less controversy compared to other domains, such as morality. In terms of morality, 
what moral success consists of is itself a central topic in theoretical ethics, and 
ethicists do not always agree on this matter. However, it is less problematic to talk 
about educational success; denying the idea that success in education contributes 
towards our meaningful life is especially controversial in the modern world. According 
 
24 Intrinsic motivation and harmonious passion are known to predict subjective well-
being and good mental health (Niemiec and Ryan 2009).  
25 For instance, Pritchard makes it explicit that our educational goal is not just the 
acquisition of knowledge, but rather the cultivation of students’ understanding. 
Understanding in this sense demands an elevated level of ability (Pritchard 2013). 
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to the studies on SDT and its application to education, students who are regulated by 
autonomous motivations (i.e., intrinsic and integrated) are more likely to experience 
positive consequences at school (Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008, 234).26 That is, 
“doing school activities out of choice and/or pleasure will produce higher levels of 
achievement than engaging in school activities for external reasons and/or internal 
pressure” (Guay and Vallerand 1996, 225). Self-determined motivation predicts 
students’ persistence in high school and college. In one study, students answered a 
questionnaire on educational activities during the semester in the class, and the 
motivational profiles of those who dropped out of the course were assessed at the 
end of semester. Students whose answers indicated they were intrinsically motivated 
to study were less likely to have dropped out of high school (Vallerand and 
Blssonnette 1992; Vallerand, Fortier, and Guay 1997).27  
    Another connected and interesting result involves creativity. According to 
psychologists, creativity involves the development of a novel product, idea, or solution 
to a problem that is of value to the individual and/or the larger social group 
(Hennessey and Amabile 2010). A classic study conducted by Amabile suggests 
subjects who have intrinsic motivations for writing poems were found to be more 
creative than their extrinsically motivated counterparts (Amabile 1985). In more recent 
 
26 These consequences can take different forms: behavioral, cognitive, or affective 
(Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008).  
27 It has also been shown that autonomous motivation predicted greater achievement 
in education over a one-year period (Guay and Vallerand 1996). Note that this finding 
is a long-term experiment and thus implies the orientation of our motivation influences 
not only our single actions, but our behavioral dispositions.  
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studies on identified (self-determined) motivation and creativity, undergraduate 
students in social science courses were asked to join an experiment. They first 
answered a questionnaire on the importance of various values as a guiding principle 
in their lives; subsequently, they participated in creativity-relevant tasks (math, art, 
and verbal). In an artistic task, participants were given 10 min to create small drawings 
with the following titles (e.g. circle, rectangle, person, and motion). Some 
undergraduate research assistants were trained as judges. Judges were instructed to 
employ their own subjective understanding of creativity to rate each product relative 
to the others. They used a rating scale ranging from not at all creative to highly 
creative. For the titles such as “circle” and “triangle,” many participants drew the 
shapes in a straightforward manner; however, other participants created drawings that 
displayed alternative, nongeometric interpretations (e.g., a circle of friends, a 
relationship triangle). This demonstrated an unusual perspective on the shapes, and 
such drawings were evaluated as creative by the judges. This study showed that 
subjects who held an identified motivation toward the value of creativity were judged 
to be more creative in the subsequent task (Kasof et al. 2007). It is striking that our 
creative behavior is observed by agents with autonomous orientation of motivation, 
because, as we have addressed earlier, creativity is one of the intellectual virtues 
Alfano has shown to be explained and predicted by situational factors (Alfano 2012, 
235). Here, the SDT data casts doubt on the situationists’ overly strong and negative 
conclusion, implying that our virtue could explain and predict our behavior in a 
different way from situationist on the same phenomena.  
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    Another empirical result comes from a study on our passion. Young competitive 
water-polo and synchronized swimming athletes were asked to join an experiment 
(Vallerand et al. 2008). These athletes were high-level performers; at the time of this 
study, they had been engaged in their sport very seriously. 28  These swimmers 
answered a questionnaire at the beginning of the season (Time 1). This assessment 
examined their passion, measuring their agreement with statements such as 
“synchronized swimming is in harmony with other activities in my life”.29 Swimmers 
were also asked about their goals of engagement in the sport (e.g. “It is important to 
develop my skills as thoroughly as possible this season”). Four months later (Time 2), 
swimmers were asked how much they engaged in individual deliberate practices such 
as the exercise of concentration and reflection to have a better control during the 
game. Finally, at the end of the season (Time 3), their coaches assessed and 
answered a questionnaire on the performance of individual players relative to others. 
They were asked to answer questions such as, “Since the beginning of the season, 
compared to the other athletes of his or her age, this athlete has been performing well 
under pressure”. The results indicated that swimmers who believed playing their sport 
(e.g., water-polo) was in harmony with other activities in their life, tended to believe it 
was important to develop their skills as thoroughly as possible during the season. 
 
28 According to the researcher, the subjects had played the sport an average of 5.21 
years, 4.73 times per week, each time for an average of 110.32 min (Vallerand et al. 
2008).  
29 At time 1, assessment was also conducted on their life satisfaction (e.g. Swimmers 
were asked if “I’m satisfied with my life”). And as expected, the harmonious passion 
predicted the higher subjective well-being among swimmers (Vallerand et al. 2008).  
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Further, this goal correlated with the swimmer undertaking additional practice 
independent of the supervision of their coaches. Swimmers who engaged in 
deliberate practices were more likely to be judged as having better performed by their 
coaches at the end of the season. The researchers maintain that by holding 
harmonious passion, these swimmers did not experience the need to compare 
themselves to others, and did not have internal or external pressure to practice, 
known as maladaptive for high-quality performances (Vallerand et al. 2008).  
    Thus, SDT has shown that the orientation of our motivation has a strong influence 
on the achievement of desirable educational goals. This is relevant to virtue 
epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemologists ask what is necessary for 
individuals to become responsible, intellectual agents. They submit that this is 
achievable via the cultivation of intellectual virtues. In essence, as we have already 
seen in the second section, this is best attained when we are motivated by epistemic 
goods for their own sake. In other words, cultivating individual character traits derived 
from these motivations is equivalent to internalizing the value of the activity to the self. 
These conditions, imposed upon us, have significant overlap with the motivational 
structure of agents with autonomous motivation and harmonious passion who are led 
to desirable outcomes in SDT research. We have already seen that students with 
desirable educational outcomes tend to be motivated by educational activities in 
themselves, or that they have internalized educational values. In so doing, they de 
facto meet the conditions imposed upon us by virtue epistemologists to be responsible 
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inquirers. Thus, it can be inferred that these empirical findings support in an important 
respect the adequacy of the empirical component of (intellectual) virtues.  
Some critical evaluation of SDT  
I should also raise some critical awareness of the problems on the current framework 
of SDT for facilitating future research between SDT and virtue theory.  
    First, one might be skeptical about the empirical validity of first-person data such 
as first person reports of motivational profile and deliberate practice in SDT. Due to 
the nature of the SDT, it is inevitable that people’s motivational orientations are based 
on first-person introspective reports (e.g. answering questionnaires). One might also 
worry that such reports might not accurately represent people’s internal state. Such a 
worry often comes from a position that introspective reports are private rather than 
public, and that science should be carried out with public method. However, Piccinini 
points out that a scientific method is public if and only if, any investigator can apply 
the method to the same questions, and that the method generates the same results 
regardless of who is applying it (Piccinini 2003b). He goes on to say that introspective 
reports accord with these methods, as “psychologists do not ask introspecting 
subjects to collect data by introspecting; rather, they record the subjects’ reports, and 
then the psychologists themselves extract data from those reports by following public 
procedures that are analogous to those followed by other scientists in generating their 
results” (Piccinini 2003b, 609). 30 Moreover, even some situationist data includes 
 
30 This is an ongoing debate in philosophy of science. See also Dennett (1991), and 
Piccinini (2003a, 2003b, 2010).  
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introspective reports as part of their experiments. In the infamous Samaritan 
experiment, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire on their religiosity 
(Darley and Batson 1973). While there might be room for improvement in 
experimental settings in the future, in the current debate, experiments including 
introspective reports do not seem to undermine the legitimacy of arguments.  
    My second worry for the current SDT program is a possible oversimplification of 
our motivational orientation. It seems a perfectly feasible explanation that a person 
could be motivated to swim because it is inherently interesting as well as out of 
concern for her health. In SDT our motivational profile is pushed into one category 
among a few different profiles, and it remains unexplained why two motivational 
profiles never coexist.  
    Related to this point, it appears there is an important dissimilarity between SDT 
and virtue theory. The lack of a developmental sequence in the internalization of the 
value of an activity in SDT framework might worry virtue theorists. It is a necessary 
part of the cultivation of virtue, that the value of a worthwhile activity is integrated into 
the self. A non-virtuous agent learns and gradually integrates the value of an activity 
into their self, and finds their activity pleasurable. Whereas SDT seems open to the 
possibility of us being natural-born moral saints, or natural-born epistemic sages. The 
problem lies in the current model in that it is a theoretically feasible option on SDT for 
a person to be intrinsically motivated towards an activity without the value of the 
activity being integrated whilst pursuing a meaningful life. In the standard Aristotelian 
model, both motivational profiles are vitally important in acquiring virtues. Virtue 
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acquisition requires an agent to both be intrinsically motivated towards moral and 
epistemic activity, as well as integrating the value of activity into their self.  
    In this section, I have addressed some theoretical implications of SDT. SDT, as a 
formal theory of a good life, has an intrinsic connection with virtue theory. It is more 
than a superficial resemblance. As a theory of a good life, SDT has shown our 
motivational profile has a big explanatory and predictive role in worthy activities such 
as education. It is also worthwhile to note there are some worries in an SDT 
framework and a potential dissimilarity between SDT and virtue theory for the future 
development of this research. In the last section, further implications of SDT and 
situationism will be addressed.  
 
5. SDT and situationism  
In this last section, I want to touch upon the relationship between situational factors 
and SDT. According to researchers, SDT can accommodate some situational factors 
as facilitating our autonomous motivation. This leads to a problem concerning the 
causation of our actions. If the orientation of our motivation plays some important role 
in the cause of our actions, SDT warrants attention equal to situationism.  
    Deci and Ryan (1985) have identified three basic needs bearing on the 
development of internalized motivation: autonomy, competence, and relatedness.31 
 
31  Researchers of SDT not only find superficial differences between the 
consequences of autonomous and non-autonomous motivation, they also investigate 
why it turns out like this. According to their findings, human beings have three basic 
psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) and intrinsic 
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Psychologists working on SDT investigate the factors that enhance these human 
needs. Many such factors are situational, in the sense that they come from outside of 
our body; in this respect, situational factors constitute an indispensable part of the 
SDT research program. For instance, college students are known to be more prone 
to having autonomous motivation to learn than high school students (Ratelle et al. 
2007; Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008). Guay maintains that the educational setting 
in college has lesser constraints compared to high school and this situational factor 
influences student motivation towards learning. This finding implies that students’ 
motivational profiles are context sensitive. Furthermore, autonomy and a relatedness 
supportive environment for students (e.g. supportive parents) have been shown to 
predict students’ intrinsic/extrinsic goal outcomes (Kasser et al. 1995).32  
    Situationists might at this point reply by insisting that situational factors bring out 
the behavioral outcome but not our motivations. While SDT researchers investigate 
situational factors influencing our behavior, it is important to note that they never 
explain data away by appealing to sheer situational factors. Beachboard et al. write, 
“SDT hypothesizes that environments that support perceptions of social relatedness 
improve motivation, thereby positively influencing learning behavior” (Beachboard et 
 
motivations are more likely to lead to desirable behavioral outcomes than extrinsic 
motivations due to the fact that they are mediated through fulfillment of these 
psychological needs.  
32 A similar finding is reproduced in the study of our motivation(Mageau and Vallerand 
2003), also in the study of passion. When coaches are autonomy supportive, athletes 
tend to have harmonious passion rather than obsessive passion(Mageau et al. 2009).  
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al. 2011, 853). Notice here that it is alleged that situational factors do not cause our 
behavior but rather influence human behavior via motivation.  
    The situationist, at this juncture, might attempt to dispute the above causal claim, 
which raises a more general and difficult question of causation. What is the cause of 
action, constitutes a devastating philosophical problem and it is beyond the purview 
of this thesis to settle such a question; however, one prominent line, which accounts 
for how one event causes the other (e.g. a short-circuit causes a fire), is Mackie’s 
much discussed INUS conditions:33  
 
the so-called cause[short-circuit] is, and is known to be, an insufficient but 
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 
result[fire]. [...] I suggest that when we speak of the cause of some particular 
event, it is often a condition of this sort that we have in mind (Mackie 1965, 245). 
 
According to this view, a fire could be set with malicious intent by an arsonist, but this 
fact does not hinder a short-circuit from being the cause of the fire at issue. Thus, the 
INUS condition observes a short-circuit as a primary cause of fire. Along the same 
line, I take it that psychologists understand our proper motivation as an insufficient 
but necessary part of a condition which itself is unnecessary but sufficient for our 
desirable behavioral outcomes, such as high-quality performance in music and 
 
33 The nature of causation is an ongoing debate and some might not agree with the 
INUS condition (See for instance, contrasted view: Northcott 2008) however, it is 
beyond the purview of this thesis to go in depth with this debate.  
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swimming, and school persistence in education. It is true that such outcomes might 
in some cases be produced in the absence of good motivation (or even with vicious 
motivation); however, just like the fire might have been caused by arson, or someone 
forgetting to put out a cigarette, this itself has nothing to do with the fact that virtuous 
motivation can take a necessary and important causal role in producing the same kind 
of outcome in different cases.34  
    To be clear, I am happy to accept the fact that situational factors can constitute 
INUS conditions in some circumstances where our desirable epistemic behaviors are 
observed. If, however, the situationist intends to show the empirical inadequacy of the 
assumptions of virtue theory based on their best data, situational factors (but not our 
motivations) must have played the role of the INUS condition in every case or at least 
in a significant part of our life. At least, they should convince us that situational factors 
are the causes of the event in most cases rather than our orientation of motivation. 
Put another way, the situationist ought to show us that motivation could not take a role 
of an INUS condition in many occasions. Nevertheless, the situationists’ alleged 
conclusion has this implication, and it is far from clear how this argument would 
succeed.  
 
34 Some philosophers have criticized responsibilist virtue epistemology in this vein, 
insisting that many responsibilist intellectual virtues are auxiliary, but not constitutive 
of knowledge (Sosa 2015). Sosa’s point is only convincing if we restrict our 
epistemological interest only to knowledge; however, some apparent auxiliary virtues 
might turn out constitutive of some other epistemic goods, such as understanding, or 
wisdom. Carter and Gordon (2014) also imply this possibility. This is an ongoing 
debate on how much responsibilist virtues are constitutive of our epistemic goals.  
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    Here the problem lies with what constitutes the primary explanation of our 
behavior. According to the situationist, it is the situational factor that most aptly 
explains and predicts our subsequent moral and epistemic behavior. For instance, in 
a situationist experiment, subjects who found a dime placed in a phone booth, 
subsequently helped a person in need (also a staged part of the experiment) (Isen 
and Levin 1972). As the situationist explains it, the situational factor (i.e. finding the 
dime) causes one to perform the helpful act in the test, not our morally-relevant 
motivation. On the other hand, according to the SDT framework, our motivational 
orientation is the factor in the experiment aptly explaining and predicting our behavior. 
On closer inspection, the situationist and SDT research programs are similar in 
experimental design. Yet based on experiments from each side, their argument 
appeals to the factor they are correlating with the result. Finding a dime was the factor 
in the former case, and having autonomous motivation played the same role in the 
latter case. If situationists want to keep being skeptical about the results of the 
experiments proposed by SDT framework, they need further arguments as to why 
they think so, in the face of the structural similarity of their experiments.  
    We have addressed even some situationists elements that could be integrated 
into this SDT framework. The decades long studies of SDT indicate that our 
motivational orientation has genuine explanatory and predictive power. Situationists 
might be skeptical as to the causal power of our motivation; however, we have 
addressed that both situationist and SDT researchers seem to share the causal 
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explanation of our behavior. Thus, on closer inspection, their evidential statuses are, 
at best, on a par.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Although situationists have criticized virtue theory for its empirical inadequacy in 
combination with the commitment to psychological realism, the nature of this criticism 
has been problematically ambiguous. This is due to their misunderstanding of the 
hard core of the virtue theory and their stipulation of theoretical commitments of virtue 
theory. In this chapter, I have addressed the confusion of the existing debate, and the 
conclusion drawn is that virtue theory ultimately remains unscathed. While 
situationists have assumed that social psychological studies undermine the empirical 
adequacy of virtue theory, such studies show, at most, that not many of us are 
genuinely virtuous. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of 
our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a 
tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: a good life. Moreover, the 
empirical components of virtues are in fact supported by such empirical motivation 
studies, and they correspond well with the way people are motivated when they 
engage in important activities. Supporting virtue theory and being a psychological 
realist are, thus, compatible, and further research on this perspective should be 




Chapter 2 Virtue Epistemology, Responsibility, and Narrative Self  
 
0. Introduction 
This chapter will address the problem of how we should consider our environmental 
influences on our virtue cultivation in relation to the concept of self and responsibility. 
In recent years, the view that virtues are traits cultivated merely by one’s control has 
been criticized; instead, more theorists are inclined to hold that being in a well-
designed environment is necessary for obtaining virtues. In her recent paper, Heather 
Battaly goes further by arguing that such friendly environment is not only necessary 
but sufficient for virtue possession; her view is called a personalist account of virtues 
and vices (Battaly 2015, 2016). My thesis goes against such radical move. In the first 
section, I will demonstrate why establishing a friendly environment is now widely 
accepted as an essential element in virtue cultivation among virtue epistemologists. 
In the second section, I will reformulate Battaly’s argument for the personalist account 
of virtue and vice. In the third section, some preliminary objections to Battaly’s debate 
will be addressed. Here, I will also demonstrate that what Battaly has pointed out 
about vice could be consistent with the traditional view (nonpersonalist view or, in 
other words, responsibilist view) supplemented with other moral considerations. In the 
fourth section, I will argue that personalist vice overlooks the success component of 
virtue, and by rejecting any efforts on the side of an agent, it contradicts the essential 
part of virtue understood as an achievement. In the fifth section, I will show that some 
manipulation cases that the personalist accepts as responsible in line with 
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attributability responsibility are problematic on the ground of attributability 
responsibility. In the sixth section, I will argue that personalism comes at a very high 
price. Personalism contradicts the concept of self embedded in virtue epistemology. I 
believe that the concept of self now known as narrative self would help us understand 
the proper relation of our virtues and environment. Finally, I will briefly explain why 
revising responsibilism so that it accommodates some environmental scaffoldings is 
a better option than holding a pluralism of intellectual virtues. 
 
1. Why the environment is important in our virtue cultivations 
Responsibilist virtue epistemologists have the common thought that epistemic virtues 
are excellent epistemic character traits—e.g., open-mindedness and intellectual 
courage—and that these traits show our values, purposes, and motivations. As Linda 
Zagzebski famously put it, virtues are “deep and enduring acquired excellence that 
require dispositions of motivation and dispositions of internal and external success” 
(Zagzebski 1996, 137). In other words, virtues have some acquisition conditions. 
Virtues need to be cultivated in specific ways—e.g., self-cultivation. The flip side of 
this acquisition condition claim is that virtues cannot be obtained by some extreme 
means—e.g., brainwashing. The assumption embedded in this kind of view is that we 
are responsible only for the trait that we choose to acquire; in other words, “S brought 
it about that she has V” (Cassam 2019). The acquisition condition states how a 
particular character trait is to be obtained among individuals. 
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    Recent findings on human cognitive shortcomings have an impact on theorizing 
this acquisition condition. Human cognitive shortcomings, such as cognitive biases, 
and constraints, as well as a large number of social psychological data implying that 
our epistemic behaviors are heavily influenced by epistemically irrelevant trivial 
factors, threaten the traditional virtue epistemology (Alfano 2013). For instance, 
Alfano argues that creative behavior is attained with the help of the environment. In 
an experiment, subjects were asked to fix a candle to a corkboard in a way that the 
wax did not drip. They were given three items: a box of thumbtacks, matches, and a 
candle. The subjects who saw a comedy film or who were given some candy before 
engaging in the task were more likely to give a proper and creative answer to the 
question: to empty the matchbox and tack it to the corkboard (Isen, Daubman, and 
Nowicki 1987). In this experiment, creative behavior was linked to mood elevators, so 
the apparent intellectually virtuous behaviors were more aptly explained by situational 
factors than personal quality. Alfano infers from such data that virtue responsibilism 
(narrowly construed) is empirically inadequate and that our virtuous behavior is 
obtainable with the help of the environment. 
    Faced with such empirical data, virtue epistemologists are now fully aware of the 
difficulty of obtaining virtues purely by our own efforts, and they understand the 
importance of tailoring friendly environments to our virtue cultivation. They concede 
that without any help from our environment, it is unrealistic and elitist to pursue virtues. 
Thus, manipulations of our environment are understood as keys in this field, and these 
theorists now believe them to be necessary for the cultivation of virtues.  
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    One way of doing this is by appealing to cognitive extensions (Pritchard 2015). 
Pritchard criticizes traditional virtue epistemologists who hold that cognitive processes 
reside only in our brains; this view is narrow-minded and ill-motivated. Pritchard 
proposes an anti-individualism of cognitive processes, going along with Clark and 
Chalmers, in which extended cognitive processes coupled with our brain, with high 
degrees of trust, reliance, and accessibility, are indistinguishable from inner 
processes (Clark and Chalmers 1998). According to such view, if some external 
process is properly incorporated into the cognitive character of the agent, this would 
be sufficient to regard this process as a genuine part of cognition, which properly 
belongs to the agent. A similar idea comes from a different angle of cognitive 
enhancement. Fröding believes that our cognitive constraints could be overcome 
through medical or technical enhancements. She maintains that with cognitive 
neuroenhancement, agents could be levelled up to a starting point from which they 
might find it very possible to embark on the habituation process of virtues (Fröding 
2011, 2013).  
    While these theorists emphasize the importance of proper environmental 
scaffoldings, they maintain that environmental scaffoldings are not enough for virtue 
acquisition. They believe that agents must play a substantive role in the explanation 
of trait cultivation (self-cultivation). Heather Battaly, in her recent papers, claims that 
self-cultivation is not a necessary component of virtue possession; when agents are 
placed in a well-designed environment, it is sufficient for holding virtues (Battaly 2015, 
 60 
2016). In other words, she distinguishes two phenomena: acquisition and possession 
of virtues.  
    Traditionally, virtues are understood to be cultivated and then obtained; hence, 
these two processes are interconnected: virtues need to be acquired in specific ways 
for them to be possessed. However, Battaly believes that we can take a pluralism 
toward what it means to possess virtues. According to her view, now known as a 
personalist account of virtues, there is no acquisition condition on virtue. I believe that 
this difference is very crucial. The personalist thesis is very problematic for virtue 
epistemologists in its own right. Ultimately, I hope to draw the following alternative 
conclusion: rather than taking a pluralism about virtues, it is more fruitful to hold a 
traditional view but revise it if necessary. In the next section, I will reformulate her 
argument for personalism—in other words, a non-self-reform view of virtues and vices.  
Personalist virtues and vices 
    In this section, I will reformulate the personalist argument and demonstrate which 
part I will go against. The personalist concludes that it is not necessary to self-cultivate 
to possess virtues. To see whether such conclusion is a feasible option, I will examine 
her arguments in detail. In my analysis, the personalist’s arguments rest on a few 
assumptions, some of which have been shown to be problematic upon closer 
inspection in later sections. 
    Before moving on to the difference between Zagzebski’s responsibilist view and 
Battaly’s personalist view, let me emphasize the commonality between the two: they 
both hold a motivationalist view of virtue. According to this view, virtues are character 
 61 
traits that reflect personal values and conceptions. Motivationalists, such as Baehr 
and Zagzebski, hold that intellectual virtues are individuated by their proximate 
motivation but that all intellectual virtues have ultimate motivations of love of 
knowledge in common (Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). The difference between 
responsibilism and personalism comes down to where this motivation arises from. 
Personalism is a theory solely about possession of virtue, rather than acquisition. At 
a given time t, a person is intellectually virtuous if and only if she is motivated by her 
love of knowledge with the right kind of conception of epistemic goods and possesses 
a disposition driven by such motivation. Such trait appears to be obtainable through 
many different ways: perhaps it can be obtained by our effort, by a mixture of effort 
and some external factors such as environmental help, or in theory, even purely by 
environmental help. Environmental support can also take a wide variety of forms, such 
as education, paternalistic interventions, nudges, external situational interventions, 
brainwashing, or in theory, an experience machine. These processes concern how to 
acquire virtuous character traits, and personalism blatantly dismisses the 
developmental process as irrelevant to virtue possession. To provide better details, 
Battaly proposes a pluralism of virtue: personalism is not trying to replace 
responsibilism. Personalism is just another way of understanding the concept of virtue. 
However, I even doubt that whether this is a useful expansion throughout the thesis.  
    By reconstructing Zagzebski’s arguments about responsibilism, in other words, a 
self-cultivation view of virtue, Battaly identifies “self-cultivation” with a control condition 
over the acquisition of our traits.  
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First, she [Zagzebski] conceives of virtues and vices as the sorts of qualities for 
whose possession the agent is responsible. Second, she thinks that to be 
responsible for possessing a quality, the agent must have had some control 
over its development. Third, she locates this control in the voluntary actions, 
and act-omissions, of the agent. To put the last point differently, she locates this 
control in the agent’s self-cultivation of the quality. In short, Zagzebski argues 
that the qualities an agent comes to possess will not count as virtues or vices 
unless self-cultivation plays a role in their development (Battaly 2016, 210). 
 
The control condition is inherently related to the concept of responsibility and 
praise/blame; it requires an agent to act her part in the course of the acquisition of 
virtues. This way of understanding responsibility corresponds to a concept of 
responsibility known as accountability responsibility (Watson 1996). “Holding people 
responsible [...] involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct 
from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with 
these demands” (Watson 1996, 229). It is a condition of virtue in its acquisition. For 
responsibilism, possession of virtue is only attainable through a proper course of the 
acquisition of traits; hence, acquisition precedes possession, and we cannot mention 
the latter without mentioning the former, according to responsibilism. 
    Personalism, on the other hand, separates these two issues. To provide a 
convincing argument that this separation is feasible, the personalist includes concrete 
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cases of vices performed by an agent without committing to control conditions, such 
as some terrorists and killers who were raised under unfortunate circumstances. 
Consider children who were “raised” by the Hitler Jugend. Imagine people who were 
“raised” by the KKK, Taliban, or ISIS. She points out that we rightly blame their traits 
(e.g., cruelty) as vices, while the traits in question might have developed that way 
because of their environment. She holds that such vicious agents are rightly blamed 
because of their vicious conceptions and motivations.  
 
Those traits [e.g., cruelty] were still personal, and they were clearly bad. To 
explicate, Harris and the Hitler youth didn’t just acquire dispositions of behavior 
from their environments. They acquired personal qualities—they acquired false 
conceptions of value with the motivational profiles to match. Harris was not an 
unthinking killing machine; he believed that other people were insignificant, and 
he was committed to making them suffer. (Battaly 2016, 212)  
 
To address the criticism that her view lets vicious people off from being responsible 
and blameworthy, she introduces the notion of attributability responsibility. Along the 
lines of George Sher’s (2005) view, Battaly believes that a person is responsible for 
a trait, or action, if and only if he is generally responsive to reasons and the trait or 
action reflects positively or negatively on him as a person or thinker (Battaly 2016, 
215). Thus, vicious persons are responsible for the possession of their vices, and they 
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are blameworthy, even if they did not have sufficient control over the development of 
their vices.  
    The most striking example that shows the difference between personalism and 
the traditional view of virtue is the transformation machine case (Nozick 1974). The 
following is a long quote from Battaly’s argument, which is crucially important for the 
current debate: 
 
Zagzebski argues that it is conceptually impossible for Robert Nozick’s 
transformation machine to produce human virtues. In one of his lesser-known 
thought-experiments, Nozick asks us to imagine a transformation machine that 
can, at the flick of a switch, “transform us into whatever sort of person we’d like 
to be” (Nozick, 1974, p. 44). Zagzebski contends that the traits the 
transformation machine produces cannot be virtues, since virtues cannot be 
gotten so cheaply—virtues are not the sort of traits that can be acquired at the 
flick of a switch. In her words, “the problem is that the subject has contributed 
nothing but a single act of will to the acquisition of the desired trait. But a single 
act of will does not a virtue make [...] a single act of will is logically insufficient 
to transform oneself into a person whose resulting quality is something we 
would praise in the sense we praise a virtue” (1996, p. 121, her emphasis). In 
other words, for a trait to count as a virtue, the agent herself must be 
praiseworthy for coming to possess it. But it is not the agent who is praiseworthy 
for the traits produced by the transformation machine, since the only 
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praiseworthy contribution the agent makes is the single act of flicking a switch. 
She has not put in enough work. If anyone deserves praise for the traits the 
machine produces, it is the creator of the machine, rather than the agent herself. 
On this point, Zagzebski agrees with Robert Roberts, who contends that even 
if we could use a transformation machine to “produce a being who was 
indistinguishable, in terms of his present dispositions, from a saint,” we still 
would not count him as virtuous (Roberts, 1984, p. 235). Is this standard 
Aristotelian line correct? Is self-cultivation necessary for developing virtues and 
vices? Contra Zagzebski, and many other Aristotelians, we have good reason 
to think that it is not (Battaly 2016, 211–12).  
 
Contra Zagzebski, the personalist would argue that a flick of a switch can, in theory, 
make someone fully virtuous—i.e., for personalism, environmental factors are 
sufficient for virtue possession (Battaly thinks that self-cultivation can contribute to 
virtues, especially at the later stage of acquisition, but she holds that self-cultivation 
is not at all necessary for virtues).  
    Based on Battaly’s assumptions that I have addressed so far, we can reformulate 
her argument as follows: Virtue is understood as excellent character traits that 
express what a person cares about and values. This is a shared view of virtue. 
Intellectual virtues reflect what a person values as an inquirer. From a standard neo-
Aristotelian view of virtues, being responsible and praiseworthy requires control on 
the agent’s part (let us call this a control condition). Some paradigmatic vicious agents, 
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however, seem to have developed their vices primarily because of their environment. 
Yet they have acquired personal qualities—they have acquired a false conception of 
value with motivational profiles to match. Attributability responsibility requires people 
only to be responsive to reasons, and the trait or action reflects the person positively 
or negatively. So vicious people are regarded as responsible without committing to 
the control condition, and we can rightly blame them. Thus, the control condition is 
not a necessary condition for vice. Virtue and vice are similar in form; thus, what we 
could say about vices could also be applied to virtues. Thus, the control condition is 
not a necessary condition for virtues.  
    If this reformulation is correct, I think further questions would arise. First, is 
personalism the right way to understand the concept of virtue? Is there anything 
seriously missing in virtue epistemology by adopting personalism? Second, is the 
personalist’s formulation of attributability responsibility correct? More precisely, is a 
transformation machine case compatible with attributability responsibility to begin 
with? By holding on to attributability responsibility, can we really be responsible for 
traits created by a flick of a switch? Third, is it really the case that what we could say 
about vice could also apply to virtues? Research on vices remains underdeveloped. 
In recent years, vice epistemologists have actively engaged in a debate about 
whether epistemic vices are similar in form as epistemic virtues (Crerar 2018). In the 
next section, I will first give a skeptical argument for the third point—the symmetry 
thesis of virtues and vices—and I will show why it is not always right that what we 
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could say about vice could also apply to virtues. In the later sections, I will challenge 
the first and second questions.  
 
2. The Asymmetry of Virtues and Vices 
In the last section, I reconstructed Battaly’s argument, of which the last part depends 
on the assumption that virtues and vices are structurally similar (symmetry of vice and 
virtue). First, let me address this point. For the sake of argument, let us grant that the 
rest of her case is correct, and hence, the vice can be rehabilitated purely by 
environmental scaffoldings. While in her argument the structural parallelism between 
virtues and vices is presupposed, it is not as clear as theorists have imagined it to be 
the case. 
    First, Battaly considers a case of vicious agents, such as terrorists and killers. 
She points out that we rightly conceive of their traits as vice, and we rightly blame 
them (e.g., cruelty) while their traits in question might have developed that way 
because of their environment. She infers from such cases of vice and concludes that 
the same judgment applies to virtues. For rehabilitating vice, Battaly suggests 
transforming vicious people through emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is an 
involuntary noncognitive process that enables us to catch emotions from other people. 
Her suggestion is to put vicious people in a friendly environment with moral 
(epistemic) exemplars so that vicious people can catch the virtuous emotions of 
exemplars through contagion. So we see this as a case of environmental scaffolding 
in terms of virtue acquisition. Her suggestion of rehabilitating vicious people through 
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the emotional (anti-intellectual) part of character development is illuminating, and I do 
not disagree at all with such suggestion per se; however, what we could infer from 
this suggestion, at most, is that we might be able to start cultivating virtue through 
similar resources. Considering that virtue comes in degrees, it is not very clear 
whether such friendly environment is sufficient for full-blown virtues or for the full-
blown rehabilitation of vice. As I mentioned in the first section, the majority of virtue 
responsibilists are happy to concede that it is important to create friendly epistemic 
environments in our virtue cultivation and rehabilitation of vice, and hence, to this 
extent, it is not necessary to hold a strong view like Battaly’s to incorporate such cases 
into virtue epistemology. 
    Battaly points out that some vicious traits are rightly blameworthy, while the traits 
are formed without efforts on the side of the agent, and she infers that the same could 
be said about virtues. Here, I pay close attention to our practice of blame. When we 
look at our practices of blaming and praising people, the asymmetry between 
praiseworthy behavior and blameworthy behavior becomes more evident.  
    For the sake of argument, let us grant Battaly’s point that vices and virtues are 
symmetrical in form; however, our subsequent blame/praise judgments might not 
necessarily be symmetrical. In a debate on our desert judgment, Sommers proposed 
a view now known as partial desert. He argued that we should not understand desert 
as connected only to the personal culpability of the agent; instead, we should adopt 
a “partial” account according to which desert judgments are properly sensitive to the 
feelings, desires, and behaviors of those most closely affected by a wrongdoing 
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(Sommers 2013). In such view, one’s personal culpability and punishment are not 
identical. Imagine that a woman decides to leave her philandering husband. Sommers 
rightly points out that in such scenario, even if the husband said to his wife, “I 
understand you’re angry, but fairness requires that you don’t leave me. Bill’s wife 
stayed with him, and he’s had several more affairs than I have” (Sommers 2013, 255), 
this does not determine what he deserves. It is up to the relevant parties (his wife) to 
determine the right response within certain boundaries.35 
 
35 Some empirical results on our moral intuition might be helpful in showing the 
dissimilarity between such cases. There is a famous experiment conducted by Knobe 
(2003). The subjects in this experiment were provided with a vignette with either a 
harm condition or a help condition as follows: “The vice-president of a company went 
to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It 
will help us increase profits, but it will also harm [help] the environment.’ The chairman 
of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the environment. I 
just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started 
the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed [helped]” (Knobe 2003, 
191–192). The subjects were then asked to determine how much blame/praise the 
chairman deserved and whether they thought the chairman intentionally 
harmed/helped the environment. In the harm condition setup, the subjects said that 
the chairman deserved a lot of blame and that the chairman brought about the side 
effect intentionally. On the other hand, in the help condition setup, they judged that 
the chairman did not bring about the good side effect intentionally, and they thought 
that the chairman deserved very little praise. How these data are interpreted remains 
extremely controversial (especially with intentionality), but for the current debate, it is 
very insightful to look at how people judge asymmetrically in praiseworthy and 
blameworthy cases. Theorists who blindly assume that our blame and praise are 
symmetrical in form, including Battaly, need an explanation on the asymmetry of our 
actual moral practices. 
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    As shown above, our practices of praising and blaming people for their good and 
bad deeds and character traits are substantially different, unlike the virtue that 
ethicists and epistemologists traditionally presuppose in theory. Going back to the 
original argument, what Battaly has shown in her argument is that for rehabilitating 
vice, putting a vicious agent in a friendly environment is deemed sufficient to start 
rehabilitating vices; but she infers from this assumption that a friendly environment 
would also be sufficient for full-fledged virtue possession. 
    The first problem with this inference is that in the former cases, she misses the 
clear dissimilarity of cases between virtues and vices: the stakes of people being 
vicious are very high. Vicious behavior is often inflicted on other people, and some 
harms are done. The desert judgment—how blameworthy the agent is—might be 
partly decided by the affect and feeling of the victims affected by the vicious behavior. 
While this partial desert account may not be applicable to all instances of vicious 
behavior, to those examples proposed by Battaly (e.g., a killer and terrorists), it 
certainly is. In the original terrorist case, what they deserve might be substantially 
influenced by the attitudes and feelings of the people affected by the incident. In 
Battaly’s argument, our moral and epistemological intuition that the killer is 
blameworthy takes an important role in supporting her further argument. The strength 
of her argument is substantially weakened when it is shown that it is not our judgment 
that “killers are vicious without the effort condition” that makes the killer highly 
blameworthy; rather, what makes the killer highly blameworthy are the attitudes and 
feelings of the victims or people affected by the incident. 
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    Related to this point, when we pay attention to the significance of our vicious acts, 
it might be argued that rehabilitating vice should be the highest priority in our societies. 
Imagine a society where the majority of citizens are haughty. Intellectually haughty 
behavior, according to Tanesini’s view, leads to another kind of vices, timidity and 
servility, on the side of the receivers of haughty behaviors. For instance, haughty 
individuals are irresponsible in a way that they often violate rules of taking turns during 
conversations, and they interrupt others by talking for too long. Such disposition is 
disrespectful and harmful, and hence, these individuals intimidate their conversation 
partners. When they harm repeatedly, haughty behaviors foster other types of vices, 
such as timidity, on the recipient side (Tanesini 2016, 86–87).  
    As described above, vicious behaviors typically harm others, and in bad cases, 
they even foster other people’s vices. Then the crucial asymmetry between virtues 
and vices is this moral and epistemic significance to others. Virtues are excellences 
of the agent, and a virtuous character reflects who a person is. On the other hand, a 
vice reflects who a person is negatively; vicious behaviors are harmful to other human 
beings. Anyone who is committed to moral theorizing aspires to remove unjust harms 
and pains. As Singer famously puts it, if it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it (Singer 1972). While this is originally a consequentialist 
account of morally obligatory acts, virtue theorists seem to have no objection to going 
along with such general moral assumption. As Battaly has argued, if moral contagion 
is shown to be an effective method in rehabilitating our vices, this is certainly good 
 72 
news for virtue theorists. With the rehabilitation of vices framed as our moral obligation, 
consider also that some virtuous actions are regarded as supererogatory actions 
(Kawall 2009). Suppose that someone risks her life for a drowning child. This action 
is admirable but does not seem to be morally obligatory. If a full-fledged virtue requires 
such supererogation, it makes sense to say that it is hard to obtain such trait. I do not 
disagree with Battaly on the rehabilitation of vices through environmental scaffolding, 
but I support it because of another reason: harm needs to be removed.  
    Even if we grant that other parts of her argument were correct, I believe that more 
needs to be said to argue that environmental scaffoldings are sufficient for virtue 
acquisition in the same way as for vices, as virtues lack the very characteristic that 
vices typically suffer. The purported inference from vices to virtues is not as clear as 
it might have been assumed by personalism. More argument is needed to support the 
symmetry between the two. In the next section, I will consider the larger problem in 
the personalist argument: her assumption that virtue is attainable without self-
cultivation on our part. 
 
3. Success, Achievement, and Virtue  
In this section, my criticism focuses on the way the personalist spells out the effort 
condition. Self-cultivation can be spelled out in a wide variety of forms. Battaly’s 
original characterization of self-cultivation in her paper is based on Zagzebski’s 
characterization of control concerning responsibility. However, I argue that we should 
focus more on the success component of intellectual virtue. 
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    Zagzebski formulates epistemic responsibility by appealing to alternate 
possibilities. She writes that the “kind of praiseworthiness that applies to virtue reflects 
the fact that the agent could have gone either way” (Zagzebski 1996, 105). The 
principle of alternate possibility is notoriously problematic. According to Frankfurt’s 
infamous thought experiment, in which a hidden demon behind the agent could easily 
intervene in the agent’s action, the notion of alternate possibility could be easily 
undermined, yet we could adequately claim that such agent is responsible (Frankfurt 
1969). I am not going to settle this issue here. When Battaly criticized Zagzebski’s 
control condition on virtue by saying, “In other words, [Zagzebski thinks] acquiring 
virtue and avoiding vice requires effort on the agent’s part. The agent must do 
something to get virtues; he must act and act repeatedly [...] on Zagzebski’s view, 
self-cultivation is necessary for the development of virtues and vices” (Battaly 2016, 
211). We can see that Battaly identifies a control condition understood as the alternate 
possibility with efforts on the side of the agent, namely, self-cultivation. I argue that it 
is just one way of spelling out efforts on the side of the agent. But it is not the only 
way. We can find an alternative sense of self-cultivation in the virtue epistemological 
framework. If the personalist disagrees with this point, she needs a further argument 
to pursue it. 
    In the virtue epistemological framework, the natural way of interpreting efforts on 
the side of the agent is the exercise of our ability. To explain this alternative 
understanding, and to see why self-cultivation as an exercise of our ability is legitimate, 
let us go back to the definition of virtue. Virtue has a success component, as well as 
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a motivation component. A virtuous agent is not only one who holds the proper 
motivation but one who reliably succeeds in behaving in accordance with this 
motivation (Zagzebski 1996). The following is a passage explaining what success 
components of moral virtues are like: 
 
For example, benevolence is the virtue according to which a person is 
characteristically motivated to bring about the well-being of others and is reliably 
successful in doing so. Courage is the virtue according to which a person is 
characteristically motivated to risk danger to himself when something of greater 
value is at stake and is reliably successful in doing it. Justice is the virtue 
according to which a person is characteristically motivated to respect others as 
persons and is reliably successful in treating them that way (Zagzesbki 1996, 
89). 
 
And here is an example of a success component of an intellectual virtue: 
  
An intellectually virtuous person is reliable in bringing about the aims of the 
virtue, which in this case are internal, this means that she is generally successful 
in acting open-mindedly or with intellectual autonomy, courage, carefulness, 
and so on. Take the case of open-mindedness. If she is reliable in acting open-
mindedly, not only must she be appropriately motivated, but she must be reliably 
aware of the views of others that are worth considering (Zagzesbki 1996, 244). 
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Here, I would like to further analyze this success component through a more 
appropriate notion: achievement. As Pritchard (2010a) has insightfully pointed out, 
success does not suffice for an achievement, as success can be attained in all kinds 
of ways, not all of them suitable for bona fide achievements. One can be successful 
through brute luck—e.g., when all of one’s competitors in a sprint race succumb to 
injury—and in such cases, being successful does not constitute an achievement. 
There is an important implication here, which is that achievements involve the 
exercise of relevant abilities on the part of the agent. That is, your abilities should play 
a role in enabling you to be successful, rather than the success in question just being 
due to blind fortune. And importantly, the account of achievement demands that one’s 
success be because of the exercise of one’s relevant abilities in the sense that this 
success is significantly creditable to this exercise of ability rather than to some other 
factor that is external to one’s agency (like dumb luck)(Pritchard 2010a). The success 
component of virtue specifies that the agent reliably succeed in behaving because of 
their proper motivation. Such success is not a lucky success, as it must arise from the 
agent’s motivation. Imagine a person who goes bungee jumping for a prize. With the 
prize money, he will be able to buy his son a Christmas gift. He was motivated to risk 
danger to himself. Before he jumped, he accidentally sneezed at the edge of the cliff 
and ended up jumping. Although he had the intention and motivation to jump, such 
action is not a case of courageous action, as he did not jump because of his motivation. 
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Hence, success understood as an achievement is precise about what the success 
component means to capture in the case of intellectual virtue.  
    The personalist commits to the view that self-cultivation is not necessary for virtue 
in any sense; they put themselves in the corner. I think personalism comes into an 
impasse. If the personalist tries to persuade us that her cases of virtue (e.g., 
transformation-machine-induced virtuous agent) are genuine cases of virtue, she 
must admit that it is a case of achievement. An achievement component requires 
exercises of our ability; hence, effort on the part of the agent in involved in the exercise 
of our ability. So her original assumption that virtuous people obtain virtue without any 
effort on their part no longer holds. On the other hand, let us imagine that personalists 
maintain their initial assumption that (apparently) virtuous people obtain (apparent) 
virtue without any effort on the agent’s part. Then such trait does not include 
achievement creditable to the exercise of the ability of the person; thus, we no longer 
conceive such case as a genuine case of virtue along with the two-tire account. It is 
up to personalism which option to choose. Either way, the conclusion of her argument 
no longer follows what she initially formulated. 
    Effort, understood as exercising our ability, is shown to be a necessary component 
of the success (i.e., achievement) component of virtue. It remains unclear how Battaly 
could define intellectual virtues without committing to the success component or how 
she could explain success without mentioning effort on the side of the agent. The 
personalist might be able to give up the two-tier concept of virtue and get rid of the 
success component altogether off the theory. The price to pay is high: without the 
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success component, having a proper motivation for epistemic goods would be 
sufficient for being intellectually virtuous. 
 
4. Attributability Responsibility and Transformation Machine 
In this section, let us focus on attributability responsibility: the concept of responsibility 
personalism relies on. Remember that attributability responsibility only requires that 
we are generally responsive to reasons and traits reflect who we are as a person. 
These can be understood as both characteristics of the agent at a particular time slice. 
The etiology of a character does not seem to matter to the status of the responsibility 
of the agent. Hence, personalism blatantly dismisses the thinking about etiology. At 
face value, personalists accept that transformation machines can even make us 
virtuous. Yet this is a radical suggestion, and even attributability responsibilists find 
some transformation machine cases problematic. Benjamin Matheson’s analysis is 
helpful in solving this puzzle that attributability responsibilists face (Matheson 2018). 
However, his solution yields another obstacle for virtue epistemologists, including 
personalists. 
    Matheson provides a helpful distinction among theories of moral responsibility 
that is directly relevant to the current debate: theorists who hold that people’s history 
partly determines whether she is morally responsible for her action is called 
historicists. On the other hand, nonhistoricists think that nonhistorical properties can 
determine whether she is morally responsible or not (Matheson 2018, 1–2). 
Attributability responsibilists are nonhistoricists, and accountability responsibilists are 
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historicists. In other words, historicists pay attention to the diachronic features of the 
agent when determining her status of responsibility, while nonhistoricist see 
synchronic features. The crucial difference between these two positions is that only 
historicists hold an ownership condition for moral responsibility by appealing to her 
history. In other words, a condition telling us which mental states belong to the agent 
in a way that she is morally responsible should refer to the agent’s past characteristics, 
according to historicists (Matheson 2018, 2). 
    Sher’s attributability responsibility is a representative nonhistoricist view of moral 
responsibility. (While there is more than one way to be a nonhistoricist, for the sake 
of argument, here, nonhistoricist and attributability responsibility are used 
interchangeably). As I mentioned in section 2, personalism is a view on the 
possession of virtue but not on the acquisition of virtue. So in theory, it appears that 
nothing prevents a person’s transformation machine created a second ago from being 
fully responsible. Battaly’s earnest acceptance of the transformation machine case 
seems to be a straightforward consequence of a theory of attributability responsibility. 
However, it is essential to point out that this particular consequence of the 
transformation machine case is seen as a considerable threat to nonhistoricists even 
among attributability responsibilists. For moral responsibility theorists, thought 
insertion cases like transformation machine go against our intuition of responsibility. 
Watson (1996) expressed this concern as follows: 
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Consider the way in which hypnosis and brainwashing are thought to engender 
“motivation” for which the agent is not responsible. Whereas other views would 
explain this by appealing to the absence of control, the problem on the self-
disclosure view is to explain these processes undercut attributability (Watson 
1996, 234). 
 
Similarly, Matheson’s two manipulation cases express a similar worry as Watson. The 
following is a local manipulation case: 
 
Local Larry: Larry has all the capacities and competences of a fully developed 
human adult. One night, he goes to see the Great Garibaldi, a famous stage 
hypnotist. Garibaldi invites Larry on stage; Larry dutifully agrees. Larry believes 
that Garibaldi will cure his fear of clowns. However, knowing that Larry plans to 
go to the bank tomorrow, Garibaldi implants a small amount of psychological 
states into Larry such that the next day Larry will rob that bank. Garibaldi is no 
ordinary stage hypnotist. He implants the psychological states such that Larry 
acts on a first-order desire that aligns with a second-order volition, and such that 
Larry acts from a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism (Matheson 2018, 
3). 
 
As a nonhistoricist, Matheson (2018) agrees that “Larry doesn’t own the relevant 
psychological states or mechanisms, and so he isn’t morally responsible for robbing 
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the bank” (3–4). However, unlike historicists, nonhistoricists need to explain why Larry 
is not responsible, by appealing to the synchronic characteristics of the agent. 
Matheson thinks that nonhistoricists can understand such ownership condition 
through a general psychological coherence involving all sorts of mental states of the 
agent, such as beliefs, values, desires, and cares. We can judge whether a 
psychological state belongs to the owner based on the fact that such mental event fits 
well in a story about the agent as told by an idealized narrator. This view remains 
nonhistorical because “the story must reference Larry’s actual psychology at the time 
of action” (8). As for Larry’s case, an intelligible story about why Larry robbed the bank 
would not be given by the narrator. “This is because Larry isn’t the sort of person who 
likes robbing banks” (8). Consider another person, Harry, who is the kind of person 
who is predisposed to rob a bank. Even if the thought of robbing the bank was inserted 
by Garibaldi, for Harry, he would be responsible for robbing the bank, unlike Larry, as 
such psychological state is consistent with his general psychology. An idealized 
narrator can offer a narrative story of Harry robbing the bank. In such scenario, 
Garibaldi just made the “bank-robbing-conducive reasons more salient” (9) for Harry. 
Along this line of thought, Matheson adopted Mele’s global manipulation case with a 
twist.  
 
Brainwashed Beth. When Beth crawled into bed last night she was an 
exceptionally sweet person, as she always had been. Beth’s character was such 
that intentionally doing anyone serious bodily harm definitely was not an option 
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for her: her character—or collection of values—left no place for a desire to do 
such a thing to take root [...] Beth awakes with a desire to stalk and kill a 
neighbor, George. Although she had always found George unpleasant, she is 
very surprised by this desire. What happened is that, while Beth slept, a team 
of psychologists that had discovered the system of values that make Chuck [a 
serial killer] tick implanted those values in Beth after erasing hers (Mele 2013, 
169–170). 
 
In the original case, Beth’s memory remained intact through manipulation, yet here, 
Matheson goes further and assumes that her memories were also inserted. 
 
Suppose we change the case so that the manipulators provide Beth with 
pseudo-memories such that the ideal narrator is then able to provide a narrative 
explanation of her action of killing George (Matheson 2018, 15). 
 
In such global manipulation case, the new Beth is morally responsible, according to 
attributability responsibility (she is reason-responsive, and her action reflects her 
values and concepts at the time of her conduct), for killing George. However, this Beth 
is numerically distinct from the original Beth. The Beth before the transformation and 
the Beth after the change are different persons, because “psychological continuity 
requires overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness” (15). The two 
Beth’s beliefs, desires, and values are so different, and “there is a break in 
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psychological continuity—and hence a break in personal identity—between pre- and 
post-brainwashing Beth” (15). Hence, in the global manipulation cases, it is true that 
the agent is responsible after the transformation, according to nonhistoricists. 
However, such agent is not identical to the pretransformed agent. In other words, the 
Beth before the transformation is not responsible for killing George. 
    If this analysis of manipulations by Matheson were on the right track, what could 
we say about the epistemic case? I would say that the epistemic transformation 
machine case (quoted in section 2) does not provide enough details for us to make 
any judgment, as it was originally formulated. If a flick of a switch can transform us 
into whatever sort of person we want, such transformation can be implemented in a 
few different ways. A flick of a switch can implant some psychological states in an 
agent, e.g., a desire to listen to the view of her opponent in a debate and a desire to 
be a person with this desire. If such implanted states were not coherent with her 
overall psychology at time t in a way that an ideal narrator can tell an intelligible story 
about her act, she would not be responsible for such implanted psychological states. 
If a flick of a switch could insert all the attitudes, values, desires, beliefs, and cares 
necessary for epistemic virtues, such agent after the transformation would be 
responsible; but she would not be identical to the person before the transformation. I 
believe that personalists are not happy with this result, as they implicitly assume that 
the same person is transformed into a virtuous one by a machine, as Battaly argues 
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that “it is possible for us to unwittingly acquire virtues and vices from our environment, 
bypassing self-cultivation” (Battaly 2016, 212).36 
    Attributability responsibility personalism relies on a nonhistoricist view of 
responsibility, so personalists pay attention only to the synchronic features of the 
agent when determining a psychological state belong to the agent. Even so, unlike 
the personalist’s initial assumption, transformation machine cases are controversial 
even for attributability responsibility: if psychological states were locally manipulated, 
only if an ideal narrator could tell an intelligible story about her action could such action 
be taken as responsible. If psychological states were globally manipulated, such 
agent might be responsible, yet she is no longer the same person as the one before 
the transformation. In the next section, I will consider how this argument transfers to 
the cases of virtues.  
 
5. Virtue and Narrative Self 
In this section, in line with the discussion from the previous section, I will address the 
following question: will the single act of flicking a switch make one intellectually 
virtuous? I want to answer no to this question. One of Battaly’s papers on personalism 
began with the following question: “what is the role of the self in developing virtue and 
 
36 Just like in Larry’s and Harry’s cases, if implanted psychological states (e.g., a 
desire to listen to the view of her opponent in a debate and a desire to be a person 
with this desire) were consistent with one’s general psychology in such a way that a 
narrative story of him listening to his opponent’s view were offered, we could say that 
the transformation machine just made the opponent-listening reason salient for him. 
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in rehabilitating vice?” (Battaly 2016, 207). She did not perform any substantive 
analysis of what the self is and quickly changed the topic into a slightly different yet 
relevant second question: what role does self-cultivation play in the development of 
one’s virtues? But what does the self amount to? Can we answer the second question 
without answering the first? This worry leads me to consider the essential underlying 
concepts of a virtue framework: the concept of self. 
    While the nature of self is underdeveloped in virtue epistemology, one thing is 
clear: virtue epistemologists, including Battaly, admit that self is an ingredient of virtue. 
Intellectual virtue reflects what we care about epistemically, what kind of agent we are 
qua epistemic agent (Baehr 2011). In such framework, people are understood as not 
mere natural organisms but as beings with specific values, abilities, and motivations. 
Contrary to the human being as a species, it is evident that a distinct way of 
understanding the human being, namely, self, is presupposed in the virtue theoretical 
framework. Without being a self, there is no hope for us to cultivate virtues or vices. 
If a self is different from an organism in our capacities and potentials, then we should 
look into the nature of the conditions, which put us in a virtue framework. Hence, I 
understand that the concept of self provides us with abilities with which we could start 
cultivating virtues. Self is the basis for holding us responsible, praiseworthy and 
blameworthy, and virtuous and vicious.37  
    In the past few decades, a particular view of self has come to the fore, now known 
as the narrative approach to self. According to narrative self theorists (e.g., Dennett 
 
37 In this chapter, I use the terms person and self interchangeably.  
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1992; Schechtman 1996; Taylor 1989; Velleman 2009), the lives of our selves are 
inherently narrative and storylike. Marya Schechtman maintains that we constitute 
ourselves as selves by understanding our lives as narratives in form and living 
accordingly. Our lives are experienced as a part of an ongoing story rather than as 
isolated moments (Schechtman 2011). Her narrative self-view is called the narrative 
self constitution view. Individual differences aside, narrative theorists have the 
common assumption that our action can only be intelligible when put into our narrative, 
reflecting our values and choices from the past and for the future. 
    For the current debate, two important points from Schechtman’s narrative account 
of self are worth mentioning: first, narratives are diachronic in nature. While 
Schechtman denies that we need an overarching thematic unity over our self narrative, 
she emphasizes that for an action or experience to belong to self, we do need to 
identify with it or care about or take an interest in it. This is called “appropriation” of 
our experience. For instance, the appropriation of our experience enables us to 
assess the quality of our present experience, unifying our consciousness over time 
through affective connections and identification (Schechtman 2007, 171). Actions and 
experiences that people find not interesting or alienating are not a part of the self 
narrative. 
    The second important point is, among the constraints on what counts as a self-
constituting narrative, there is an “articulation constraint,” which indicates that “the 
narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he 
believes, and feels what he feels” (Schechtman 1996, 114). Schechtman later 
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specifies what is required to meet her articulation constraint. Confronted with a 
question like “Why did you choose that course of action?” people do not necessarily 
need to have a clearly thought-out explanation to meet this constraint. But one should 
not be at a loss or fail to understand the sense of the question. One must recognize 
a kind of explanatory burden and be able to meet it for the most part (Schechtman 
2007, 163). According to the narrative account of self, living a life of self poses many 
theoretical and empirical conditions upon the course of our life. If the nature of our 
self is as such, as I will explain, we will encounter a huge difference between the 
virtues in the personalist’s account and the virtues as traditionally understood. 
The narrative self constitution view that I endorse in this chapter is different in some 
critical sense from the ideal narrator supported by Matheson (2018), which I 
addressed in the previous section. Matheson explicitly rejects Schechtman’s view, on 
account of the unity of self. He maintains that 
 
    narrative explanations do not need to include every aspect of a person’s life, but 
need only involve smaller stories. As I will now explain, my sense of narrative 
explanation only appeals to these smaller stories [...] these are then constitutive 
of an individual’s personal identity over time. On their view, if a person is able to 
tell a story about a mental state or action and they are psychologically connected 
(that is, causally connected and psychologically similar) to the person-stage who 
possessed that mental state or performed that action, then they are narratively 
connected to that person-stage (Matheson 2018, 7). 
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But the narrative self constitution view asks more than having smaller stories for our 
narrative to constitute a self. While rejecting the strong ethical thematic unity, her 
concept of narrative requires “individual conceive of his life as having the form and  
the logic of a story—more specifically, the story of a person’s life—where “story” is 
understood as a conventional, linear narrative” (Schechtman 1996, 96). This form of 
narrative self is embedded in the idea that intellectual virtue reflects what we care 
about epistemically, what kind of agent we are qua epistemic agent.3839 The self of 
 
38 The narrative self constitution view might ultimately contradict Matheson’s 
understanding of self (person); however, even so, it does not threaten my arguments. 
The aim of my argument in the previous section was minimal. A personalist commits 
to attributability responsibility. We can be responsible for things based on what we 
care about synchronically. Given that the attributability responsibility were correct, the 
personalist’s conclusion in the case of the transformation machine did not follow. As 
a personalist presupposes, a machine can transform the same person from 
nonvirtuous to entirely virtuous through global manipulations. This claim has been 
shown to be inconsistent. In doing so, I remain neutral about the legitimacy of 
attributability responsibility. As I am on board with the responsibilism of virtue, I am 
more inclined to hold accountability responsibility. However, settling this debate is 
beyond the purview of this thesis. Moreover, in the next footnote, I propose how two 
ideas of self can be compatible. 
39  I can endorse the pluralism of the degree of intelligibility of narratives. As 
Schechtman states, “at one extreme, there is the ideal (which no one actually attains) 
of perfect intelligibility—a life story in which every aspect coheres with every other. At 
the other extreme, there is a random sequence of experiences that have little, if any, 
relation to one another . . . the demand that a person’s narrative be intelligible cannot, 
therefore, be a categorical demand, for intelligibility is not an all-or-nothing condition” 
(Schechtman 1996, 97–98). It might be the case that having small narratives is 
sufficient for selves to be responsible for their action (as Matheson proposes), but 
being responsible is necessary but not sufficient for being virtuous. In this sense, 
Schechtman might be wrong in saying that our self per se requires that an “individual 
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people who are intellectually virtuous, or at least those who pursue intellectual virtues, 
is in such a way that they can tell a story of their life.40  
    Based on this understanding of the narrative self, I will start arguing against the 
personalist virtue. Remember that for personalism, as long as the environment de 
facto constitutes people’s reason-responsiveness and her traits reflect positively or 
negatively on him as a thinker as required by the virtue epistemologist, this is sufficient 
to conceive of such people as genuinely epistemically virtuous.  
    To counter such account, imagine a college student, Lily, who has little motivation 
to write her dissertation on ethics. Her supervisor decides to transform her using the 
 
conceive of his life as having the form and the logic of a story—more specifically, the 
story of the person’s life—where ‘story’ is understood as a conventional, linear 
narrative” (Schechtman 1996, 96). However, I think it is correct that the self of a 
virtuous person, or the self of a person who pursues virtues, is exactly intelligible in 
such a way that the “person has a self-conception that coheres to produce a well-
defined character” (97). All I need in this chapter is to show that the self narrative 
shared by the intellectually virtuous agents embedded in virtue epistemology (namely, 
by the idea that intellectual virtue reflects what we care about epistemically, what kind 
of agent we are qua epistemic agent) resembles a narrative story through the 
narrative self constitution view. And this is no coincidence, as when we aspire for 
intellectual virtue, we are disposed to act in specific ways to attain epistemic goods.  
40 Another putative difference between the narrative self constitution view and the 
ideal narrator held by Matheson is that in the former, the narrator is the agent herself. 
In the latter, it is the idealized narrator who tells a story about the agent. The reason 
Matheson believes that the story about the agent should be told by the ideal narrator 
rather than herself is that “individuals aren’t reliable narrators of themselves”  
(Matheson 2018, 6). However, in the narrative self constitution view, there is a reality 
constraint on our self narrative: the story of us cannot be massively false. It is not 
entirely clear to what extent these two characterizations of the fallibility of our 
narratives are different. 
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machine. Not knowing what is going on, she goes into the machine and subsequently 
obtains the intrinsic motivation for epistemic goods, such as obtaining a deep 
understanding of ethical issues. After the transformation, Lily believes that it is 
genuinely worthwhile to understand ethical problems. She enjoys her project 
wholeheartedly and subsequently obtains various intellectual virtues: reading 
academic papers carefully, discussing ethical issues with her friends open-mindedly, 
and writing her dissertation thoroughly. 
    Lily* is an epistemic counterpart of Lily. She also has little motivation to write her 
dissertation on ethics but does not go into the machine. Instead, she talks to her friend 
Mika, who is always very keen to discuss ethical problems. Mika advises Lily* to think 
about concrete cases where morality matters in Lily*’s life and in the world that Lily* 
lives in. Lily* looks back and considers cases in which she thought she was morally 
harmed: sexual harassment, racial prejudices, and so on. Mika helps Lily* imagine 
problems of morality in the world around her: the legalized death penalty in her country, 
the widespread poverty in some developing countries, and so on. By doing so 
repeatedly, Lily* finds out how angry and resentful or puzzled she is by these issues. 
She tries to look for some data that support her memory, as well as about the problems 
with which she is concerned. After all this, Lily* finds out that she is motivated to learn 
more about ethical issues. Now that Lily* believes that it is genuinely worthwhile to 
understand ethical problems, she enjoys her project wholeheartedly and 
subsequently obtains various intellectual virtues: reading academic papers carefully, 
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discussing ethical issues with her friend open-mindedly, writing her dissertation 
thoroughly.  
    Both Lily and Lily* appear to have become genuinely intellectually virtuous in the 
personalist’s formulation because of the fact that not only Lily* but also Lily have de 
facto intrinsic motivation for ethical inquiry, and she surely succeeds in writing her 
thesis through her epistemic motivation. Then, the personalist believes that the two 
motivations are functionally identical and serve in the same way in our life. I doubt this 
move. I do think that Lily* but not Lily is genuinely intellectually virtuous. What I need 
to show is that there is some important functional difference between Lily and Lily* 
and that such difference undermines the full-blown virtue of Lily.  
    Based on the narrative self view, “in order to constitute oneself as a self, one 
must have a narrative in which one experiences the past and future as one’s own in 
the strong sense of experiencing the present as part of the whole narrative” 
(Schechtman 2007, 171). Our self narrative requires the appropriation of our 
experience even in the case of Lily and Lily*; in such cases, alienated experiences 
cannot be properly integrated into the self narrative. In Lily’s case, her present self 
may have certain motivations, values, and attitudes toward the relevant domain of 
ethical research, but her self narrative cannot integrate her past experiences about 
the issue at hand. This is because, by definition, her current self narrative holds a set 
of motivations, values, and attitudes toward ethical research that have risen by using 
the machine, and the affective connections and identification necessary for self 
narrative are attainable only for her future behavior. Her narrative is ruptured by the 
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transformation machine. I do not deny that the transformed Lily would hold a different 
self narrative, but her new story has just begun. And it begins from nowhere, because 
the transformation machine cuts her off from her previous self; her past experiences 
are alienated from her current narrative.  
    People might wonder—Lily* has gone through a change in her motivation for 
ethical research (after all, she was also not intrinsically motivated to study ethics at 
some point, and then she started to feel the opposite)—why should only Lily’s self 
narrative be understood as being cut off? I think that Lily’s self narrative is 
substantially different from Lily*’s, which is successive even before and after the 
changes to her motivational profile, because there are some stories to tell for Lily*. To 
understand the further difference between Lily and Lily*, here, the articulation 
constraint of self narrative comes into the debate. Imagine people asking Lily, “Why 
did you come to believe that ethical inquiry is intrinsically worthwhile?” Lily will be 
puzzled, not knowing what to say, because that is the motivation infused by the 
machine; and although she is de facto motivated by ethical inquiry, it is something 
unrelated to her past. On the other hand, Lily* can tell a story like the following: “You 
know, I was a lazy student back then. I did not even think properly what morality 
amounts to. But my friend Mika suggested I should think about my past experiences 
where I believe I was unjustly harmed. I then looked back at my past experiences. I 
remembered I felt very offended when I was verbally harassed by my male friend in 
primary school. Come to think of it, I felt similar resentment when I saw children 
working at the age of ten, instead of going to school in developing countries. You know, 
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it’s wrong. Something is wrong. This kind of thing really matters! I don’t know to this 
date what exactly makes me so resentful, but I went to the library to look for some 
books about this stuff. I read a book by Rawls, and his work was inspiring...” Stories 
like this are open to alteration or reinterpretation later in her life, but a subject like Lily* 
has a story to tell about her intrinsic motivation for epistemic goods, while Lily does 
not. 
    My argument has addressed the functional differences between Lily and Lily* that 
the personalist has failed to notice. Two possible objections need to be addressed: 
First, people might wonder that we could imagine the machine implanting the same 
kind of beliefs of Lily* about her motivations on Lily. In that case, a subject such as 
Lily seems to meet the two relevant requirements of self narrative: appropriation and 
articulation. As Schechtman puts it, however, the story of us cannot be massively 
false; she thinks that the self constitutional narrative must cohere with reality; hence, 
for instance, if someone believes himself to be Napoleon even when he is not, we 
cannot properly believe him as a self. This is called reality constraint on the narrative 
self. Even if Lily obtains a corresponding belief about why she is motivated by ethical 
inquiry as she is now and competently tells a story about why she finds ethical theory 
a worthwhile thing to study, the meaning of her present action, according to the 
narrative constitution view, depends on her story across time. According to narrative 
self theory, what it means for an action to be a part of someone’s narrative is for it to 
flow naturally from the rest of her life story (Schechtman 1996, 159). I have described 
how Lily’s story is not continuous before and after the intervention of the machine; it 
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is true that our belief constitutes a part of our story; however, belief about her 
motivation on its own does not seem to give a sufficient ground for us to regard Lily 
to be as continuous as Lily*.  
    The second kind of objection might be to think that if Lily knows what the machine 
will do to her, and then goes into the machine, expecting to be virtuous, and obtains 
the proper motivations and behavioral dispositions accordingly because of the 
machine, then some might think that she would be as virtuous as her counterpart 
because her motivation for epistemic goods and her behavioral disposition to match 
are guided by her second-order desire to be epistemically virtuous. Let us call this Lily 
with belief about the reliability of the machine as Lily**. Is Lily**’s belief about the 
reliability of the machine sufficient for her to obtain virtue like Lily*?  
    My answer is that it depends on the details of the vignette. It is possible to imagine 
a case where Lily** is able to continue narrating her self narrative before and after the 
transformation and tell an intelligible story about her transformation. However, Lily**’s 
belief about the reliability of the machine might not be enough to make her virtuous, 
because such objection weighs too much on our synchronic belief at one point. I think 
this kind of objection conflates a case of intellectual virtue with a case of knowledge. 
In a debate on the nature of knowledge, virtue reliabilists have analyzed knowledge 
through our reliable cognitive abilities. Not any kind of reliable cognitive ability is 
sufficient for knowledge, but only those abilities integrated into one’s cognitive 
character are understood as properly knowledge conducive (Greco 2003), because 
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we can come up with cases where reliable cognitive abilities allow the agent to have 
a true belief yet fail to obtain knowledge, like Temp, 
 
who regularly forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting 
a thermometer on the wall. Unbeknownst to Temp, however, he is looking at a 
faulty thermometer which is randomly fluctuating within a given range. 
Nonetheless, his beliefs so formed are reliable because (again unbeknownst to 
him) there is someone hidden in the room next to the thermostat who every time 
she sees Temp heads towards the thermometer and adjusts the thermostat so 
that the temperature of the room corresponds to the reading on the thermometer. 
(Pritchard 2010b, 135). 
 
Epistemologists agree that Temp does not obtain knowledge because his cognitive 
ability is not properly integrated into his cognitive character; however, Pritchard goes 
on to say that if Temp becomes aware that he has a helper in this way and, hence, 
obtains a rational belief about his reliable cognitive process, we can think that his true 
belief about the temperature of the room is sufficient for us to count it as knowledge, 
because now the reliable cognitive character is integrated into his cognitive character 
(Pritchard 2010b). So as for the case of knowledge, I agree that a subject such as 
Lily** can obtain knowledge by trusting a machine.  
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    Yet the matter of whether such cognitive integration is sufficient for epistemic 
virtue is another issue.41 There are two reasons why I doubt that Lily** is not as 
virtuous as Lily*. First, it is true that intellectual virtues and knowledge go hand in hand 
to some extent, as virtue epistemologists define intellectual virtue as character traits 
common to epistemically praiseworthy people, and such agents often obtain a lot of 
knowledge as a matter of fact, but not vice versa. Knowledgeable people are not 
necessarily virtuous, as we know counting grains of sand would not make us 
intellectually praiseworthy qua person. Knowledge is descriptive, while virtues are 
inherently value-laden concepts. The extension of knowledge does not seem to 
correspond to the extension of virtue. Second, as we saw in the earlier section, virtue 
is a form of achievement (hence success) that demands that one’s success be 
because of the exercise of one’s relevant abilities, in the sense that this success is 
substantively creditable to this exercise of ability rather than to some other factor that 
is external to one’s agency. Then, the cognitive integration at issue in cases of 
intellectual virtue is more demanding than cases of knowledge, which sometimes 
require a lot less than cognitive achievement, such as testimony cases (Pritchard 
2015).  
 
41 Note here that I am fully aware of the importance of cognitive integration even in 
cases of intellectual virtues. For instance, according to Beahr, being intellectually 
virtuous involves having a good reason to think that one’s virtue-relevant actions are 
likely (in the world in which one finds oneself) to be an effective means to one’s virtue-
relevant goals (Baehr 2013). 
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    Hence, the fact that Lily knows that the transformation machine reliably changes 
her into a being that she likes is not a sufficient ground for intellectual virtue. The 
moral here is that even if we could say that belief about the reliability of the machine 
is sufficient for cognitive integration of knowledge, as reliabilists assume, we cannot 
straightforwardly infer from such cases that the same applies to virtue. There is at 
least a difference between the story that Lily* can tell and that which Lily** can on her 
transformation. If the opponent of my view insists that Lily is as virtuous as Lily* on 
account of her knowledge about the reliability of the machine, they need to explain 
more why they believe that. Settling the debate about the relation of knowledge and 
cognitive integration or its relevance to intellectual virtue goes beyond the purview of 
this thesis, yet I hope that I have provided some reasons that would convince my 
readers that our intuition in cases of knowledge does not support cases of intellectual 
virtues in Lily**.  
    In sum, the self narratives of Lily and Lily* are, after all, very different in nature. 
This difference demonstrates what is missing in Lily’s trait (after transformation). Lily’s 
trait lacks emotional attachment to her past experience, which is necessary for the 
continuous narrative self; thus, her self narratives are torn, fragmented at best. In 
addition, Lily’s trait lacks the rich explanatory story behind her motivation. Lily’s de 
facto motivation is not rich enough, unlike Lily*’s. Lily’s motivation does not flow 
naturally from her narrative. These points give enough reasons to doubt the 
personalist’s assumption that subjects like Lily and Lily* have motivations that are 
functionally on a par with each other. In this section, I have given an argument on why 
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I doubt the personalist’s argument based on the underlying concept of virtue: narrative 
self. As virtue epistemologists, including Battaly, hold the view that the self is an 
ingredient of virtue, the significant difference I have shown between the self of the 
transformed agent like Lily and the virtuous agent in a traditional sense like Lily* 
should cast doubts on the personalist’s assumption that the motivations of Lily and 
Lily* are functionally identical; hence, Battaly’s argument for a non-self reform view of 
virtue is more problematic than it initially appears. 
6. Against Personalism 
Why do I worry so much about personalism? Ultimately, personalism does not 
threaten responsibilism, because Battaly recommends pluralism of virtue by 
proposing her personalism. People might think that adding a personalist option does 
no harm. In this final section, I hope to briefly provide reasons why, instead of holding 
a pluralism of intellectual virtues, I recommend revising responsibilism so that it can 
accommodate environmental scaffoldings into the theory of virtue.  
    First, holding personalism as it is formulated blurs the importance of weighing 
appropriate environmental help against inappropriate ones. I believe that both 
responsibilists and personalists are concerned about how we could effectively avoid 
intellectual vices and cultivate virtues. And as shown in section 1, virtue 
epistemologists are pressured to accept that environmental factors are necessary 
components of virtue cultivation. However, environmental scaffoldings vary so much. 
If personalism were correct, how we obtain traits would have nothing to do with the 
status of virtue. Personalism dismisses the differences among environmental factors 
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that influence our behaviors as if they can all contribute to intellectual virtues in the 
same way. We have already seen that global manipulations and local manipulations 
are different in terms of virtue possession. Are nudges compatible with virtue 
cultivation (Engelen et al. 2018)? How about cognitive enhancements (Fröding 2011)? 
Personalism does not seem to help direct us to virtues by weighing appropriate 
environmental help against inappropriate ones. 
    This first worry leads me to the second worry: what can a personalist say about 
what we can do to improve our virtues? If any environmental factors contribute to 
intellectual virtues in the same way at one point in the past, we can expect that any 
environmental factors can contribute to the same extent in improving intellectual 
virtues now or in the future. Personalism does not help direct us to virtue, even in 
cases where we are future-oriented.  
    Personalists might dismiss these worries. They might insist that personalism has 
nothing to do with the etiology of traits, and thus, only responsibilists should deal with 
such problems. If so, we must ask ourselves instead, what kind of difficulties can 
personalism deal with that responsibilists cannot? Can responsibilists not blame 
vicious people who purportedly have no control in the acquisition of their vices (e.g., 
Robert Harris, Hitler Jugend) as the personalist initially portrays? As discussed earlier, 
the control condition is one way but not the only way to spell out how we put our efforts. 
We can revise responsibilism in a way that it accommodates some cases of vices 
where we lack control (e.g., Harris) but not others (e.g., global manipulation case) into 
their theory. Revisions to responsibilism might be feasible by adopting an alternative 
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way of spelling out our effort but with control. To me, it looks like we lose too much 
and gain too little by thinking of virtue as having been formulated by the personalist. 
Revising responsibilism in a way that it can accommodate some environmental 
scaffoldings, but not all of them, in line with an alternative understanding of self-
cultivation seems to be a more fruitful approach for both understanding and pursuing 
(avoiding) intellectual virtues (vices). 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I criticized the personalist account of intellectual virtue (a non-self-
cultivating view of intellectual virtue). While I am fully aware of the importance of a 
friendly environment in cultivating virtues and rehabilitating vices (especially the 
latter), I still believe that self-cultivation—i.e., efforts on the side of the agent—is a 
necessary component of virtue acquisition. Success—i.e., the achievement 
component of virtue widely shared by virtue epistemologists, including Battaly—
involves efforts on the side of the agent. The personalist relies on attributability 
responsibility. I argued that such responsibility is not compatible with some 
transformation machine cases, as the personalist initially assumed. I have argued 
that the self in the form of a narrative underlies the concept of intellectual virtue 
when they say that intellectual virtue reflects who we are as a thinker. From a 
narrative point of view, there are some essential differences between the agent with 
de facto epistemic motivation inserted by the transformation machine and the 
genuinely virtuous agent. In future research, instead of holding the pluralism of 
 100 
intellectual virtues, fertile research should come from our inquiry about to what 




Chapter 3 Epistemic Partiality of Friendship, and Epistemic Justice 
 
0. Introduction 
We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, more so than those who are not our 
friends. This imbalance in our doxastic attitude towards friends and non- friends is 
often called the epistemic partiality of friendship (Stroud 2006). The epistemic 
partiality of friendship is widespread and commonly observed in our daily lives, but 
whether or not it is a good practice is far less clear. Philosophical dialogue on the 
epistemic partiality of friendship for the past 15 years has shown us that the solution 
to this puzzle cannot be straightforward. In this chapter, I will first lay out the standard 
picture of the epistemic partiality of friendship. Second, I will summarize arguments 
proposed by the main opponents of epistemic partiality, Jason Kawall (2013), Sanford 
Goldberg (2018), and Katherine Hawley (2014). Third, I will analyze the nature of 
friendship as a dynamic process and point out that the current debate ignores some 
important aspects of friendship. Fourth, I will outline potential arguments from 
epistemic injustice against epistemic partiality of friendship that I believe are as strong 
as any argument from friendship against evidentialism. Fifth, I will provide three 
interpretations of my arguments and summarize that although epistemic partiality of 
friendship is not as strong as it first appears, it leads us to an even more complicated 
debate about value pluralism. Finally, I will come back to the implication of this 
argument for virtue epistemology.  
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1. Epistemic Partiality of Friendship  
Sarah Stroud (2006) and Simon Keller (Keller 2004) have both made very similar yet 
independent arguments for allowing the epistemic partiality of friendship precedence 
over epistemic norms. Let me begin with two examples motivating the debate 
proposed by these two philosophers. The first one is “Samʼs case” from Stroudʼs paper.  
 
Suppose, for instance, that a third party reports that your friend Sam recently 
slept with someone and then cruelly never returned any of that personʼs calls, 
knowingly breaking that personʼs heart. Importantly, though, … letʼs stipulate that 
this story is not something which you know to be false (Stroud 2006, 504). 
 
When facing a damning story about our friend, as a good friend, Stroud suggests that 
we ought to adopt, “differential epistemic practices” (505). This consists of interpreting 
such cases in less damning ways, and giving greater credence to such alternative 
interpretations in cases involving friends, as compared to non- friends. She is clearly 
aware that an outright rejection of obvious facts cannot be a characteristic of 
friendship; rather, epistemic partiality occurs at the level of “interpreting the reported 
actions and placing them in perspective” (507) by spending more time and energy on 
minimizing the effect of damning data regarding friends, and giving such an alternative 
construal greater credence: something we are not expected to do for strangers. What 
is distinct about Stroudʼs proposal here is that she maintains that it is our beliefs, not 
only our behaviors, that need special handling in cases of friendship. Hence “the 
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differential doxastic practices of the good friend are a constitutive feature of friendship” 
(Stroud 2006, 505).  
    What is illuminating about this proposal? It is new because the way we are 
encouraged to believe in friends by Stroud is alleged to go against what the evidence 
straightforwardly suggests. Take the case of Sam; if Sam were not our friend, Stroud 
assumes, we would take this damning story about Sam at face value, and believe the 
testimony of the third party. A standard epistemological norm assumed here is 
evidentialism. To put it bluntly, the evidentialistsʼ principle is that P is justified if and 
only if S believes in accordance with the evidence.42 In Samʼs case, the evidence 
suggests Sam has done something wrong, but the fact that Sam is a friend leads us 
to interpret this evidence in a different way than we would in cases of non-friends.  
    Kellerʼs example suggests a similar yet slightly different positive doxastic 
treatment we extend to friends.  
 
Rebecca is scheduled to give a poetry reading at a café. She is nervous about  
reading her poetry in public, but has decided to do it on this occasion because 
she knows that a certain literary agent will be present and she hopes that her 
work might catch his attention. She lets her good friend Eric know that sheʼll be 
giving the reading, and asks whether heʼd mind coming along to be in the 
audience (Keller 2004, 332).  
 
42 More precisely, Stroud cites the following definition of evidentialism: “Doxastic 
attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having 
D toward p fits the evidence S has at t” (Feldman and Conee 1985, 15–34). 
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Keller describes what Eric is expected to believe. That is, as a friend, he should listen 
to Rebeccaʼs poetry with a “sympathetic ear” (332) and subsequently believe her 
poetry was pretty good—even though if it were not Rebecca reading, he would not 
have judged the same way.43 But Keller carefully avoids an unfavorable conclusion 
here, and emphasizes that sympathetic interpretation does not necessarily lead to 
sympathetic belief formation. If Rebeccaʼs poetry was hopeless then Eric, as a good 
friend of Rebecca, should actually tell her so. So, the thought behind Keller’s 
epistemic partiality is that friendship requires us to make special effort. Similarly to 
Stroud, Keller sees this sympathetic ear in friendship as not only descriptive, but also 
as a normative concept: sympathetic treatment is not only manifested in friends but 
“it is one that we can want them to manifest ... the distinctive goods of friendship is 
the knowledge that someone is on your side” (338).  
    Thus, both Stroud and Keller believe in a genuine clash between epistemic 
partiality of friendship and epistemic norms. Objections to the epistemic partiality so 
far proposed (I will address these in the next section) have targeted this clash. But 
Stroud does not only acknowledge the clash, goes further and defends something 
more provocative: in many cases, the epistemic partiality of friendship gives us strong 
 
43 Hawley writes that both Stroud and Keller operate “a kind of counterfactual test of 
epistemic reasonableness” (Hawley 2014, 2039) as they both treat our non-friend 
cases as our default reactions to the evidence available, and then compare special 
cases of friends, given the same evidence. As it turns out, later in this chapter, this 
assumption is not very convincing, as it presupposes that “friendship per se is an 
epistemically irrelevant factor” (2039). 
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reasons to revise our ideas of epistemic rationality. The following is a reconstruction 
of her argument (Stroud 2006, 518‒519):  
 
① Friendship is an indispensable component of a good life. Hence, each of us has 
very strong reasons to form and to maintain friendships.  
② If satisfying certain ideals would preclude friendship, we all have very strong 
reasons not to live up to those ideals.  
③ Epistemic partiality (i.e. friendship) competes with a certain conception of 
epistemic rationality. 
④ We have strong reasons not to live up to such a concept of epistemic rationality.  
 
This implies that when the standard conception of epistemic rationality and friendship 
compete, friendship—due to its indispensable role in our well-being—provides a 
strong case against the standard view of epistemic rationality. Opponents of the 
epistemic partiality of friendship have not paid enough attention to this latter half of 
Stroudʼs argument.  
The proposal of epistemic partiality of friendship—that we should afford epistemic 
partiality to our friends—is, by itself, a very controversial claim, and hence, 
epistemologists have criticized the idea. I find the latter half of Stroud's argument: that, 
on the ground that friendship is a necessary part of a good life, epistemic partiality of 
friendship should override other values such as the epistemic norm, even more 
controversial. I will address these two points individually. In the next section, I first 
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address objections to the proposal of epistemic partiality of friendship by 
epistemologists. I will come back to the second point in section 4.  
 
2. How to Solve the Dilemma  
The epistemic partiality of friendship is recognized as a genuinely problematic 
proposal for epistemologists. There are a number of ways to explain away the clash 
between the epistemic norm and the norm of friendship: for example, we might (1) 
claim that friendship actually tracks evidence and hence, epistemic partiality of 
friendship is in line with epistemic norms; (2) epistemic partiality of friendship exists 
but it does not threaten the epistemic norm. In doing so, there are a few key features 
that epistemologists could tweak so that the putative tension between the two norms 
can be explained away. Remember that both Stroud’s and Kellerʼs proposals consist 
of two views: the epistemic partiality of friendship in combination with the epistemic 
norm (more precisely, evidentialism). And according to evidentialism, there is a widely 
shared hidden assumption that the doxastic attitude we take to a proposition is 
decided uniquely at a time, given evidence: uniqueness of doxastic attitudes (White 
2005, Hawley 2014). Proponents of epistemic rationality can attack one or many of 
the components in the initial argument. Hence, the points I would like to draw my 
readersʼ attention to in each opposing view are: the relationship between friendship 
and reason; the evidentialist’s claim that we should believe in accordance with the 
evidence; and the uniqueness of doxastic attitudes.  
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    Let me start with the simplest objection to epistemic partiality of friendship: it is a 
reductionist answer. Reductionism ultimately reduces our epistemic reliance on our 
friends to the epistemic reasons why we should believe our friends more than our 
non-friends. Stroud anticipated the reductionist reply:  
 
This strategy sees the friendʼs apparently differential epistemic practices simply 
as reflections of the very different evidential stances she occupies vis a vis her 
friends on the one hand and nonfriends on the other (Stroud 2006, 515). 
 
It is obviously true that we know more about our friends than strangers. And as Stroud 
herself concedes, if your friend leaves a party without thanking the host, the host 
might see him as a rude man, but you have better epistemic reasons to believe he 
did not act rudely, but rather he (might have) just received worrying news and left in a 
hurry (Stroud 2006). Even so, Stroud has two reasons for doubting that such a 
reductionist answer is sufficient to describe the epistemic partiality of friendship. First, 
that in such cases our active intervention in interpreting the evidence in favor of our 
friends seems “out of kilter with the objective weight of the considerations” (516), and 
second, that the evidence we hold regarding our friends is already corrupted. I will 
come back to this reductionist argument again in the next section.  
    According to Hawley (2014), trust will steer us out of the crisis. Trust in friendship 
is beneficial: trust will deepen our friendship and is rewarding for us: these are self-
interested reasons to trust our friends. There are also good grounds to trust our 
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friends: “people are more likely to behave in a trustworthy manner towards their 
friends, and we are more likely to form friendships with people we consider to be 
trustworthy” (2037). Trusting someone to do X is compatible with not having a belief 
that she would do X. Unless we have overwhelming reasons to believe otherwise, we 
are epistemically permitted to trust friends “without-belief” (2034). She concedes that 
if we were to choose one single epistemic rationality, between cases of friends and 
non-friends, she admits that what we believe of a stranger is a norm, but it does not 
necessarily mean that our trust in friends is epistemically irrational, as she here gives 
up the principle of uniqueness of our doxastic attitudes. For her, “more than one set 
of standards is epistemically reasonable” (2040). Hawley explains away the putative 
clash between two norms by analyzing our trust in friendship and provides epistemic 
reasons why we ought to believe in friends, and she also sacrifices the uniqueness 
criteria of doxastic attitudes.  
    Jason Kawall also tweaks the epistemic norm (i.e. evidentialism) so that it 
accommodates the apparently problematic pragmatic pressure, arising from 
friendship, to reinterpret the evidence. As he rightly points out, two goals often 
acknowledged among epistemologists are obtaining true beliefs and avoiding false 
beliefs, and we must always balance these two goals. How is such balance 
determined? Pragmatic concerns can play a role in deciding how we balance these 
two concerns, according to Kawall. The following example of his illustrates a clear 
example in which a pragmatic reason influences our epistemic rationality.  
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Claire is severely allergic to peanuts; her friend is not. At a bakery, the friend is 
satisfied by asking an employee whether there are peanuts in the baked goods 
she is about to buy. It seems she can form a justified true belief that there are no 
peanuts based on the employee’s testimony—a paradigmatic instance of 
knowledge-acquisition via testimony. But Claire will presumably be much more 
careful—are products with peanuts made on the same machinery as these 
goods? Have there been any past instances of contamination? It is crucial for 
Claire to be careful to avoid falsely believing that there are no peanuts in the 
items she is about to purchase (Kawall 2013, 364). 
 
Avoiding a false belief about the absence of peanuts is vitally important for Claire. 
Kawall sees cases of friendship as similar to this allergy case. There is a minimum 
justification for belief to count as knowledge (cases of non-friends would need to 
satisfy this criteria), and pragmatic concerns can raise it to a certain degree, but 
anything that comes down in between absolute certainty and the minimum threshold 
of knowledge is “epistemically permissible” (367). So, according to Kawall, friendship 
does set a bar high for knowledge, but people who act upon it “would be acting entirely 
appropriately epistemically” (367‒368). Hence, epistemic norms and the norm of 
friendship do not clash, as Stroud and Keller initially illustrate.44 Kawall explains away 
 
44 Kawallʼs idea is in line with an epistemological view called pragmatic encroachment. 
He explicitly avoids a strong type of pragmatic encroachment thesis: subject-sensitive 
invariantism (SSI). According to SSI, “if you have knowledge-level justification that p, 
then p is warranted enough to justify you in Φ-ing, for any Φ”(Fantl and McGrath 2009, 
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the clash between norm of friendship and epistemic rationality but by doing so, he 
admits that pragmatic concern can change the thresholds of knowledge.  
    Very similarly to Kawall, Goldberg also appeals to pragmatic concerns in 
explaining away the putative tension between the two norms. Practical reasons 
naturally arise from various values we cherish, and friendship is a representative 
example of such a value in life. In Goldbergʼs terms, the allergy case discussed above 
can be understood as one in which we have value-reflecting practical reasons to 
protect our values, as our survival or health are at stake (Goldberg 2018). Here, unlike 
Kawall, Goldberg does not believe that these practical reasons would change the 
threshold of justification. People who have practical reasons to inquire further are 
justified in believing in the first place, before any further inquiry. Further inquiry 
imposed by their value-generated practical reasons are for actions, but not for beliefs 
to be justified, and hence, according to Goldberg, beliefs are still governed by the 
standard evidentialistic epistemic norm. Goldberg explains away the tension between 
the two norms, but in doing so, the epistemic norm remains as the evidentialists have 
traditionally formulated it, and the reason why we believe in our friends is reduced to 
pragmatic reasons to inquire further, hence, action. 
 
98). Unlike SSI, he admits there is a minimum threshold for all beliefs to satisfy; 
however, I took Kawallʼs view in line with pragmatic encroachment in a broad sense, 
because he allows that pragmatic reasons ultimately decide the thresholds of justified 
belief. He might not agree with my interpretation here; however, it is beyond the 
purview of this thesis to settle this issue. 
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    I have summarized three approaches that aim to eliminate the tension between 
epistemic norms and the norm of friendship. For epistemologists, Goldbergʼs analysis 
might be judged as the most attractive, as his view keeps the standard epistemic norm 
in its purest form, compared to the other two views, where the uniqueness of doxastic 
attitudes is violated. Giving up the uniqueness of doxastic attitudes, or committing to 
pragmatic encroachment, might be attractive options for some, but are not welcome 
solutions for every epistemologist. In the next section, I will outline my potential 
concerns about the whole debate.  
 
3. Friendship as a Dynamic Process 
In this section, my aim is to express concerns that I have with the current debate on 
the epistemic partiality of friendship. My core point is that the dynamic of friendship is 
never discussed in the literature on the epistemic partiality of friendship in philosophy. 
How do we make friends and maintain our friendships in real life? When do our 
friendships come to an end? If we pay proper attention to the dynamic nature of 
friendship, I believe that the putative tension between Stroud and Keller and their 
opponents would be much more subtle and also more complicated than it initially 
appears.  
    There is a question lurking in the debate. Does our friendship track the truth? 
Stroud and Keller would agree that the epistemic partiality of friendship genuinely 
clashes with epistemic norms, because they think that loyalty to friends is not 
compatible with tracking the truth. And their opponents, especially Hawley, provide 
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reasons for thinking otherwise—i.e., she provides a reason why trust in friendship is 
an epistemically relevant factor (Hawley 2014), and hence goes along with 
evidentialism, broadly construed. My concern here is this: why do we need to take a 
side in the first place? Another option seems available when answering this question. 
Does friendship track the truth? My answer is both yes and no, to some extent.  
     Friendship is dynamic and comes in stages: friendship is constructed over time; 
friendship also has to be maintained; and sometimes friendship decays, or ceases to 
exist when things go wrong.45 Thus, I take it that there are at least three possible 
stages in friendship: construction, maintenance, and termination. 46 By examining 
each stage of friendship (though this is surely not an exhaustive list of what friendship 
can be), we would be able to provide a richer understanding of this type of relationship. 
 
45 When Stroud explains that the reductionist answer does not hold because our 
beliefs about our friends are already “corrupted and slanted” (Stroud 2006, 516) due 
to the epistemic partiality of friendship, she misses the fact that friendship is a 
gradually constructed phenomenon. Hawley also points out that friendship is 
constructed gradually, hence Stroud’s point does not hold for the early stage of a 
friendship (Hawley 2014). According to Hawley, “earlier beliefs about our friend’s 
behavior may have been less ‘corrupted and slanted’, and thus can provide some 
grounds for our current opinions” (2037). But in her account, it is not clear how such 
early beliefs about our friends help shape our current friendship and how our beliefs 
about our friends in the early stage of friendship transform into trust in our friends. In 
section 4, I hope to explain this gap via the concept of epistemic partisanship.  
46 Oswald also points out that “relationship maintenance is conceptualized both as 
the phase in between initiation and termination of the relationship and also as a 
process”(Oswald 2016, 368). My view of friendship as a dynamic process is in line 
with this understanding. 
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This claim is in line with some psychological studies on friendship. For instance, 
Roberts and Dunbar write: 
 
Social relationships are not fixed, static entities but are prone to decay such that 
they become less close over time […] To prevent this decay, and keep the 
relationship at a particular level of emotional intensity, active maintenance is 
required (Roberts and Dunbar 2011, 187).  
 
This characterization of friendship implies that friendship requires special kinds of 
maintenance behavior, and their experiments show that maintaining behaviors such 
as engaging in different activities together (multiplexity), and frequent communication, 
are called for in order to maintain emotional closeness in friendship over time, unlike 
other close relationships such as kin (Roberts and Dunbar 2011).  
    Once a good friendship is established, its maintenance comes to the fore. In 
maintaining friendship, some important aspects of being friends are more relevant, 
such as being mutually respectful and supportive. Friendship here constructs a 
special relation—namely, it is a care relation. We all have a small number of people 
who are near and dear to us, more so than strangers. We often care for our parents, 
our partners and our friends. It is surprising that the theorists in the debate on the 
epistemic partiality of friendship have not made an explicit connection between 
friendship and care ethics; however, the strong connection between the two is already 
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implicit in the debate. For instance, Keller compares friendship with coaching when 
he writes:  
 
If you are working towards a goal, like increasing your fitness or performing well 
on an exam, you might benefit from having a coach who doesn’t just teach you 
skills and give you specialized information, but provides motivation and 
encouragement (Keller 2004, 339).  
 
Kellerʼs description of our friends as encouraging coaches is in line with some 
descriptions of our care relations; for instance, Nel Noddings rightly points out that the 
carer becomes attentive to the needs of the cared-for, and by detecting their needs, 
she is motivated to act for the cared-for and his project, more so than for her own 
projects (Noddings 2012). Here people might associate the care relation with a one-
sided relation such as the parent‒child, but this is not always the case, as she writes:  
 
In adult, on-going relationships, the usual expectation is that the parties will 
exchange positions regularly: I may be carer in one encounter and cared-for in 
the next (Noddings 2012, 53).  
 
In a friendship understood as a care relation, it makes sense that we put effort into 
answering the need of the cared-for (i.e., your friend) in comparison with a stranger. 
In a care relationship, there is an expectation of mutuality: that your friend is taking 
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good care of you, and you will be taking good care of your friend. Seen from this 
maintenance point of view, sticking to your friend, as Keller and Stroud expect, might 
be a necessary part of what it is to be a good friend. I take the epistemic partiality of 
friendship to be best understood from this maintenance stage of friendship.  
    Having said that, I think the construction stage of friendship is best understood 
from an evidentialist point of view. We do not make friends with everyone. And unlike 
some other close relationships, friendship is voluntary (Oswald 2016)—we need to 
pay attention to its formation, and termination as well. If someone claims that he 
believes in a friendʼs testimony because she is his friend, he is putting the cart before 
the horse (Hawley 2014; Keller 2004). We become friends with someone because 
they are trustworthy, because of their attractive character traits, etc. but not vice versa. 
Compulsive lying prevents true friendship, and becoming friends with someone who 
says morally repugnant things all the time is perhaps not a feasible option. Saying 
that believing in a friend does not track the truth at all would make the genealogy of 
friendship a complete mystery. On the other hand, it is not the case that we make 
friends with someone for their knowledge, either. It sounds counterintuitive and also 
repugnant to make a friend because I want her as a reliable informant. Such a reason 
for friendship is counterintuitive in the same way that we feel morally disgusted when 
we visit a sick friend in the hospital because we think it is our moral duty, not because 
she is my friend (Stocker 1976).  
    When it comes to understanding the relation of the initiation of friendship and 
epistemic norms further, I think introducing the concept of partisan affiliation would be 
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helpful. Partisan affiliation reflects a personʼs value commitments, and, based on the 
common normative views of the world among partisans, “sometimes it makes sense 
to assign greater credibility to a testifier because you know you share a political 
affiliation with her...When I learn a personʼs partisan affiliation, I learn something about 
the political and moral values she endorses” (Rini 2017, E-50‒51). There are 
significant diversities within parities but when I learn my partisan affiliation is shared 
by someone, “I learn that she tends to get normative questions right (by my normative 
lights)” (E51). The scope of Rini’s argument is primarily on moral and political values; 
however, I would like to propose an idea that friends tend to share epistemic values 
as well. And I believe that this point helps us understand why construction of 
friendship is more in line with epistemic norms rather than the epistemic partiality of 
friendship.  
    I see no reason why we cannot extend Rini’s argument to epistemic value 
commitments. When you inquire into something, what is the first thing you would do? 
What do you think allows one to reach the truth? What kind of intellectual character 
traits do you think are truth-conducive? Who, do you think, are reliable informants and 
why do you think so? People have different responses to such questions. And 
people’s styles of inquiry are different depending on their answers to such questions. 
I would like to call these value commitments related to inquiry, epistemic partisanship. 
When my friend and I share epistemic partisanship i.e. epistemically normative 
commitments, I will think that she tends to get epistemic questions right by my own 
normative lights. Then, there is a sense in which friendship tracks truth (through my 
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eyes). But such evidence is dependent on our subjective epistemic values: what I 
think leads us to truth. If friends are epistemic partisans, we have reasons why we 
think they get things correct. But obviously this is a double-edged sword: if I were not 
on the right track, my friend who shares a partisan affiliation with me might also be 
perceiving important things incorrectly. With epistemic partisanship in mind, we are 
able to see why construction of friendship track evidence (but by my own normative 
lights).  
    People might say that in the cases of friends from childhood, we become friends 
with someone based on contingent factors rather than shared values (e.g., where you 
happened to have been born). I do not disagree on this point; however, is it not 
precisely this contingency and lack of a common set of values that explains why we 
often end up being estranged from our old friends later in life? Here, to understand 
further that construction of friendship is in line with epistemic norms (by my own 
normative lights), let’s imagine the third stage of friendship: where friendship ceases 
to exist. Let me illustrate a couple of examples.  
    Imagine your old childhood friend A. You and he grew up together in a small town, 
and he was a close friend of yours. You left your hometown for college but you 
occasionally stayed in touch when you went back home. You were confused about 
his condescending remarks to his female colleagues in his workplace, but you visited 
A from time to time. Time went by, and you are now working as an ethics lecturer in a 
college in the city where you live. When you call your parents, you hear that your old 
friend A has committed sexual harassment in his workplace and been fired. You are 
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disgusted by the incident and feel very distanced from him: you consider stopping 
visiting him, stopping sending him messages, because such immoral conduct runs 
contrary to your values. 
    Imagine another friend B. As with A, you and he grew up together in a small town, 
and he was a close friend of yours. You have a newborn baby at home, and raising a 
child is a totally new experience for you. You remember your old friend B had a baby 
a few years ago, and call him to get some advice on baby care. When you call him, 
you quickly discover that he is now actively denying the efficacy of vaccines, and he 
tries to convince you not to vaccinate your newborn baby. You hold up the phone, take 
a deep breath, and determine that you will never ask B for any advice related to child 
raising in future.  
    We all have similar experiences in life—when your old trusted friends suddenly 
express a sexist opinion, when they say something awful about immigrants, when 
they don't pay money back to you on time, when they tell you a lie, etc. The cases of 
friends A and B described above are thumbnail portraits of friendship decay. There is 
a clash of value commitments: in the case of A, the value in question is moral, and in 
the case of B, epistemic. When friendship breaks down, we can often pin down the 
reason, namely, that our values have moved apart. If this analysis is on the right track, 
then these descriptions of the construction and termination of friendship teach us that 
friends often share normative values, and especially, epistemic values. Epistemic 
partisanship would provide some basis for the claim that friendship tracks evidence. 
Believing a friend is therefore in line with epistemic norms.  
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    I am not aiming to describe all cases of friendship here. Admittedly, there are 
cases where strong friendship remains, between people who have radically different 
moral-political commitments and world views. However, it is enough for the current 
debate to show that epistemic partisanship sometimes explains the initiation and 
termination of friendship—in such cases, friendship does track truth from the 
subjective point of view of the agent. Then the problem remains, especially for 
epistemologists, how these subjective epistemic standards are to be improved, so 
that our subjective epistemic standard and epistemic partisanship actually track truth. 
Virtue epistemology might be helpful in this regard; I will come back to this point in the 
final section.  
    My illustrations of the first and the third stage of friendship indicate that the current 
debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship is too coarse-grained: Keller and 
Stroud would be sympathetic to the view that friendship is by nature like coaching, 
while an opponent like Kawall or Hawley would not. Without making reference to 
different stages of friendship, they look as if they are in real conflict over what 
friendship is supposed to be (i.e. some say friendship must be such that it is like 
coaching, and others do not), although it seems to me that they are just trying to 
capture the different stages of friendship respectively. In the worst case, they end up 
talking over each other, with different concepts of friendship in mind. In any case, this 
putative conflict looks futile. 
    What can we infer about friendship per se from this analysis? Regarding the three 
potential stages of friendship—construction, maintenance, and termination—I hope 
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to have shown that we are encouraged to act in different ways in different stages of 
friendship, and the existing literature on the epistemic partiality of friendship tries to 
capture one or some among the many. The construction period is dependent on 
evidence (albeit subjective), in contrast to what Keller and Stroud suggest. On the 
other hand, in maintaining friendship, the care ethics framework fits very well in 
explaining the partiality we owe. Note that I do not claim that only these considerations 
apply to each stage of friendship— rather, the point of emphasis is that friendship is 
a dynamic process in which different concerns can apply in different contexts, and the 
current debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship does not seem to pay enough 
attention to this fact.  
 
4. Testimonial Injustice, and Friendship 
In the last part of the second section, I explained that epistemologists perhaps prefer 
Goldbergʼs practical account because his account holds to evidentialism in its purest 
form. Here I will express a concern that even if his view is on the right track, it leads 
us to a clash of values (namely, between friendship, evidence, and justice). And 
there’s a potential further worry about the practical account. I will first address cases 
where multiple values clash, including friendship and epistemic rationality, but also 
justice. And second, I will provide three interpretations of such clashes of multiple 
values including friendship. 
    We attribute credibility to our interlocutor’s assertions. When a speaker receives 
an unfair deficit of credibility from a hearer because of prejudice on the hearer’s part, 
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we are able to identify in such a case that the speaker is suffering from testimonial 
injustice (M. Fricker 2007). In testimonial exchanges, hearers make credibility 
attributions regarding the speakers, and in the attribution, there can be error in the 
direction of excess or deficit. An excess will tend to be advantageous for the speaker, 
and a deficit tend to be disadvantageous. The hearer must match the level of 
credibility she applies to the speaker to the evidence that the speaker offers. There 
exists a distinctively epistemic injustice when someone is wronged specifically in her 
capacity as a knower. As a specific case of testimonial injustice, I draw your attention 
to a case of gaslighting. Gaslighting “involves expressing doubts that the harm or 
injustice that the speaker is testifying to really happened as the speaker claims” 
(Mckinnon 2017, 168). Looking at a case of  
gaslighting, we might be surprised by how structurally similar Mckinnon’s case is to 
the case proposed by Stroud. A trans-woman Victoria is testifying to Susan about her 
colleague James, where James is a friend of Susan.  
 
Susan: “I’m sure you just misheard him: you’re on edge and expect to hear 
mispronouncing. I just don’t believe that James would do that. He won a 
university diversity award for his supporting queer issues, after all. Besides, he’s 
been a supporter of yours in the past too. He really is your ally.” 
Victoria: “Well, he’s done it a bunch of times in the past few months. The last 
time was two weeks ago in his office.”  
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Susan: “You say that he’s done it before, and maybe he has, but I’ve never heard 
him do it before” (McKinnon 2017, 168). 
 
McKinnon further argues that social situatedness decides who is sufficiently well 
epistemically positioned to even properly perceive the world in a certain way. As a 
trans-woman, Victoria is “far better epistemically positioned than her cis ‘ally’ Susan 
to perceive mispronouncing” (170). Susan’s epistemically partial treatment of 
Victoria’s testimony about what her friend James has said to her might be regarded 
as desirable from the “friendship” point of view by Keller and Stroud. If McKinnon is 
on the right track, Victoria is here gaslit, suffering from an epistemic injustice and 
wronged as a knower. My concern is that for those who were convinced by the 
argument for the epistemic partiality of friendship Susan’s belief can be seen as 
desirable, seen from a point of view of a friendship Susan holds to James, although it 
is a clear case of epistemic injustice. What is even more frightening here is that this 
concern can be generalized. Here’s a recipe for many problems: imagine a case in 
which subject X, a victim of gaslighting from an underrepresented group in society, 
tries to testify about something important to you, and your good friend Y stops by and 
testifies to the opposite of what X says. Is it epistemically desirable to defend Y on the 
grounds of your friendship?  
    If Stroud and Keller are right, we do have an obligation to listen to a friend’s 
testimony with more sympathetic ears (as Susan clearly does for James) than we 
would a stranger’s. So if we take their argument at face value, it is epistemically 
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desirable to gaslight Victoria, from the friendship point of view. Even conceding to 
Goldberg that friendship gives us pragmatic reasons to inquire further in the case of 
a friend, Susan might be justified in believing Victoria had she inquired further, but 
she will not do this as her friendship to James gives her proper excuses not to.  
    In the first section, I showed that Stroud’s initial argument was that friendship 
outweighs epistemic rationality because friendship is necessary for a good life, and if 
epistemic rationality competes with friendship, we have reasons not to live up to such 
a concept of epistemic rationality. However, justice is also, arguably, an indispensable 
component of a good life. Imagine the ethicists’ favorite case of The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn. The reason why, in ethical debate, Huck is perceived as morally 
praiseworthy in helping Jim run away from his owner is partly because of his friendship 
to Jim, but also because not acting so was unjust (despite his knowledge, Jim’s action 
is just, as a matter of fact). He would not have been so praiseworthy if he had rescued 
a friend who was a runaway murderer. Then why can we not construct a very similar 
argument for epistemic justice, based on the same reasoning as that given in section 
1? 
 
① Being treated epistemically justly—not being wronged specifically in my capacity 
as a knower—is an indispensable component of a good life. Hence, each of us 
has very strong reasons to conform to epistemic justice.  
② If satisfying certain ideals would preclude epistemic justice, we all have very 
strong reasons not to live up to those ideals.  
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③ Epistemic justice competes with the epistemic partiality of friendship 
④ We have strong reasons not to live up to such a concept of the epistemic partiality 
of friendship.  
Epistemic partiality, as a necessary component of a good friend (Stroud’s second half 
of the argument), is then shown to infringe something that is by itself also necessary 
for a good life: epistemic justice. As we have seen in the case of gaslighting, Victoria 
was suffering from the epistemic kind of injustice due to the epistemic partiality of 
friendship of Susan to James. In order to respect epistemic justice as such, we are 
required to respect evidentialism and believe in accordance with evidence (i.e. 
Victoria’s testimony). I hope to have shown that not only friendship but also other 
values, such as epistemic justice, can take exactly the same role in the form of 
argument proposed by Stroud. Hence, Stroud’s initial argument does not look as 
convincing as it first appears.47 
    Let me close this section with possible interpretations of my analysis here. If we 
grant that the values of friendship and justice genuinely clash, what should we do in 
such scenarios? I have three suggestions. First, there’s an issue of subjective and 
 
47 Note here I am not claiming that epistemic justice always outweighs epistemic 
partiality in friendship, but nor do cases of friendship: neither Keller nor Stroud believe 
that epistemic partiality of friendship always outweighs epistemic rationality. My 
argument given here is sufficient to show that where an important value like epistemic 
justice competes with another value X, this would give us reasons not to live up to X. 
As the original argument goes, this would provide us with a strong reason to revise 
our understanding of X. But, as shown here, value X could be friendship, and the 
subsequent partiality arising from friendship.  
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objective values. In the practical approach proposed by Goldberg, he is referring to 
subjective values: 
 
The basic idea behind the notion of a value-reflecting reason is not new. Ethicists 
have employed the idea to capture the practical reasons we have in virtue of our 
values—deriving either from the values themselves, or from our valuing them. 
In this paper I will employ the version which speaks of our valuing, not of the 
values themselves—but nothing hinges on this choice (Goldberg 2018, italics 
mine). 
 
We are all fallible in choosing what we feel is worthwhile to pursue for our well-being. 
Unlike Goldberg, we could perhaps say some values are objectively good (i.e., justice). 
Even if Susan values friendship and fails to notice the value of justice, and hence fails 
to listen to Victoria’s testimony thus making her act look appropriate initially, from 
perspective of friendship, we could perhaps still condemn her and says that she 
misses the important objective value of justice (which is perhaps supposed to be a 
dominant value in this particular case). A potential issue here is that friendship could 
also be objectively valued, as well as the objective value of justice; hence some 
people will find that a genuine clash between the two values seems to remain. 
    This leads us to our second interpretation of the clash of friendship and justice: 
impossibility of perfection. This interpretation is in line with Michael Slate’s moral 
imperfectionism. Slote criticizes a widespread ideal in philosophy that our values for 
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happiness are ultimately in harmony. He concedes that an ethically perfect being is 
untenable, evident from cases such as clashes between tactfulness and frankness, 
career and family, and so on. We cannot be ethically perfect: according to Slote, if we 
aspire to this we are failing to “recognize how messy and unharmonious our values 
really are” (Slote 2013, 149). This is not tantamount to a claim of ethical pluralism, as 
pluralism can accommodate many lives with “different styles of perfection” and hence 
permits “different styles or forms of harmony” (150). On the other hand, 
imperfectionism denies the possibility of perfect harmony per se, and takes the 
following predicament at face value: “certain conflicting values cannot either 
separately or in some kind of diluted combination make for a perfect whole” (150). By 
following moral imperfectionism, there is a chance we can say, in a particular case 
such as gaslighting, that both the original Susan, and the Susan who listens to Victoria 
sympathetically, act virtuously, as they both genuinely aspire to adhere to an objective 
value, although each conflicts with the other, and it is not feasible for us to pursue 
these two values at a time in this scenario. Two values cannot be pursued in harmony.  
    Lastly, the most pessimistic interpretation of the case at hand is to see it as similar 
to an irresolvable tragic dilemma (Hursthouse 1999). An irresolvable dilemma is one 
in which we have no clue how we should to choose one action over another: such as 
pondering what kind of birthday present to give to your daughter, where both options 
A or B are desirable and there’s no moral ground on which to opt for one over another 
(this is a pleasant irresolvable dilemma). Tragic dilemmas are cases such as “saving 
one’s own life by betraying or killing others” (Hursthouse 1999, 72), where both 
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actions are bad, hence even the virtuous agent cannot “emerge with her life 
unmarred… simply in virtue of the fact that her life presented her with this choice” 
(74–75). But my case of gaslighting—where friendship and epistemic justice 
compete—is neither a straightforward case of a pleasant irresolvable dilemma, nor a 
tragic irresolvable dilemma. Unlike those cases, interestingly, our case of gaslighting 
can be understood as a mixture of the two (or, we could perhaps say these are a 
particular case of tragic irresolvable dilemmas whose choices are all virtuous): both 
actions—sticking to your friend’s testimony, or believing what Victoria says because 
she is from an underrepresented group of today’s society—pursue their own good, 
yet the agent cannot avoid their own life being marred, nonetheless. An unpalatable 
conclusion for this strongest interpretation of the phenomena for an epistemologist is 
that, even if we listen to Victoria in pursuing justice, we must admit that we cannot 
emerge with clean hands in such a case.48  
    Among these three interpretations, the question of which best describes the 
genuine clash of friendship and epistemic justice requires a whole paper in itself, and 
goes way beyond my current purview. As for the particular case of Victoria and Susan, 
there might be a way to handle it in line with the first interpretation. Even if we concede 
that we see friendship as an objective value, it does not necessary follow from that 
that the friendships we currently engage with are with the kind of friends we are 
 
48 These three interpretations are not competing with each other: it might be the case 
that two or three interpretations are compatible. I aim to show as many potential 
interpretations of the clash of values of friendship and epistemic justice as possible, 
some of which can overlap with each other. 
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supposed to have. The case of abusive relationships is suggestive here: as a matter 
of fact, in an abusive relationship, people still love their abusive partner, love being 
their objective and subjective value, but they often retrospectively regret such a 
relationship and think that they should not have spent time and energy on this kind of 
person. A similar thing can be said of some friendships. On the other hand, in cases 
of knowledge or justice, it is hard to imagine instances of knowledge that we should 
not have had, nor justices we should not have achieved. So even if it is true that 
friendship, justice, and knowledge are all pursued objectively in the case of Victoria 
and Susan, we might still be able to argue that Susan’s action of gaslighting Victoria 
is vicious here, as Susan should not have been a friend to a person like James in the 
first place, or alternatively, she should not have shaped herself the way she currently 
is.  
 
5. Implication for Virtue Epistemology  
Based on these arguments about epistemic partiality of friendship so far addressed, 
there are two implications for virtue epistemology. I will argue that virtue 
epistemologists are required to spend more time considering cases where epistemic 
value clashes with non-epistemic values. Such conflicting cases were neglected in 
the debate because theorists did not take imperfectionism seriously. Subsequently, 
the problem of proper reaction toward such conflicting cases, i.e. tragic cases, would 
arise. Secondly, a positive implication of epistemic partiality of friendship for virtue 
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epistemology will be addressed. I will argue that epistemic partisanship held by 
friendship reinforces the importance of cultivation of intellectual virtues on individuals.  
    First, and foremost, virtue epistemologists have not paid enough attention to 
conflicting cases of non-epistemic and epistemic values. The debate of epistemic 
partiality of friendship was the first significant attempt as such. If my argument is on 
the right track, epistemic partiality of friendship often creates not only a conflict 
between evidence and friendship but also a three-sided struggle among evidence, 
friendship, and (epistemic) justice. We ought to pursue all these three values in life. 
As we have seen in the previous section, some situations might require us to choose 
a virtuous act over others, without emerging with our life unmarred. 
    Traditionally minded virtue epistemologists believed that such a conflict could be 
explained away. Because they are, consciously or unconsciously, committed to the 
“enlightenment assumptions and those of ancient Greek thought about the harmony 
or harmonizability of all our ethical values” (Slote 2013, 149). The presupposition 
among traditionalists is that there can be a harmony among the epistemic virtues we 
pursue, or epistemic and moral virtues we pursue. So even if the situation appears to 
call for two incompatible virtuous actions, they thought that a truly virtuous agent could 
find a way out. Nevertheless, I believe virtue epistemologists ought to pay proper 
attention to imperfectionism. Where there is a fundamental conflict among values, and 
among virtues, they need to figure out cases where epistemic goods are to be pursued 
over other values. Similarly, there are cases where an epistemically virtuous action 
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needs to be weighed against a morally virtuous action. Virtue epistemologists need to 
take these cases more seriously, and provide justifications for such choices. 
    It is important to note that virtue epistemologists do not pursue epistemic goods 
over other goods in every case. It is hard to make sense of a theory encouraging 
people to spend their entire life pursuing epistemic goods such as knowledge. Instead, 
virtue epistemologists’ contribution in philosophy is that they have established a 
distinctively epistemic dimension in our good life. Relatedly, there are distinctively 
good and bad epistemic character traits according to such epistemic goods. When 
virtue epistemologists remained less sanguine about the clash of values and virtues; 
they did not need to worry about how to solve such a conflict seriously. However, 
throughout the chapter, I hope to have shown that such conflicts are not at all 
negligible, and can be observed frequently, and with surprising variety.  
    To show how this problem multiplies, remember that friendship is broadly in line 
with care-relation. It is fair to say that other care-relations we hold with people who 
are near and dear to us might provide us with (pragmatic) reasons to inquire further 
compared to cases where people whom we do not care are involved. This clash might 
present in a different way in different friendship cases. Representative of such 
relationships are a partnership, a kinship, and a children-parent(s) relationship. Virtue 
epistemologists need to investigate further the nature of the clash between epistemic 
goods and goods inherent in each care relation.  
    Relatedly, the problem of our response to the conflict would emerge. Hursthouse 
argues, “a situation from which even a virtuous agent cannot emerge with her life 
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unmarred” (Hursthouse 1999,75) is the definition of us calling situations  tragic. 
However, imperfectionism would multiply such tragic cases significantly. By the nature 
of the principle, we cannot be perfect, every life would encounter a tragic conflict. Are 
we supposed to call each one of them tragic where we cannot emerge with our life 
unmarred? Is it not too harsh to describe every tragic conflict as marring life, when 
fulfilling it is not tenable for anyone? Shall we, instead, feel regret in situations where 
two virtuous actions and two fundamental values are mutually exclusive? We have to 
ask ourselves what response we are to take in tragic cases. A serious consideration 
of imperfectionism would thus lead us to a new theoretical terrain of virtue 
epistemology.  
    Secondly, a study on epistemic partiality of friendship might paradoxically 
promote virtue epistemology on individual level. As shown in section 3, epistemic 
partisanship can partly explain why we think our friends are right. When my friend and 
I share epistemically normative commitments, such as whom we think are reliable 
informants and why we think so, I can trust them in getting questions right by my own 
normative rights. In this way, there is a sense in which friendship tracks evidence from 
my perspective. But such evidence is dependent on my subjective epistemic values. 
We have seen that this is a double-edged sword: if I were not taking epistemic norms 
right in the first place, my friend who shares an epistemic partisan affiliation with me 
might also be incorrect. So epistemic partiality of friendship would perpetuate a 
vicious cycle in such a scenario. Note that here, what I believe to be truth-conducive 
is the reference point of judgments. Then, in order to minimize the epistemic error 
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springing from epistemic partiality of friendship; we have strong motivation to hold on 
to the right kind of epistemic standards on individuals. Epistemic virtues are known as 
character traits responsible inquirers would hold (Zagzesbki 1996). Virtue 
epistemology has a distinct role in promoting this aim by encouraging cultivations of 
epistemic virtues. Ironically, then, the fact that we are prone to believe our friend puts 
extra practical pressure on us to cultivate epistemic virtues on the individual level.  
    However, this does not necessarily mean that we should promote cultivations of 
virtues by individuals. Given that we are prone to become friends with someone from 
a young age, cultivation of intellectual virtues needs to be implemented around the 
same time, from an early stage of our life to mitigate the effect of epistemic 
partisanship. Promotion of virtues at the early stage of life are not our choice, but often 
imposed upon us. As Heather Battaly describes, “self-cultivation may be the exception 
rather than the rule with respect to our initial possession of virtues and vices” (Battaly 
2016, 214). The kind of virtue cultivation the current debate of epistemic partiality of 
friendship promotes for virtue epistemologists would be environmental routes at the 
early stage of our lives. Nevertheless, this does not contradict with individuals aspiring 
for virtues individually at the later stage of our life, as I have argued in chapter 2, self-
cultivation does have some important roles in cultivating virtues overall. If epistemic 
virtue cultivation and epistemic partisanship formation were done around the same 
time, we might be able to expect that a side effect of epistemic partiality of friendship 
could be minimized in such a way that intellectually virtuous character traits of 
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We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, and given that good friendship is a 
care relation, I do agree that epistemic partiality of friendship exists and rightly so. But 
if we pay attention to the initiation and termination of friendship, there is a sense that 
our friendships track evidence. If I do not give up evidentialism, then some values—
including friendship—generate practical reasons to inquire further. Stroud and Keller 
make a strong argument for the claim that friendship is necessary for a good life and 
that if anything competes with friendship, we have reasons not to live up to such a 
concept of epistemic rationality. However, I hope to have shown that the exact same 
thing can be said of any of the important values in life, such as justice. And there is a 
genuinely epistemic kind of justice we pursue: epistemic justice, and this competes 
with epistemic partiality in friendship. This conclusion can lead to three interpretations: 
a clash of subjective and objective values, moral imperfectionism, and irresolvable 
tragic dilemmas. Either way, I conclude that the argument from the epistemic partiality 
of friendship is not as strong as Keller and Stroud initially propose. Finally, this debate 
had two implications for virtue epistemology. A serious consideration of 
imperfectionism encourages virtue epistemologists’ careful examination of the nature 
of the conflict between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Such a consideration at 
least involves: what kind of care-relation creates tension with epistemic values beyond 
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friendship, how are we to respond to such a tragic conflict. Secondly, epistemic 
partiality of friendship also indirectly promotes cultivations of epistemic virtues on 
individuals. Because epistemic partisanship partially supports friendship, and we take 
our friend to get things right (from my normative lights). When an individual holds a 
set of epistemic values that are biased, epistemic partiality based on such a partisan 
affiliation this invites disastrous epistemic consequences; the existence of epistemic 
partiality puts even more pressure for the individual inquirer to cultivate epistemic 
virtues. Nevertheless, given that we make friends with others from the early stage of 
our life, virtue cultivation should also be promoted from a young age. Such a process 
would be predominantly from environmental routes rather than self-cultivation. If 
epistemic virtue cultivation and epistemic partisanship are formed hand in hand, we 
could expect that a side effect of epistemic partiality of friendship is minimized. 
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Chapter 4 Toward Establishing Intellectual Receptivity as an Epistemic Value  
 
0. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to apply the value of receptivity to virtue epistemology.  I 
do this in the interests of the development of virtue epistemology. In the first section, 
I will first portray what it means to know something first-hand. I do this by way of 
addressing Elizabeth Fricker’s argument against the autonomous knower (E. Fricker 
2006) and Duncan Pritchard’s argument on the epistemic importance for seeing 
things for oneself (Pritchard 2016). In the second section, I address the social nature 
of our inquiry. In the third section, I ask the question of where we need to pursue 
epistemic autonomy. I will discuss how our “interests” call for first-hand knowledge. In 
the final section, a value of intellectual receptivity will be introduced. I argue that the 
value of intellectual receptivity helps us realize the vice that the value of epistemic 
autonomy could not solely explain and better articulate some essential intellectual 
virtues. 
   
1. Seeing It for Oneself 
In this section, I will examine the idea that we ought to know P first-hand. Elizabeth 
Flicker (2006) addressed how epistemologists have long been obsessed with the 
ideal of an autonomous knower and indeed criticized such a view. Nevertheless, by 
doing so, she retained some desirable features of the first-hand knowledge that 
testimonial knowledge lacks. Duncan Pritchard (2016) also suggests that there is a 
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sense in which seeing it for oneself is more valuable than testimonial knowledge. The 
two authors have proposed a few ways about how first-hand knowledge can be more 
desirable than testimonial knowledge. 
    First and foremost, what is an autonomous knower? “The wholly autonomous 
knower will not accept any proposition, unless she herself possesses the evidence 
establishing it” (E. Fricker 2006, 225). Such a perfect epistemically autonomous agent 
would never believe “on the basis of a second-order warrant for belief” (243).  
In fact, we are not such perfectly epistemically autonomous beings, and we defer to 
the testimony of others in regard to knowing many things. According to Elizabeth 
Fricker, deferring to such testimony is appropriate in the following manner: 
 
TDAP [Testimony Deferential Acceptance Principle] 2: One properly accepts that 
P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P – her word that P– just if she 
speaks sincerely, and she is epistemically well enough placed with respect to P 
so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form, a conscious belief 
regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and she is 
better epistemically placed with respect to P than oneself; and one recognizes 
all these things to be so; and one is not aware of significant contrary testimony 
regarding P (E. Fricker 2006, 232). 
 
She provides this standard for discerning when we ought to defer to the testimony of 
others and when we ought to obtain evidence establishing knowledge. Although she 
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rightly criticizes the ideal of the autonomous knower and accepts that we need to 
defer to the testimony of others when it is due, nonetheless there is an assumption 
behind the standard that knowledge obtained by testimony is second-class compared 
to first-hand knowledge. But in what way is testimonial knowledge second-class? She 
explains: 
 
T: If H knows that P through being told that P and trusting the teller, there is or 
was someone who knows that P in some other way – not in virtue of having been 
told that P and trusting the teller. It is a consequence of T that if someone knows 
that P through trust in testimony, there must be some other way in which P is or 
once was known. Hence T has the corollary: T corollary: For any proposition P 
that can be known, there must be some way other than trust in testimony through 
which P can or once could be known (E. Fricker 2006, 240). 
 
Being fully aware of the impossibility of the ideal of the entirely autonomous knower, 
Elizabeth Fricker nevertheless holds that the knowledge obtained by testimony is “at 
least one respect inferior to when I know at first hand” (240). She argues that there is 
a risk of being deceived in testimonial exchanges and that believing in testimony will 
lack “sensitivity to defeating evidence” (242). There are some important properties of 
first-hand knowledge that testimonial knowledge lacks, but the flip side of this analysis 
is that there are a few distinct characteristics of testimonial knowledge that first-hand 
knowledge lacks. To begin with, it is time-saving and pragmatic, and it expands our 
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epistemic horizons. Thus it does not have the general superiority of first-hand 
knowledge, instead, it seems more accurate to identify the two kinds of knowledge as 
having different characteristics: one understood in the context of discovery (and 
rediscovery), and another that is already discovered and hence available to people in 
the pool of knowledge in society.  
    One might argue that the discovery of knowledge provides an individual with 
credit in regard to their possessed knowledge, which they do not possess in regard 
to their testimonial knowledge, and in this sense the latter is inferior to the former. This 
point is in line with Duncan Pritchard’s argument on the superiority of seeing it for 
oneself to testimonial knowledge.49 
 
[seeing it for oneself] essentially involve what are known as strong cognitive 
achievements, where strong achievements, cognitive or otherwise, are 
standardly thought of as being finally (i.e., non-instrumentally) valuable. An 
achievement is typically held to be a success that it is because of – i.e., 
attributable to – one’s exercise of relevant agency (i.e., as opposed to being 
attributable to dumb luck, or someone else’s agency, and so forth). A strong 
 
49 Pritchard’s “seeing it for oneself” covers both perceptually seeing something for 
oneself and intellectually seeing something for oneself (i.e., understanding). These 
two cases are both knowing things in a particular way, contrasted with knowing by 
testimony. Seeing it for oneself is a technical term derived from the broadly Aristotelian 
tradition of believing that human desires to know. Pritchard thinks a particular kind of 
knowledge, namely, only seeing it for oneself can sate our desire to know, rather than 
knowledge simpliciter (Pritchard 2016).  
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achievement in addition demands either the manifestation of a high level of skill 
or else the overcoming of a significant obstacle to success (Pritchard 2016, 37). 
 
On the contrary, testimonial knowledge can be obtained easily. It can be obtained 
passively. When we obtain knowledge via testimony, our cognitive success is normally 
attributable to the speaker’s agency rather than the hearer’s. Then, there is a sense 
in which seeing it for oneself has a special value that a corresponding testimonial 
knowledge lacks. People who know P via testimony cannot claim that they have 
achieved something in a strong sense in obtaining P. This special value is, as 
Pritchard notes, a general value attached to a strong achievement. Hence, 
discovering P is valuable because achieving something due to one’s high-level skill is 
valuable. Hence, the special kind of credit given to first-hand knowledge is a sense in 
which seeing it for oneself is superior to testimonial knowledge on the grounds of non-
epistemic value. 
    The most interesting suggestion for the current debate Pritchard makes about 
the epistemic value of seeing it for oneself concerns intellectual autonomy. He 
maintains: 
 
Intellectual autonomy can be thought of as both an intellectual virtue and as a 
goal of intellectual virtue (i.e., being intellectually autonomous). In the latter 
sense, it is the good of being epistemically self-reliant, where this involves one 
taking ownership of one’s epistemic position” (Pritchard 2016, 36). 
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By knowing something first-hand, then, we pursue a value of intellectual autonomy as 
a goal of intellectual virtues. If it is an epistemically significant value to become 
epistemically self-reliant, we have to ask when we should pursue such a value. As 
Pritchard himself points out, the “good of intellectual autonomy is entirely compatible 
with treating the acquisition of knowledge as for the most part a social enterprise” 
(Pritchard 2016, 40). Elizabeth Fricker also admits that “we humans are essentially 
social creatures, and it is not clear that we do or could possess any knowledge at all 
which is not in some way, perhaps obliquely, dependent on testimony” (E. Fricker 
2006, 225). It might be true that the value of epistemic autonomy is the value when 
we pursue first-hand knowledge and cultivate intellectual virtues thereof. But we need 
to ask where and when we are encouraged to pursue knowledge in this fashion. I will 
come back to this point in the third section. 
    In this section , I have addressed some differences between first-hand knowledge 
and testimonial knowledge. We have seen that each type of knowledge has some 
distinct characteristics, yet, the pursuit of first-hand knowledge can promote an 
epistemic value of intellectual autonomy in such a way that second-hand knowledge 
cannot. 
 
2. Knowledge Pool and Social Nature of Our Inquiry 
In this section, I will consider what it means for knowledge as being inherently social. 
Elizabeth Fricker herself repeatedly points out that trusting someone is necessary for 
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our social life (E. Fricker 2006, 226, 228). The social nature of the inquirer would 
transfer to the inquiry. Influenced heavily by Edward Craig’s work (Craig 1990), the 
epistemological view sharing the view that the function of knowledge is to flag a good 
informant is called the genealogical method in epistemology (Kusch and McKenna 
2018)50.  
    Along the same lines, Miranda Fricker portrays three collective epistemic needs 
springing from the state of nature. If we as humans live in a minimally social group, 
we need truth for our survival, such as to obtain food, and to avoid being poisoned; 
we need to engage in an epistemic practice whereby information is shared or pooled; 
we need to foster dispositions in people that will stabilize a community of trust (M. 
Fricker 2007, 110–11). The most important aspect of this argument from the point of 
view of the current debate is that we have an epistemic need to engage in an 
epistemic practice whereby information is shared or pooled. The maintenance and 
generation of knowledge as such are inherently social rather than individual: pooled 
knowledge is maintained by society as a whole. It is true that knowledge is discovered 
at one point and then integrated into the pool, and later transmitted through the chain 
of testimonial exchanges. 
 
50 The original discussion of Craig's work (1990) was about the concept of knowledge 
rather than knowledge itself, and he asked why the concept of knowledge was 
introduced in hypothetical primitive human society. In this chapter, I discuss 
knowledge in line with the genealogists' state of nature story. The difference between 
the concept of knowledge and knowledge itself is important yet negligible for this 
discussion. For objections to the genealogical view and their replies, see also (Kusch 
and McKenna 2018). 
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    Such a knowledge pool can be in good shape or bad shape. For instance, if 
knowledge in the pool was scarce, people in society might find it difficult to survive. 
By the time the complexity of our life increases, the need for more knowledge would 
also increase. Thus, pooled knowledge needs expansion. If no one takes care of the 
knowledge in society, society may lose track of why something is the case. Moreover, 
the justification of knowledge might be improved by the enhancement of the epistemic 
tools, and by the growth of the research community, the pool of knowledge needs 
proper maintenance. The knowledge pool can be biased in many ways. For instance, 
knowledge in the pool may not be beneficial for the marginalized population in society; 
some knowledge might be compartmentalized, not equally accessible for all. 
Knowledge in the pool might not be homogeneous: e.g., we can imagine a society 
where a particular kind of knowledge is abundant while other kinds are scarce. There 
is a sense in which the knowledge pool is in better shape if there are no such biases. 
    If we engage with the knowledge pool, a few different kinds of responsibility will 
spring from the demands of the knowledge pool I have just articulated (i.e., expansion, 
proper maintenance, and no bias). Related to the second demand, it is then also fair 
to expect someone in society being responsible for maintaining intact the chain of 
non-testimony based evidence, even after it was first discovered (I would call this 
process rediscovery). As Elizabeth Fricker argues, for any proposition P, there is a 
way other than trust in testimony through which P can be known: namely, discovering 
P.  
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    We could ask who should take this role of rediscovering and maintaining the 
chain of non-testimonial evidence for knowledge in the pool. It is not everyone: if 
everyone engages with rediscovery, it would be repetitive and redundant as regards 
the purpose of maintaining the knowledge pool. If someone suitable in society knows 
P by discovering or rediscovering it, and hence maintains intact the chain of evidence 
from testimony to non-testimony, why should others who are less suitable engage in 
the same task to the same extent? Once P is tethered to non-testimonial evidence by 
a suitable group of people, it does not need to be rediscovered repeatedly by every 
other citizen. This is because such repetition would become futile and pointless after 
a few trials (especially those carried out by people who are not suitable for the project 
in the situation), and, more importantly, excessive repetition would hinder society’s 
other responsibilities in relation to the knowledge pool: i.e., to expand its knowledge 
pool, or to make knowledge more accessible for all, etc.  
    Consequently, there is a further departure from Elizabeth Fricker in terms of 
where we each think our inquiry should begin. For Elizabeth Fricker, knowing on the 
basis of non-testimonial grounds is the norm. This means that where there are good 
grounds for believing someone else, we should defer to the other’s view. She 
maintains: 
  
we have seen that rational prudence dictates that one should bestow trust only 
where it is due; where one has good grounds to believe one’s informant 
competent and sincere (E. Fricker 2006, 243). 
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If we take the social nature of knowledge seriously, the knowledge pool does not 
require everyone to maintain the chain of every piece of knowledge. Instead, by 
default, we defer to the testimony of others in the vast majority of cases, and rightly 
so. We do not ask ourselves if we should defer to the testimony of others in a history 
class, in cases of reading newspapers, or when talking to our friends. Instead, we 
ought to discover P only where we have good grounds to do so. The next question is 
what counts as reasonable grounds for acquiring knowledge first-hand. Even the 
proponents of the value of epistemic autonomy are aware it not the case that we are 
always required to pursue seeing things for oneself. Then, when would it be 
encouraged? 
 
3. Seeing It for Oneself, Revisited 
In the first section, we discussed why knowing first-hand is more desirable than 
testimonial knowledge. Nevertheless, both Elizabeth Fricker and Pritchard admit that 
holding on to such an ideal does not mean that we should not defer to the testimony 
of others. Instead, in the previous section, we have seen in the majority of cases, by 
default, that we in fact defer to the testimony of others. In this section, I will ask what 
calls for knowledge first-hand. Pooled knowledge requires maintenance and 
rediscovery. When is first-hand knowledge more desirable than testimonial 
knowledge? Who is expected to maintain the chain of testimony back to the non-
testimonial grounds? In short, my answer is that our interests determine when it is 
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appropriate and who should hold knowledge first-hand. I will explain more in detail 
below. 
    Here, my theory is schematic and relies heavily on folk psychological observation. 
I do not aim to cover an exhaustive list of situations where we are required to obtain 
first-hand knowledge, nonetheless this analysis may be helpful to begin to sort cases 
where first-hand knowledge is more desirable than testimonial cases. The pressure 
to know something first-hand may spring from both external and internal factors 
surrounding agents, but I think we can capture both cases by the concept of interests. 
Representative cases, as such, are expertise, personal concerns, and social interests, 
which I will address respectively.  
    Intuitively, the more complex knowledge becomes, the more it is the case that 
there should be a group of people who are expected to rediscover the non-testimonial 
grounds of the knowledge in question – namely, experts in the subject area. When 
people seek a piece of medical advice, they go to their GP, instead of to primary 
school teachers or butchers. This is because GPs are more inclined to have better 
knowledge about medicine than primary school teachers or butchers. Expertise 
requires thorough knowledge of certain domains: this involves knowing on the basis 
of non-testimonial grounds.  
    Secondly, non-testimonial knowledge might be called for based on individual 
concerns. The representative as such is self-knowledge. You know about yourself 
based on non-testimonial grounds more than anyone else, and you are interested in 
doing so because it is important for you, relevant to your concerns, and vital for your 
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survival. Similarly, if you are curious about baking, you will not only watch YouTube 
tutorials on baking, you will also proceed to bake by yourself and know first-hand what 
it means to bake. There is something off-putting in saying that Sam is interested in 
math, but never engages with it. When someone is personally interested in something, 
it is fair to say that she is the right person to pursue such knowledge first-hand.  
    Both of these interests, expertise and personal concern, are well articulated in 
Pritchard’s scientist case: 
 
Imagine, for example, a scientist conducting important experiments as part of a 
team, but who always opts, despite there being no practical cost to her, to being 
told how the experiments went rather than observing them for herself. Indeed, 
to make the case more vivid, imagine that the experiments are concerned with 
something momentous, like the discovery of the Higgs boson. Wouldn’t we think 
there was something importantly lacking, from the perspective of intellectual 
virtue and character, about a scientist who was content to be told the results of 
such an experiment second-hand when she could easily see it for herself 
(Pritchard 2016, 30).  
 
If the scientist is not concerned with observing the result for herself at all, there is 
something epistemically off about her. First, it is her profession that requires her to 
see the result for herself, more so than others. Second, she is the one who became 
a scientist, then, observing such a result is supposed to fit well with her personal 
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concern. If she were genuinely interested in science, and became a scientist, she 
should care about the truth in the domain and this behavior of hers shows the lack of 
such a concern for truth in science. In this way, having no interest in seeing the 
experimental result for herself goes against both external and internal interests in this 
scenario. As Pritchard describes, some inquiries cannot be adequately closed by 
mere knowledge (i.e., testimonial knowledge). For someone who is genuinely curious 
about the movement of the tides, her curiosity is not sated by the experts’ testimony: 
her curiosity is sated only by her understanding of the phenomenon. In this way, some 
inquiries can only be legitimately closed by knowledge of a specific kind (i.e., first-
hand knowledge, or knowledge as understanding) (Pritchard 2016, 33-36).     
    Lastly, social interests might determine when first-hand knowledge is desirable. 
Non-testimonial knowledge may spring from coincidental factors of the agent in an 
important way. Such coincidences confer on particular subjects first-hand knowledge 
regardless of whether they want to hold on to it or not. First is the external coincidence 
case. If you happen to be involved in a tragic train crash, or if you happen to be born 
in a country in the middle of a civil war, your first-hand knowledge of what has 
happened as the remaining passenger or as a war survivor are of great importance 
in society, both symbolically and pragmatically. There is a sense in which non-
testimonial knowledge as such is more desirable than testimonial knowledge in such 
a context. Relatedly, the demand for non-testimonial knowledge may spring from 
coincidental personal factors of the agent. In a society marked by systematic 
oppression, the oppressed are said to have privileged knowledge about their life that 
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the non-oppressed will find it hard to obtain (Wylie 2013). In a patriarchal society, then, 
women are expected to have privileged knowledge of their oppressed life first-hand, 
and such first-hand knowledge might be of greater importance than testimonial 
knowledge. I will come back to this point in more depth in the next chapter. 
    One might be worried about the third case, as the agents may not be personally 
interested in the course of obtaining their knowledge. However, we could say that 
there is a sense in which society is interested in the content of their knowledge. For 
instance, imagine first-hand knowledge of the Second World War by a survivor in a 
concentration camp, or immigrant women’s first-hand knowledge of their marginalized 
experience in the UK. Such first-hand knowledge is of higher social and historical 
importance. In this sense, it may first appear that the agents are passively acquiring 
their perceptual knowledge. However, in such socially interested knowledge, I think 
there is a sense in which the agents actively engaged in maintaining their knowledge. 
In this sense, some knowledge of which the interest is socially conferred we can take 
as active perceptual knowledge, i.e., seeing it for oneself. In other words, our inquiry 
can only be adequately closed by a particular kind of knowledge, first-hand knowledge 
in these cases. 
    Individual and social interests represented by the expertise, personal concerns, 
and social interests– this might not be an exhaustive list of what makes first-hand 
knowledge more desirable than second-hand knowledge, yet it tells us how to start 
differentiating between cases where we can rely on the testimony of others and those 
where we should start inquiring in a non-testimonial mode. In the next section, I will 
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address the other side of the epistemic phenomenon – obtaining knowledge primarily 
by testimony, and I will introduce new epistemic value in understanding what we do 
and should do in such cases.  
 
4. Receptivity and virtue epistemology 
The focus of my debate will shift from first-hand to second-hand knowledge in this 
section. I boldly claim that we should adopt the value of receptivity in the realm of 
virtue epistemology. I will explain why this move is necessary throughout the section. 
    In the first section, I summarized a few advantages of first-hand knowledge that 
testimonial knowledge lacks, represented by the value of epistemic autonomy that 
seeing it for oneself promotes. However, in the second section, I emphasized that in 
most cases we defer to the testimony of others and rightly so, derived from the social 
nature of inquiries and the knowledge pool. I think there is an apparent tension here: 
where our interests are concerned, we can say that we are encouraged to acquire 
knowledge first-hand, and pursue the value of epistemic autonomy by wishing to be 
epistemically self-reliant. However, the vast majority of our epistemic activity relies on 
the testimony of others. What kind of value are we pursuing here? Claiming that 
deferring to the testimony of others is the norm obviously does not mean that we 
should believe in such testimony indiscriminately. Instead, when deferring to the 
testimony of others, we realize that doing so is actually a more nuanced and varied 
activity than Elizabeth Fricker’s TDAP2. Trusting competent and sincere testifiers is, 
of course, better than trusting incompetent and deceitful counterparts. It is, however, 
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a complicated task to find a trustworthy testifier. We must ask what the characteristics 
of competence and sincerity in trusting are. Such a question lies at the center of virtue 
epistemological inquiry. In the case of first-hand knowledge, we have the value of 
epistemic autonomy. One thing missing in this debate of excelling at testimonial 
knowledge acquisition is the corresponding epistemic value.    
    In the realm of morality, there is an important yet neglected value: receptivity. 
According to Slote (2013), receptivity is a value that has long been neglected by 
Western philosophers. He portrays receptivity as an antidote for harmful yet influential 
overly rationalistic ways of thinking in modern philosophy, which are characterized by 
their excessive desire for control. Our attitude to and desire for control and domination 
in areas of our life that we cannot control is the issue. Through praising practical 
rationality, philosophers have encouraged the idea that “one should live one’s life 
according to a life plan” (Slote 2013, 169). Yet, in life, there are some crucial goods 
that we cannot properly plan to obtain, such as love and friendship. We cannot plan 
to become friends with someone, and we cannot control ourselves being in love with 
someone. “Anyone who thinks or tries to think of those goods in that way is expressing 
a desire for control over his or her life and a lack of receptivity toward the eventualities 
of their life that make no sense for human beings” (173). By contrast, in areas we 
cannot control, Slote continues, “a receptive and open attitude makes sense in our 
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lives” (174). Being receptive to what our life may bring to us is thus one value that is 
often overshadowed by our excessive desire for control.51  
    Claiming that receptivity is a value is not to deny the value of control altogether. 
It is, instead, to say that there are limits to the value we place on control. Not pointing 
out such a limit is equal to giving “a distorted ethical picture of human life” (213). 
Receptivity is thus an antidote for our excessive desire for control, but what exactly 
does “being receptive” amount to? Slote only provides a negative definition of the 
concept. Receptivity is not the same as passivity, because “passivity is receptivity 
without any admixture of or potential for activeness” (212). Receptivity is not the same 
as openness, either, because “being receptive to the idea or suggestion of change 
implies more readiness to change than mere talk of openness does” (220). 
Summarizing those characteristics given so far, I take being receptive as having a 
positive attitude towards things that cannot be controlled (including our own life, other 
people, or objects) and appreciating such things as they are, and integrating them 
into our self. In the realm of epistemology, I believe we can say something similar in 
line with Slote’s argument.  
 
51 Our excessive desire for control comes in different forms. One way in which we 
have an inappropriate desire for control is towards nature. Human beings have treated 
nature as something we can dominate. Such an attitude is now under attack. An 
alternative attitude we could hold towards nature is “appreciating” it, or “feeling awe” 
(182) towards it. Slote also calls these attitudes receptivity (Slote 2013, Chapter 10).  
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    The ideal of becoming an autonomous knower involves “being willing and able to 
think and decide things for oneself” (215), and such a desire for control in our inquiry 
might be appropriate for some knowledge within the reach, as I have shown in the 
previous section. However, we are not required to obtain first-hand knowledge in 
every case. Holding such a desire in regard to every piece of knowledge would be 
excessive, and hence, might even be harmful for us because such an attitude ignores 
and fails to appreciate the important value of being receptive. I would like to propose 
a value of intellectual receptivity as a goal of intellectual virtues together with the value 
of intellectual autonomy: 
 
Intellectual receptivity: having a positive attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot 
be controlled and appreciating such things as they are and integrating them into our 
epistemic self. 
 
When virtue epistemologists take this value of intellectual receptivity as a goal, I 
believe there are a few advantages of such an approach.  
    First, the putative tension between cases of when we pursue first-hand 
knowledge and when we pursue testimonial knowledge would be explained away by 
adopting the value of intellectual receptivity. As shown in the previous section, there 
are some inquires that can legitimately be closed by a particular kind of knowledge 
such as first-hand knowledge. However, the flip side of such an argument is that other 
inquiries are adequately closed by testimonial knowledge. If someone believes every 
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knowledge must be closed by seeing it for oneself, what can we say wrong about 
him? Pritchard expressed the relevant worry: 
 
The crux of the matter is that it seems to be part of what it is to be intellectually 
virtuous, and hence to have a good intellectual character, that one has a 
standing desire to see things for oneself. As with the exercise of all virtues, one 
needs to bear in mind the different trade-offs that might be relevant in this regard. 
If one excessively desired always to see things for oneself, even when, say, the 
practical costs of doing so are enormous, then this would no longer be the 
manifestation of virtue but of vice (Pritchard 2016, 31).  
 
When we solely hold on to the value of epistemic autonomy, it is hard to articulate 
what is wrong with this agent with his excessive desire to know things first-hand. In 
other words, he is trying to be epistemically self-reliant. What is puzzling about this 
agent is a putative tension between the value of epistemic autonomy and his attitudes. 
Seen from the value of epistemic autonomy, his attitude appears to be in line with 
fulfilling this value, while there is something epistemically off about him. Once we 
adopt the value of intellectual receptivity, the problem of this agent becomes much 
more intelligible. He lacks the appropriate receptivity toward his epistemic life. He 
should notice the eventuality of our epistemic life and ease his excessive desire to 
know things first-hand.  
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    I think it is important to leave a few cautionary remarks: note that my proposal is 
not in tension with the value of epistemic autonomy per se. Instead, it is complimentary. 
The proponent of the goal of epistemic autonomy is not encouraging epistemic 
autonomy without limit. In this sense, this revision is supposed to be welcome news 
even for the proponent of epistemic autonomy. As moral receptivity is the antidote to 
the excessive desire to control one’s life, I believe that intellectual receptivity is the 
antidote to our excessive desire to see things for oneself. Some might worry if 
intellectual receptivity gets in the way of our curiosity. I believe that intellectual 
receptivity does not get in the way of one’s curiosity. We have seen that a genuinely 
curious agent’s desire to know the cause of the movement of the tides is only sated 
by her proper understanding (i.e., seeing things for oneself). Imagine an ambitious 
freshman; she might be curious in many different subjects, enjoys attending lectures 
in chemistry, law, Spanish, and philosophy. However, at the end of the day, she needs 
to select one or a few subjects to study at university. Genuine curiosity requires our 
focus and dedication, and indiscriminate curiosity would hinder genuine curiosity from 
being sated. Being intellectually receptive to what we can know first-hand goes hand 
in hand with our genuine curiosity. 
    Second, some intellectual virtues become more intelligible by the goal of 
intellectual receptivity than intellectual autonomy. Some intellectual virtues are better 
understood as aiming at being excellent at relying on others. It is hard to make sense 
of such a virtue in terms of epistemic autonomy. Take the example of the virtue of 
intellectual humility. I focus on two ways of understanding intellectual humility here: 
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the accuracy view and non-egoist view (Pritchard 2018).  According to the accuracy 
view, being intellectually humble means to be properly attentive to, and to own, one’s 
own epistemic limitations (Whitcomb et al. 2017). Owning one’s epistemic limitation 
involves proper cognitive, behavioral, motivational, and affective responses to one’s 
own limitations (Whitcomb et al. 2017, 518): one believes, admits, cares about, and 
regrets that one has epistemic limitations. Intellectual humility is a virtue; hence this 
character trait makes a person excellent as a cognitive agent (Baehr 2011). An 
intellectually humble person is attentive to and owns their epistemic limitations. Hence, 
she knows full well that she does not know certain things on her side, and by calling 
this a virtue, it is particularly at this point that she has excelled. If epistemic autonomy, 
i.e., being epistemically self-reliant, were a sole goal of intellectual virtues, such a goal 
does not sit well with the virtue of intellectual humility in this accuracy sense. We can 
expect a humble agent to defer to the testimony of others, where she knows her 
knowledge is limited. According to the value of intellectual receptivity, being humble 
in this sense is one way we are responsible for deferring to the testimony of others. 
    According to the non-egoist view, humility “involves lacking those characteristic 
dispositions involved in excessive self-regard, such as conceit, arrogance, 
haughtiness, and so on” (Pritchard 2018, 6). The non-egoist view of humility is 
characterized by our epistemic disposition of other-directedness motivated by one’s 
respect for others. Such epistemic dispositions involve being open to change one’s 
opinion, willing to reflect on one’s evidence and counterevidence presented by others, 
being respectful of other people’s views (Pritchard 2018, 8). What can we say about 
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the non-egoistic view of humility concerning the value of intellectual receptivity? I 
believe that the other-directed motivation that humble dispositions are rooted in 
represents the fact that our epistemic endeavor is social, collective, and collaborative 
in nature. The non-egoist view of humility ably demonstrates that there is a way we 
can excel at having an epistemically collaborative attitude. This is a sense in which a 
value of intellectual receptivity is promoted.52  
 
52 Pritchard is opposed to the accuracy view and held his non-egoistic view, he 
proposed some independent reasons to support the non-egoistic view over the 
accuracy view, but one of the biggest reasons why the non-egoistic view is more 
attractive is that it fares better in a non-conciliatory view of peer-disagreement. The 
accuracy view of humility appears to recommend us to change our confidence in our 
belief in the face of disagreements. “The problem is that if one sticks to one’s 
commitment to the target proposition in the face of an epistemic peer disagreement, 
and hence regards one’s belief as just as justified as before, then one is not, it seems, 
‘owning’ one’s fallibility at all, but rather ignoring it” (Pritchard 2018, 8). On the 
contrary, if one takes the non-egoistic view, sticking to one’s commitment is 
compatible to be epistemically humble: namely, having dispositions rooted in the 
motivation of respect for other epistemic agents, and holding one’s belief no less 
justified, and hence, no less likely to amount to knowledge after disagreement. I agree 
with Pritchard’s points here (e.g., the importance of holding a non-conciliatory view of 
peer disagreement, and also the importance of other-regarding epistemic motivation). 
But in this thesis, I leave the issue of epistemic humility open for the following two 
reasons. First, there might be another independent reason for an accuracy view to be 
more attractive that we have yet to consider. Second, the accuracy view might be 
compatible with a non-conciliatory view of peer disagreement. Riggs (2010) proposes 
a similar worry in his paper on open-mindedness. Should a genuinely open-minded 
person consider every challenge to one’s belief? In his reply, he takes open-
mindedness as an attitude toward oneself as a believer. “To be open-minded is to be 
aware of one’s fallibility as a believer, and to be willing to acknowledge the possibility 
that anytime one believes something, it is possible that one is wrong” (Riggs 2010, 
180). By having this attitude, an open-minded person engages with self-monitoring 
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   In this way, a virtue of humility can be understood as promoting our goal of 
intellectual receptivity. The virtue of epistemic humility is pursuing something different 
from being epistemically self-reliant. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it is 
epistemically desirable and the agent who holds the trait as being admirable as an 
inquirer. Virtue epistemologists had a hard time articulating this value. Epistemic 
autonomy is demonstratively a value some intellectual virtues are aiming at promoting 
(e.g., intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, and so on). On the other hand, 
some intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness seem to 
promote something different from being epistemically self-reliant, yet something 
epistemically worthwhile in a distinct way. I believe intellectual receptivity will help 
articulate such an alternative value that some intellectual virtues are aiming at 
promoting. Complexity aside, this division of epistemic values would map nicely onto 
the debate of first-hand knowledge and testimonial knowledge. Broadly speaking, the 
individual and social interests call for seeing things for oneself; we are encouraged to 
 
“for signs that one is in a domain or situation in which one is likely to be biased” (183). 
With the self-knowledge of the situations and domains, she is prone to go astray, 
“when an open-minded person dismisses a challenge from a confident judgment both 
that she is well-justified in her belief that p and that she is not being led astray by the 
relevant bad habits of thought, and she is correct about the latter, her dismissal is 
open-minded” (186). It might be the case that for this strategy to work, we are obliged 
to no longer see one’s opponent as an epistemic peer. However, at least the 
supporters of accuracy view of intellectual humility can start considering how their 
view can be compatible with the non-conciliatory view of peer-disagreement from 
Riggs’ answer stated above. In this way, the debate on the compatibility of epistemic 
humility and peer disagreement generates considerable debate. Nevertheless, 
settling this debate goes way beyond the purview of this thesis. 
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cultivate and display intellectual virtues promoting the goal of epistemic autonomy. On 
the other hand, when we rely on the testimony of others, we are encouraged to 
cultivate and display intellectual virtues promoting the goal of intellectual receptivity. 
Both epistemic autonomy and intellectual receptivity are necessary for attaining 
various epistemic goods and navigating our epistemic life. As is always the case, the 
balance between two such values would be crucial for our epistemic flourishing. 
    I want to close this chapter with a potential case where the values of intellectual 
autonomy and intellectual receptivity clash. Is there any case where two values 
conflict? In the majority of cases, these two values go hand in hand; however, imagine 
where some external interventions can change our cognitive make-up so that they 
enable humans to expand the possibilities of what we can know by ourselves. These 
interventions are known as cognitive enhancements. It is tempting for us to expand 
our human cognitive potentials to know more. For some, cognitive enhancements are 
essential for cultivating intellectual virtues (Fröding 2013). However, unlimited 
excessive desire for knowing things for ourselves might get in the way of the virtue of 
respecting other epistemic agents and realizing one's epistemic limitations. The 
proponent of the value of intellectual receptivity would be more cautious about such 
cognitive enhancements. This problem is, in short, an epistemic mirror image of the 
debate between the proponents of moral enhancements and bio-conservatism 
(Sandel 2007; Persson and Savulescu 2012). If I am on the right track, we could say 
that intellectual autonomy and intellectual receptivity are both equally significant 
epistemic values that intellectual virtues are aiming at promoting. Then, virtue 
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epistemologists must have a right balance between the two tendencies: the 
transhumanistic tendency of overcoming our human nature by cognitive 
enhancements, and the bio-conservatistic tendency of accepting our human nature 
(i.e., not pursuing epistemic perfection). Finding the right balance between the two is 
easier said than done: in future research, virtue epistemologists need to look into this 
debate more seriously, e.g., how each value promotes and prohibits individual cases 
of cognitive enhancements. Settling this debate is way beyond the purview of this 
thesis, but it is nonetheless important to flag the future direction of this inquiry. 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I first addressed some differences between fist-hand and second-hand 
knowledge. There are some senses in which first-hand knowledge is more desirable 
than testimonial knowledge, such as only the former being finally valuable and 
promoting the value of intellectual autonomy. In the second section, the social nature 
of our inquiry was explained. In the vast majority of cases, we defer to the opinions of 
others and are right to do so. In the third section, I have articulated what makes seeing 
things for ourselves more desirable than relying on testimony both socially and 
individually. In the final section, I introduced the value of intellectual receptivity derived 
from the receptivity in the realm of morality. This value is an antidote for an excessive 
desire for first-hand knowledge. Being intellectually receptive means having a positive 
attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such 
things as they are, and integrating them into our epistemic self. This value can help 
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explain what is missing in an agent who excessively desires to know everything first-
hand. The value would help explain some intellectual virtues such as intellectual 
humility and open-mindedness, where we are not pursuing an epistemically self-
reliant agent. In developing virtues of humility, we are hoping to excel at relying on the 
opinions of others or having an epistemically collaborative attitude. The value of 
intellectual receptivity goes hand in hand with the value of intellectual autonomy. 
Intellectual receptivity might play an essential role in understanding some intellectual 
virtues concerning obtaining our testimonial knowledge. Finally, I have sketched a 
potential case where the value of intellectual receptivity and intellectual autonomy 
may conflict in the form of the cognitive enhancement debate. Future research will 
spend more time on this debate. 
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Chapter 5 Toward the standpoint virtue epistemology 
 
0. Introduction 
In the past 30 years, running parallel to the advancement of virtue epistemology, 
another strand of epistemological theory of knowledge has undergone an outstanding 
development: this is feminist standpoint theory (henceforth, standpoint theory, for 
short). In this chapter, I will argue that virtue epistemologists can learn tremendously 
from standpoint theory. In the first section, I briefly explain the core thesis of standpoint 
epistemology and suggest the complexity the theory implies. If standpoint theory were 
on the right track, what can we say about virtue epistemology? In the second section, 
I provide a schematic view of standpoint virtue epistemology and then in the third 
present a possible scenario where social oppression promotes vices in different ways 
on the oppressed and non-oppressed. In the fourth section, I address some 
institutional interventions to our cognition called “nudge” theory (especially, nudge-
enhanced exemplar stories). Nudges might help cure our vices. However, I will leave 
some cautionary remarks on how to set up nudges considering social oppression. 
 
1. Standpoint theory  
I aim at achieving three things in this section: first, I will portrait some core theses of 
standpoint epistemology. Second, I will highlight the important way the oppressed are 
epistemically disadvantaged. Third, I will lay out the complexities of our standpoint, 
virtue epistemology needs to incorporate in the future. 
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    According to Alison Wylie’s influential work, the central claim of standpoint 
theorists is called the inversion thesis: “those who are subject to structures of 
domination that systematically marginalize and oppress them may, in fact, be 
epistemically privileged in some crucial respects” (Wylie 2013, 26). So, women might 
be inclined to know certain things or know certain things in a better way than their 
male counterparts who are privileged, based on their experience and interpretation of 
their experiences. Wylie is careful to avoid two claims that are easily conflated with 
the inversion thesis: essentialism and the automatic privilege claim. It is not the case 
that the inversion thesis implies that a woman knows some things better because 
she’s biologically a woman, nor that she knows some things better without doing 
anything on her part. It is, rather, the historically coincidental, social, political features 
of women that lead them to know some things better than men, who occupy a more 
dominant, oppressing, and central role in society. Hence: 
  
Those who are economically dispossessed, politically oppressed, socially 
marginalized and are therefore likely to be discredited as epistemic agents—
e.g., as uneducated, uninformed, unreliable—may actually have a capacity, by 
virtue of their standpoint, to know things that those occupying privileged 
positions typically do not know, or are invested in not knowing (or, indeed, are 
invested in systematically ignoring and denying) (Wylie 2013, 32).53  
 
53  One might worry that such a theory would inevitably lead to a relativism of 
knowledge; this is not the case. Our standpoint is perhaps not objective: what 
standpoint theorists are committed to is the idea that objectivity, understood as the 
 163 
 
Our standpoint, such as being women, people of color, being gay, or being poor, may 
confer some epistemic privilege. What kind of epistemic privileges can the oppressed 
obtain? I here apply Uma Narayan’s analysis regarding the epistemic privileges of 
those who are oppressed. People who are systematically oppressed in society are in 
a better position to have “immediate subtle, and critical knowledge about their 
oppressed life” (Narayan 1988, 36). Such knowledge includes: 
 
All the details of the ways in which their oppression is experienced, seen to be 
inflicted, and of the ways in which the oppression affects the major and minor 
details of their social and psychic lives. They know first-hand the detailed and 
concrete ways in which oppression defines the spaces in which they live and 
how it affects their lives (Narayan 1988, 36, italics added by the author). 
 
Those who are oppressed are under pressure to develop the ability to grasp power 
dynamics for their survival in a way that people from the dominant group are not (Wylie 
 
neutrality of the subject (such as, disengagement and affective distance from the 
claim), is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for reaching the objectivity which is 
one of the desirable characteristics of knowledge. Such objectivity as a property of 
knowledge consists of “fidelity to a rich body of evidence (empirical depth)” and the 
capacity for the claim to be “extended to a range of domains or applications (empirical 
breath)” (Wylie 2013, 33). Such objectivity as a characteristic of knowledge can be 
effectively achieved by individuals with particularly interested standpoints. Hence, 
Wylie has successfully shown the compatibility of the non-objective standpoint of the 
inquirer with objectivity as a desirable characteristic of knowledge. 
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2003, 35). But Narayan adds a cautionary remark on the nature of the epistemic 
advantages of the disadvantaged: such an epistemic privilege of the oppressed often 
lacks “clearer or better knowledge of the causes of their oppression” (Narayan 1988, 
36). Why is this the case? It is because a part of the oppression they suffer is 
represented in the unequal access to epistemic resources, such as education and 
conceptual tools: by being denied access to the same kind of education or method of 
inquiry, they lack “detailed knowledge of the history of their oppression, conceptual 
tools with which to analyze its mechanisms” (36).54 
    This final point that the oppressed enjoy an epistemic privilege together with the 
structural epistemic disadvantage will be of great importance in my discussion in the 
next section.55 It is undoubtedly true that due to their unequal access to epistemic 
resources, the oppressed are systematically in a bad position to articulate where their 
 
54 According to Narayan, there is a possibility for people who are not members of the 
oppressed group to come to understand the experiences of the oppressed, but this is 
only feasible with a great deal of effort (Narayan 1988). She emphasizes that it is also 
a part of their responsibility to try to understand the experience of the oppressed. 
Extrapolating from Narayan’s description, what makes standpoint distinct from mere 
subjectivity is this difficulty of transmission of the privileged knowledge by the 
oppressed. I, as a philosopher, do not have knowledge of what it is like to be a lawyer, 
or a primary school teacher, yet this knowledge can be transmitted and obtained 
relatively easily through the testimony of lawyers and teachers, in a way that 
knowledge of black American life cannot be.  
55  This point about epistemic disadvantages of the oppressed resembles the 
hermeneutical injustice proposed by Miranda Fricker: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the 
injustice of having some significant area of one's social experience obscured from 
collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource” (M. Fricker 2007, 155).  
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oppression is coming from. Moreover, if unequal access to education and epistemic 
resources is a part of the very oppression people who are marginalized in the society 
are suffering, even if they actually have the epistemic privilege of first-hand knowledge 
of their oppressed life experiences, as Narayan and Wylie suggest, simultaneously, 
there is a structural difficulty in transferring such knowledge to the dominant group. 
The oppressed often lack epistemic access to an orthodoxy of knowledge 
consumption and production in their society, so even though they enjoy the epistemic 
advantage of immediate knowledge of their oppressed life, they are likely to suffer as 
regards effectively communicating it to the non-oppressed.56 
    Before moving on to the next section, let me close this part with a cautionary tale 
about the way oppression has been simplified in the current debate. The idea that has 
been missing in the current debate is intersectionality. Various kinds of oppressions 
interact with one another in complex ways. It is in no doubt that women are 
marginalized in many patriarchal societies, yet the way white women are troubled by 
such oppression is very different from the way women of color experience it. Moreover, 
rich women of color might be able to mitigate the result of the social oppression they 
 
56  Ironically, this fact that the oppressed suffer from an unequal access to the 
epistemic resource also explains another dimension related to why they enjoy a kind 
of epistemic privilege. As Wylie points out, the oppressed have a “critical dissociation 
from the authoritative forms of knowledge that are born of and that serve (that 
legitimate and rationalize) positions of privilege” (Wylie 2013, 37). The oppressed are 
not interested in maintaining the world view of the dominant: rather, they suspect the 
epistemic authority in such a way that their standpoint might contribute to improving 
the objectivity of the knowledge in question (as a desirable characteristic of 
knowledge).  
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suffer by means of being rich (e.g., moving from one place to another) in a way that 
poor women of color cannot. Ann Garry’s comprehensive characterization of 
intersectionality might be helpful, in order to obtain a better understanding of this 
phenomenon: 
 
Oppression and privilege by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, 
nationality, and so on do not act independently of each other in our individual 
lives or in our social structures; instead, each kind of oppression or privilege is 
shaped by and works through the others. These compounded, intermeshed 
systems of oppression and privilege in our social structures help to produce (a) 
our social relations, (b) our experiences of our own identity, and (c) the 
limitations of shared interests even among members of "the same” oppressed 
or privileged group (Garry 2011, 827). 
 
Thus, when we consider the effect of social oppression in our inquiry, talking only 
about being women, being non-white, etc. is too coarse-grained. Oppressive social 
structures work in more complex ways than I have portrayed in the earlier parts of this 
section, and failing to realize this intersectionality and providing interventions solely 
based on the experiences of those who are oppressed in one way yet privileged in 
another way will not be helpful for certain groups of people suffering from multiple 
oppressions. As the theorist who introduced the concept of intersectionality, Kimberley 
Crenshaw, states, “women of color are differently situated in the economic, social, 
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and political worlds. When reform efforts undertaken on behalf of women neglect this 
fact, women of color are less likely to have their needs met than women who are 
racially privileged” (Crenshaw 1991, 1250). A striking example of such a case are the 
interventions related to domestic violence established primarily with white women in 
mind: such interventions are not always helpful for victims who are women of color. 
Because women of color in the US suffer not only from oppression due to their gender, 
but also from oppression due to their race, and often also suffer from economic 
hardship, depending on the cultural background, there is a barrier for women of color 
to report violence to the authorities, which white women do not experience. For 
instance, when immigrant women can only apply for permanent residency after a 
certain period of time of marriage, they might prefer to remain married despite the fact 
that their spouse batters them, since they fear being deported. A woman suffering 
from domestic abuse whose cultural background means she has extended family of 
multiple generations may find it difficult even to be alone in the house in order to make 
a call to report her case (Crenshaw 1991, 1247–1252).  
    Intersectional analysis of oppression and privilege is, hence, crucial in fashioning 
remedies for issues arising from multifaceted social oppression in real life. In the same 
vein, I believe that intersectional analysis of oppression and privilege in inquiry needs 
to be combined with virtue epistemology, in the same way that we need to integrate 
standpoint theory into virtue epistemology. Nonetheless, this goes beyond the purview 
of the current thesis. In the next section, I will discuss how social oppression 
understood in a simpler way, such as the subordination of women, can change the 
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way we understand intellectual virtues and vices. Intersectional analysis of the 
inquirer is an extension of such a project, and I would like to expand my project in this 
direction in the near future. For a start, we can make valuable progress in virtue 
epistemology if we realize the systematic influence of social oppression on inquirers.  
 
2. Social oppression and virtue epistemology  
Standpoint theory illustrates one critical aspect of our inquiry that virtue epistemology 
has traditionally systematically failed to articulate: it is our oppressive social structures 
that form the epistemic divide between insider and outsider. Such a division even 
creates a niche epistemic privilege of the oppressed, in regard to their first-hand 
knowledge of their oppressed life experiences. Nonetheless, due to the oppression 
they suffer in the epistemic domain (lacking the epistemic tools and proper education), 
it is difficult to communicate their knowledge to people who are not oppressed. Virtue 
epistemologists have recognized the ways that oppressive social structures affect our 
efforts at inquiry, but they have not sufficiently incorporated such a factor into their 
analyses. More precisely, virtue epistemologists have perhaps been fully aware of the 
oppressive social structures in society, and their potential effect on individual inquirers, 
but they have taken them as one of the social factors influencing individuals’ inquiries 
in the same way as other situational factors, and they did not consider having different 
approaches to vices depending on how the vices are primarily shaped. If a form of 
oppression is so systematic that it even shapes the epistemic privilege of the 
oppressed, it is no longer a negligible phenomenon that is happening at an individual 
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level. Until recently, there has been little study of the relationship between our 
standpoint as shaped by oppressive social structures and epistemic virtues. My view 
is that research on epistemic virtues should incorporate the standpoint of the inquirer 
more seriously. This goes beyond just seeing it as an external factor influencing 
individual inquirers.  
   I propose the idea that when we think of the cultivation of individual virtues and 
the avoidance of individual vices, social structure of oppression and subordination 
should be integrated more systematically into the virtue epistemological theory. I thus 
propose “standpoint virtue epistemology”. Where an oppressive social structure 
causes an epistemic divide in society in such a way that the oppressed have an 
epistemic privilege with regard to their oppressed lives, the oppressed are required to 
foster different kinds of intellectual virtues based on the standpoint of the inquirer. 
When virtue epistemologists take oppressing social structures into account, we can 
expect a few theoretical consequences: Whenever we ask ourselves how our 
individual character vices hinder our inquiry, we have to first take the oppressive social 
structures shaping our standpoint into account. If we find that the vice at issue is 
primarily shaped by the social oppression than individuals:   
(1) The oppressed might be suffering from intellectual vices in a distinct way. This 
means that the oppressed might be encouraged to develop a different kind of virtues 
to the non-oppressed, or the oppressed might be encouraged to develop the same 
virtue as the non-oppressed but in a very different way.  
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(2) If so, epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vices of the 
oppressed, as well as those of the non-oppressed. 
(3) Where the oppressed are required to cure a vice that is formed by social 
oppression, virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation should be facilitated socially more 
than individually.  
 
    Let me address these three claims one by one in the next section. Regarding the 
first point, what I am trying to establish is in line with Alessandra Tanesini’s influential 
work on haughtiness, and intellectual timidity and servility (Tanesini 2016). In the 
beginning of the section in which she discusses how haughty behaviors shape the 
intellectual vice of timidity and servility on the recipients, she mentions that the 
influence of social oppression in the society is what is ultimately shaping this individual 
character vice. 
 
Their ultimate causes lie in social relations of domination and subordination 
which are systematic. Nevertheless, these social causes have effects on 
individual psychologies and contribute to shaping people’s characters. […] It is 
my contention—although for reasons of space I cannot substantiate it here—
that relations of domination shape the psychology of members of dominant 
groups so that they are extremely likely to become haughty and arrogant. A 
particularly pernicious consequence of this state of affairs is that haughty and 
arrogant behavior is most likely to be exhibited in interactions with members of 
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subordinated groups, since they are more likely to be judged as intellectually 
inferior and are less likely to have the power required to put a stop to the 
inappropriate behavior (Tanesini 2016, 86–87). 
 
According to Tanesini’s view, the intellectual vice of haughtiness leads to another kind 
of vice of timidity and servility on the side of the receivers of haughty behaviors. 
Timidity and servility often co-developed, due to two kinds of interacting silencing 
behaviors. When someone is not given a proper opportunity to speak up in 
conversation, they are subject to locutionary silencing. Haughty individuals are 
irresponsible in such a way that they often violate rules of turn-taking during 
conversation, and hence they locutionary silence their conversation partners: they 
interrupt others, and talk for too long; such a disposition is disrespectful and harmful.  
    When people are subject to locutionary silencing repeatedly, they will be 
intimidated and will choose to stay silent, and they eventually become timid. They do 
not get the respect that they are due as inquirers. In a similar way, when someone 
asserts something, we make ourselves accountable to others in terms of the content 
of the assertion. Yet such an assertion misfires if the receiver does not even recognize 
it as an assertion. In this way, a speaker is subject to illocutionary silencing. Haughty 
individuals inappropriately dismiss others’ assertions. When this is done repeatedly, 
individuals are humiliated, and eventually they defer to the other’s view too easily; 
they become servile (Tanesini 2016, 87–90).  
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    Tanesini notes that we often observe such locutionary and illocutionary silencing 
where there is a systematic social relation of “domination and subordination” (86) 
between speakers and hearers. In a society where women are subordinated to men, 
the vice of haughtiness often belongs to men, whereas timidity and servility are 
observed among women (claiming this does not exclude cases of some men being 
timid, and some women being haughty). It is in no doubt, as Tanesini points out, that 
“these social causes have effects on individual psychologies and contribute to 
shaping people’s characters” (86). Tanesini is right in pointing out that oppressive 
social structures in society shape some vices. On top of her analysis of the vice 
shaped by social oppression, I further believe we need a deferential approach to the 
vice primarily shaped by social oppression. Where there is a systematic social relation 
of oppression, in such a way that this oppression shapes our standpoint, we should 
consider this social contribution as more fundamental to the formation of intellectual 
vice, and hence more fundamental to considerations of how to get rid of them. Where 
there is systematic oppression, their standpoint makes individuals’ vicious behaviors 
more intelligible. To put it more crudely, the true nature of such an intellectual vice is 
made clear when we shed light on the systematic oppression in the society.  
    If an individual suffers from an intellectual vice primarily because of the 
oppressive social structure, she might be suffering from a particular vice, hence she 
would be encouraged to develop a virtue in a different way than a non-oppressed 
person. In my opinion, social oppression is more than just one way the environment 
surrounding the agent influences our behavior, but I would like to argue that such 
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cases are of greater importance for virtue epistemologists and need a special 
attention. In the next section, I hope to show why such an approach is necessary, by 
showing that doing otherwise yields epistemic harm to the oppressed.  
 
3. Social Oppression and Intellectual Vices 
In the previous section, I have proposed the following three claims about standpoint 
virtue epistemology. When a vice is primarily shaped by social oppression: 
(1) The oppressed might be suffering from intellectual vices in a distinct way. This 
means that the oppressed might be encouraged to develop a different kind of virtues 
to the non-oppressed, or the oppressed might be encouraged to develop the same 
virtue as the non-oppressed but in a very different way.  
(2) If so, epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vices of the 
oppressed, as well as those of the non-oppressed. 
(3) Where the oppressed are required to cure a vice that is formed by social 
oppression, virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation should be facilitated socially more 
than individually.  
In this section, I hope to show these claims are on the right track, by portraying a case 
where a social oppressive structure shape vices on the oppressed and non-
oppressed in different ways.  
    The main body of research on individual virtues and vices has been conducted 
within a Western cultural background. The epistemic virtue of humility is a popular 
virtue, but I doubt if the same argument applies in other societies where social 
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oppression works in a different way. The virtue of humility is important when our 
epistemic life is impeded by the people in the society who fail to comply with it. But 
there are many ways to fall prey to vices.  
    Consider a case of Japanese female.57 The Japanese are known to provide 
inaccurate responses in self-assessment tasks in psychology experiments. They 
underestimate how well they do in tasks unlike their Western counterparts, even in an 
anonymous condition.58 According to Yamagishi and his colleagues who conducted 
this research, Japanese are socially pressured to be “modest” and, an 
underestimation of their ability among Japanese is known to be their default strategy 
 
57 Here, I am not arguing that there is something inherently different among eastern 
cultures compared to the west. The difference I hope to articulate here is contingent. 
We saw that Wylie's inversion thesis did not commit to essentialism and the automatic 
privilege claim. Similarly, my claim about the intellectual vice of Japanese women 
does not commit to essentialism and automatic privilege claim, either. It is, instead, 
the historically coincidental, social, political features of Japanese women that lead 
them to shape certain vices. The critical point to make is that social oppression shapes 
our standpoint in varied ways; then, the vices created thereof are also different from 
society to society.    
58 An interesting twist of Yamagishi’s study is that the observed self-effacing effect 
among Japanese participants was found to disappear, and was even reversed (hence, 
became self-enhancing), when they were given a small amount of money (equivalent 
to 3 dollars). Yamagishi believes that this is because Japanese have a default “do-
not-offend-others strategy” (Yamagishi et al. 2012 , 63), and such a strategy is 
mitigated by the bonus. This finding is fascinating and it might be key when searching 
for a cure for the intellectual servility among Japanese. Yet, considering that we 
normally are not explicitly given economic incentives in judging how well we perform, 
the self-effacing effect observed among Japanese remains insightful for the current 
debate.  
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(Yamagishi et al. 2012).59 Researchers have found that women tend to apply a lower 
assessment of their own ability than their male counterparts; this self-effacing 
tendency has been observed across cultures (Furnham et al. 2001). Note that broadly 
Aristotelian virtue theorists including many virtue epistemologists believe that virtue is 
a mean between two vices. Then, virtue of humility is a mean between intellectual 
arrogance and intellectual servility (Whitcomb et al. 2017).60 Intellectually arrogant 
people act like epistemic authorities due to their inflated self. Intellectually servile 
people, on the other hand, defer to others’ views too much because they are 
repeatedly silenced by their conversation partners (Tanesini 2016). Intellectual 
servility is an epistemic vice because it impedes our responsible inquiry (Cassam 
2016). When there is a social pressure to be modest, unlike in other society, Japanese, 
and especially Japanese women, are more inclined to be epistemically servile. 
    It is true that both for those who are arrogant and servile, intellectual humility is 
lacking, yet how we can cure such vices and how we should aim to develop humility 
differ significantly in those two cases. The rehabilitation processes the intellectually 
arrogant need to go through would be different from those of the intellectually servile. 
 
59 A default strategy means a rule people adopt when what kind of decision rule 
should be used is not clear. In collectivistic societies where the cost of being excluded 
from the social relationship is very high, the best rule to adopt is avoid actions to 
offend others. Be modest is hence, the default strategy in such a collectivistic society 
(Yamagishi et al. 2012, 61). 
60 For another interpretation of intellectual humility, see also (Priest 2017; Pritchard 
2018). However, settling the debate of intellectual humility is beyond the purview of 
this chapter.  
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Those who are socially oppressed, i.e. Japanese females, need to acquire the virtue 
of humility via battling with their intellectual servility. If virtue epistemology only 
focuses on how to be humble by battling with intellectual arrogance, oppressed 
Japanese females will be left out of the debate, and such a “cure” for the arrogant 
might even worsen the servility of Japanese females, if applied inappropriately. If a 
study of humility available in a society was centered around the problem of arrogance 
as against humility, it would not only be unhelpful for Japanese women, it might also 
perpetuate their oppression. First, they might lack epistemic resources to cure their 
servility, and, second, the epistemic resources in the society would be invested in the 
rehabilitation of the vice of the non-oppressed. Is this not yet another form of social 
oppression in the domain of epistemology? 
     It might be argued here that, if we take Tanesini’s argument at face value, it is 
the haughtiness of the non-oppressed that is creating the servility on the side of the 
oppressed. Curing the former is actually helpful for curing the latter, so why should 
we be bothered by the vice of servility? Due to the nature of vices, it is fair to say that 
mitigating vice (of any kind) is always good. In this sense, I agree that any project that 
seeks to avoid falling prey to intellectual haughtiness is desirable. And since the fact 
that haughtiness contributes to creating servility of the oppressed, it might also be 
true, to some extent, that getting rid of the haughtiness of the oppressor might reduce 
the servility of the oppressed. Nonetheless, I think there is a sense in which studying 
the vices that oppressors suffer, but not those of the oppressed, is not quite right: that 
is, in the sense of distributive justice. Epistemic resources, such as intellectual virtue 
 177 
education, need to be distributed fairly. As Miranda Fricker describes, where 
distributive justice is at issue, “we picture social agents who have an interest in various 
goods, some of them epistemic, and question whether everyone is getting their fair 
share” (M. Fricker 2007, 1). If epistemic virtue education does not pay attention to the 
vices the marginalized are suffering, we cannot say that they are getting their fair 
share. When we think about how to cultivate virtues, and avoid vices, such epistemic 
education ought to be distributed fairly. Doing otherwise is unfair to certain groups of 
people: in the current debate, it is unfair to the oppressed who suffer from intellectual 
servility, such as Japanese females. Noting that they already suffer from the 
oppressive social structure, such an unfair distribution of epistemic resources even 
perpetuates their oppression. In this way, when an oppressive social structure shapes 
particular vices of the oppressed in a different way to the non-oppressed, they are 
encouraged to develop particular virtues depending on their standpoints, and 
epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vice of the oppressed as 
such. 
    Let us now move on to the final point. I believe that in cases like the above, where 
the oppressed are required to develop virtues in a special way due to their standpoint, 
virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation ought to be facilitated socially more than 
individually. My view here reflects Elizabeth Anderson’s position in the debate 
between Anderson and Miranda Fricker on counteracting epistemic injustice 
(Anderson 2012; M. Fricker 2007, 2010). Among two cases of vice of epistemic 
injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, I will focus on testimonial 
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injustice in the following discussion, yet the same thing can be said for the case of 
hermeneutical injustice. In Miranda Fricker’s original formulation, the central case of 
testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer discounts a speaker’s credibility due to 
prejudice against the speaker because of her social identity (M. Fricker 2007, 28). If 
juries did not believe the testimony of a black man because he is black, despite 
overwhelming evidence in line with his testimony, he is suffering from testimonial 
injustice on the part of the hearer. The vice of testimonial injustice should be 
counteracted by cultivating a virtue of epistemic justice among vicious individuals. 
Such a virtue could be obtained innately, in theory. Yet in many cases it is corrective 
in nature: the virtue of epistemic justice operates in such a way that people correct 
their own prejudice via reflection. By increasing the credibility level of the speaker, 
making their own judgement vague and more tentative, by suspending their 
judgement, by seeking out further evidence, “the virtuous hearer neutralizes the 
impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements” (M. Fricker 2007, 92). Though she 
admits its difficulty, Fricker’s approach is individualistic, as it implies that the main 
strategy for counteracting testimonial injustice should be operated at the level of 
individuals.  
   By contrast, Anderson believes we need to stress institutional solutions to 
testimonial injustice. First and foremost, Anderson is skeptical about ideas of 
reflectively correcting prejudices, which are a kind of cognitive bias. It is in the nature 
of bias that it is difficult to control and that it is insulated from our consciousness. 
Moreover, while Fricker’s original testimonial injustice relied on individuals’ social 
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identity prejudice, Anderson argues that disadvantaged social groups can be unjustly 
denied credibility in structural forms, and such structural credibility deficits are more 
pervasive than Fricker acknowledged. For instance, individuals make use of various 
markers of credibility when making credibility judgements, such as education, and 
rightly so. “Yet in societies that systematically deprive disadvantaged social groups of 
access to a decent education, the use of such markers in assessing credibility will 
tend to exclude those groups from further participation in inquiry” (Anderson 2012, 
169). Where there is a differential access to markers of credibility for people from 
marginalized groups, there is a structural cause of their testimonial injustice. And to 
counteract such a structurally formed testimonial injustice, institutional epistemic 
justice is called for. Anderson writes: 
   
In the face of massive structural injustice, individual epistemic virtue plays a 
comparable role to the practice of individual charity in the context of massive 
structural poverty. Just as it would be better and more effective to redesign 
economic institutions so as to prevent mass poverty in the first place, it would 
be better to reconfigure epistemic institutions so as to prevent epistemic 
injustice from arising. Structural injustices call for structural remedies. 
(Anderson 2012, 171).  
 
In a similar vein, where there is a structural cause for the formation of a vice of the 
oppressed, I believe it calls for structural remedies. In cases like intellectual servility 
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of the oppressed, institutional remedies will be more effective than individual vice 
rehabilitation and virtue cultivation. (It goes without saying that this approach is not 
hostile to an individual approach. Instead, I am skeptical about the sole use of such 
an approach in solving the problem of the structurally formed vice). As, Anderson 
suggests, transactionally innocent behaviors of individuals might help foster the 
intellectual vices of the oppressed. Earlier, we saw how a haughty individual 
locutionarily silences people who are oppressed in the society (e.g., women) in 
Tanesini’s argument. However, those who locutionarily silence women might not 
always be haughty individuals. Similar to Anderson’s example, imagine a marker of 
credibility in the domain of political debate in Japan. If being a professional politician 
functions as a marker of credibility in political debate, women are locutionarily silenced 
in Japan, where only 10.2% of lawmakers (in the house of representatives) are female, 
giving Japan the rank of 165 out of 193 countries as for the numbers of female 
lawmakers (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019). In such a society, Japanese women will 
be inclined to be servile when debating political issues in public. The difficulty is that 
those vices are formed partly by benign behaviors of individuals (when seen from the 
transactional level) and yet women are treated unjustly when seen from the structural 
level. If those structures are fostering a vice of intellectual servility of Japanese 
women, then institutional change might help change the status quo. 
    Another reason why an institutional remedy is called for the vice of the oppressed 
is because there is a sense in which society would be benefitted by rehabilitating the 
oppressed with respect to their vice. Since the oppressed suffer from vices such as 
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timidity and servility, such vices get in the way of incorporating the first-hand 
knowledge of the oppressed in the knowledge pool of a society. Remember the 
inversion thesis: the debate about the epistemic privilege of the oppressed. We have 
seen that those who are systematically oppressed in society are pressured to develop 
an ability to understand power dynamics for their own survival in a way that people 
from dominant groups are not, and, consequently, the oppressed are in a better 
position to have immediate, subtle and critical knowledge about their oppressed life 
first-hand. Also, remember the discussion of first-hand knowledge in chapter 4. Not 
everyone is required to obtain knowledge first-hand, but for every piece of knowledge, 
there must be some groups of people who are in charge of maintaining the chain of 
non-testimonial evidence of knowledge. Coincidental factors, like their standpoint, 
confer on the oppressed first-hand knowledge that the non-oppressed cannot easily 
obtain. This means that although the oppressed have valuable first-hand knowledge 
of their oppressed life, it is compartmentalized in such a way that people from 
dominant group cannot easily access it. The function of the knowledge pool is to help 
our social life, yet such a pool is malfunctioning when some valuable knowledge is 
blocked and is not accessible for all. It was also pointed out that the first-hand 
knowledge of oppression possessed by the oppressed is difficult to communicate to 
the non-oppressed due to their unequal access to epistemic resources, such as 
education. The intellectual vice of the oppressed makes it even more difficult for the 
society to circulate and appreciate their first-hand knowledge about their oppressed 
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life. To improve the knowledge pool in the society, an institutional remedy is necessary 
to rehabilitate them with regard to their intellectual vice.  
    In this section, I have proposed three steps to improve the individualistic 
framework of virtue epistemology. I believe traditional virtue epistemologists have 
been too individualistic in thinking how vice is formed. There are cases where 
individual vice is primarily formed because of systematic social oppression. When 
intellectual vice is formed by systematic social oppression, we need special care for 
such cases. The oppressed often suffer from vices in different ways from dominant 
groups: treating such vice of the oppressed separately from the vice of the dominant 
is vitally important from a distributive justice point of view. And when the intellectual 
vice of the oppressed is structurally formed, a structural remedy is called for. This is 
also needed in order to improve the knowledge pool of the society.   
 
4. Nudging in oppressed societies 
In this section of the chapter, I consider a particular type of institutional intervention in 
character building: Nudging, concerning the current debate of social oppression and 
standpoints. As the advocates of nudging strategy, Thaler and Sunstein define 
nudging as an intervention in “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). Some theorists 
are interested in integrating nudging in character building (Engelen et al. 2018). I will 
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argue that nudging in character education can be a form of structural remedy for vices 
but add a cautionary remark about how we should implement such strategies.  
    Before moving on to the debate, we first need to address the nature of nudging. 
Unlike other paternalistic interventions to contents of our choices, nudges are 
exploiting our psychology, appeal to our unconscious decision-making mechanisms; 
choices are structured in such a way people can attain the designed goal with less 
cognitive effort. Take a famous cafeteria case: school can promote a healthy diet 
among students by rearranging the order of the food shown in cafeteria by 
manipulating the effect of our psychology that we are prone to choose things 
presented earlier than the later (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). In such a scenario, there 
is 
 
a manipulation of people’s choices via the choice architecture, i.e. the way in 
which the choices are presented to them. This works in the following way. 
Choices are structured such that some psychological mechanism leads people 
toward options that are either thought to be in their own best interest or thought 
to be in society’s best interest. In all cases of Nudge, if the choice situation had 
not been so structured, then people would be less prone to make the choice that 
is either in their own or in society’s interest (Bovens 2009, 208).61 
 
61  The advocate of nudging strategy believe that manipulations of our choice 
architecture are not at all as problematic as it may sound: as in every case of our 
decision making, our choices are presented in certain ways, our decisions are taking 
place in certain choice architecture anyway, it does not matter if such a choice 
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In theory, it is a feasible option to set up nudges to constrain our behaviors by 
ourselves (Bovens 2009, 215-216); however, most nudges are provided by someone 
else with good intentions. My main concern for this section is, among others, nudges 
set up to promote our character education by any authoritative institutions. Engelen 
and his colleagues proposed nudge-influenced character-building strategies about 
exemplars. Namely, they believe we can improve the use of exemplar stories through 
nudge strategies in three ways.62 We should tell a story about our exemplars in such 
a way that their stories are particularly emotionally laden, and that the exemplars are 
more relatable to the hearers, and that the narrative elicits our admiration for the 
exemplars. These strategies exploit the way we are emotionally triggered by the story, 
the way the perceived relatability between exemplars and ourselves influences our 
behavior, and the way we are triggered to feel more admiration so that we can imitate 
the exemplars (Engelen et al. 2018, 352-355). I am aware that constructing “nudge-
enhanced exemplar stories” (Engelen et al. 2018, 357) is just one way we can 
 
architecture were consciously designed or not. This argument is called an argument 
from ubiquity (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 83). 
62 According to Engelen and his colleagues, exemplar stories are by nature nudges: 
“moral exemplars are typically embedded in narrative structures whereby certain 
features of the choice situation are highlighted and others rendered less salient. As 
such, exemplar stories are already nudges. They employ at least the following nudge 
strategies from Sunstein’s list: (2) making information available; (7) personalizing 
information; (8) framing (moral) choices; and (9) rendering options salient” (Engelen 
et al. 2018, 351).  
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institutionally intervene in vice rehabilitation and virtue cultivation. However, for the 
sake of argument, I will focus on this strategy in the following discussion.  
    We can think of two cases where standpoint matters in nudge-enhanced 
exemplar stories. In the first case, the vices at issue are formed primarily by social 
oppression in the society (let us imagine again, the case of intellectual servility among 
Japanese females). In such a scenario, what I have argued in the previous section 
directly applies: special care for the vices of the oppressed is called for. In a nutshell, 
by nudging, we should cure vices of the oppressed as well as the non-oppressed. 
When we tell stories about our exemplars that are emotionally laden, relatable to the 
hearers, and elicits our admiration for the exemplars, the society should consciously 
construct nudges so that they address the vice of the oppressed. Some of the 
exemplar stories of the intellectually humble (or stories of the exemplar being not 
servile) should be provided in such a way the oppressed, i.e., Japanese females can 
feel emotionally aroused, being relatable to, and elicit their admiration. 
    In the second case, where the vices at issue are formed primarily individually (not 
by the social oppression in the society), what can we say about nudges for curing the 
vices? Even in these cases, there is a sense in which we still need to pay attention to 
the social oppression and standpoints in nudging. We should be wary of nudging 
where we can expect the oppressed to react differently to the manipulated choice 
architecture, due to their standpoint. If nudge-enhanced exemplar stories about the 
intellectually courageous people available in the society happened to be white male 
figures, people of color or women might not feel the same extent of admiration or 
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found him relatable unlike their white or male counterparts. In such a scenario, the 
oppressed in the society may not take the nudged choice as salient as it is initially 
designed. If nudge-enhanced exemplar stories could promote intellectual vice 
rehabilitation (and intellectual virtue cultivation, subsequently) as Engelen expects, 
even for vices primarily shaped by individuals, we need to worry about social 
oppression when we set up the nudge-enhanced exemplar stories.  
    People might worry about why we must pay special attention to social oppression 
in nudging. At the end of the day, our personal preferences might have similar 
countervailing effects on nudges. If an intellectually courageous person in the 
exemplar story coincidentally looks very much like a person bullied you in the past, 
you might not be emotionally triggered to emulate the exemplar as the designer 
intended. If you are interested in cultivating open-mindedness for whatever reason, 
you are prone to emulate the exemplar regardless of nudges. Contrary to the 
designer's intention, not everyone would indeed react to nudges.  The reason why I 
believe we should pay special attention to social oppressions is: social oppressions 
often occur along with categories of social identity (racial, political, sexual, religious) 
that are essential to one's identity, essential to who the person is (M. Fricker 2007, 
54). This implication for our identity is an essential difference between social 
oppression and mere personal preference. Institutional interventions should benefit 
the mass but, simultaneously, they should not perpetuate the pre-existing injustices 
in society. We need to avoid any systematic harm done to our identity. In this sense, 
even in cases of the vice primarily shaped by individuals, social oppression, and the 
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standpoint thereof needs to be taken into serious consideration when we construct 
nudges to cure such vices. I will come back to this point, and the details of the 
pedagogical implication of exemplars concerning virtue cultivation will be discussed 
in more depth later in the final chapter. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, my aim was to incorporate standpoint theory into virtue epistemology. 
I have challenged the ideal of the objectivity of the inquirer by introducing the recent 
work of standpoint theory. According to standpoint theory, systematic social 
oppression creates privileged knowledge on the side of the oppressed. The 
oppressed have first-hand privileged knowledge about their oppressed life that the 
non-oppressed would find hard to grasp. Simultaneously, a part of the oppression 
they suffer is epistemic in form: they lack tools and sufficient education to 
communicate their privileged knowledge to the non-oppressed. As already hinted in 
the work by Tanesini, social oppression systematically contributes to our vice 
formation: it systematically fosters intellectual vices in a distinct way for the oppressed 
compared to the non-oppressed. Vices created this way by social oppression need 
special attention and care. Where social oppressions foster intellectual vices, these 
cases are not the same as the mere situational influences. The oppressed are 
suffering in an epistemically unique way: their valuable first-hand knowledge of their 
oppressed experience are not easily transferable. Treating the vice of the oppressed 
would be just from distributive justice point of view. Doing otherwise, the oppressed 
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would fail to have a fair share of epistemic virtue education. Moreover, not treating 
their vice prevents their privileged knowledge being transmitted in the society further. 
When our vices are formed primarily by social oppression, such vices should be 
addressed institutionally. Lastly, the same consideration may apply to when we 
consider some concrete cases of institutional interventions to cure vices and foster 
virtues. Rearranging the way our choices are presented with the intention of changing 
our behavior by exploiting the knowledge of our decision making, nudging might help 
make some exemplar stories look salient and attractive. In doing so, it was suggested 
that we should emphasize the emotional, relatable, and admirable aspects of the 
exemplar-stories. Nudges are one way we can approach our vices institutionally. 
What might be missing in this picture is again, social oppression and our standpoint. 
Virtue epistemology developed in the past 30 years has, without a second thought, 
inherited some old values prevalent in modern epistemology, yet I hope to have shown 
that it is high time to reconsider some of them: paying proper attention to our epistemic 
standpoint created by the social pressure would be of great importance. It is a myth 
in many cases that our intellectual vices are formed individually. Some of them were 
primarily fostered by the oppressive social structures in the society. Virtue 
epistemologists should incorporate insights from feminist philosophy on social 
oppression and standpoint into their theory, and such insight will help construct 
institutional scaffoldings to cure our vices. 
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In this chapter, I have two aims: first, to give some suggestions in relation to 
emulation-based virtue epistemology, to enable greater sophistication of our 
understanding of them, based on the study of imitation and emulation in psychology; 
second, to engage with a diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in 
philosophy, and to suggest some pedagogical implications. I will explore how 
emulation-based virtue epistemology, represented by Zagzebski’s recently proposed 
exemplarism, can be related to recent studies on social distances in imitating 
behaviors in psychology, and I will make clear the implications of such investigation 
for the education of character: diversification of exemplars. In the first section, I will 
define emulation-based virtue theory in order to initiate the discussion. In the second 
section, the recent study of the influence of psychological distance on copying and 
learning behaviors will be addressed. Third, I will argue, based on the aforementioned 
studies, for diversification of exemplars. In the fourth section, the problem of diversity 
and inclusion in philosophy will be addressed, based on the argument I have 
formulated. I will argue that philosophers who endorse emulation-based virtue 
cultivation, especially in the domain of epistemology, must also accept and promote 
diversification of those models that are emulated in society. Particularly in philosophy, 
this leads to the promotion of hiring people from underrepresented groups in the 
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community, such as women, people of color, and the disabled population; this also 
promotes diverse reading lists in philosophy classes. 
 
1. Emulation-based virtue theory  
In this section, my aim is to lay out an overview of emulation-based virtue 
epistemology, and present the potential concern I have identified, which such a view 
needs to address.  
    Virtue epistemologists in the Aristotelian tradition, broadly construed (e.g. 
Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011), in line with virtue ethics (Hursthouse 1999), endorse 
common assumptions on the nature of virtues: virtues are habituated character traits; 
and virtues are inherently related to, if not constitutive of, a good life. I use the term 
“virtue theory” here as an umbrella term to refer to both virtue epistemology and virtue 
ethics, but the focus of my thesis is on virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemologists are 
not entirely in agreement on how we actually cultivate such epistemic virtues and 
avoid or correct epistemic vices. According to Porter, there are four standard 
approaches to virtue inculcation: (1) direct instruction on the nature and importance 
of the virtues; (2) exposure to exemplars of the virtues; (3) the practice of virtuous 
behaviors and the resultant habituation of virtuous dispositions; and (4) crafting 
environments that enculturate virtue (Porter 2015, 222). 63  My discussion In this 
chapter addresses the second strand in his list: exposure to the exemplars of the 
 
63 See David Carr's work for educational theories of moral virtues (Carr 1996, 2003, 
2017). 
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virtues. Before moving on to present my main concern with such a view, let me first 
clarify some central concepts I will use throughout this chapter.  
    Who are exemplars? Models and exemplars are those who are perceived as 
excellent in some respect, in other words, they are human examples that have 
“achieved a kind of normative force” (Warnick 2009, 5). Students or novices are 
attracted to a model’s display of their virtuous traits, and “thereby inspired to approach 
a subject matter with the disposition that has been exemplified” (Porter 2015, 222). 
Porter’s description indicates that exemplars are always people with admirable 
character traits: moral or epistemic. Zagzebski also thinks exemplars have good 
character traits: exemplars are those who obtain excellent, acquired psychological 
features (Zagzebski 2017, 64)64. Thus, exemplars are a kind of model with certain 
characters traits. In line with their usage, in this chapter, I use the terms ‘exemplar’, 
‘model’, and ‘role-model’ respectively. Exemplars are a subset of models and it is 
harder for us to achieve exemplarity than merely to become a model or role-model. 
Both role-models and exemplars instantiate some excellences in a certain domain, 
and exemplars instantiate them more fully and extensively in the area of virtues (See 
 
64 Epistemic virtues are directly relevant to my second aim of this chapter: engaging 
with a diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in philosophy. 
According to virtue epistemologists: epistemic virtuous persons are intrinsically 
motivated by epistemic goods (such as truth, knowledge, and wisdom) and they 
successfully develop certain dispositions out of this motivation (Baehr 2011, 
Zagzebski 1996). Academic philosophers are known to be critical thinkers, pursuing 
epistemic goods for their own sake, and we would expect novices see philosophers 
as epistemic exemplars or epistemic role models. 
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also Gibson and Dolan 2003; Vos 2018). In this chapter the domain I am chiefly 
concerned with as such is the excellences of our epistemic character traits, known as 
epistemic virtues, but I assume what we can say about models can also be said of 
exemplars, and role-models, other things being equal.  
    The next point of clarification is on emulation and imitation. In this chapter, I 
differentiate imitation from emulation in the following way: imitation here corresponds 
to copying the end state of an observed action by executing the same movements as 
performed by the modeled person, while emulation corresponds to reproducing the 
same end state of an observed action, but not necessarily by the same movements 
as the models use. This definition of imitation and emulation is endorsed by 
psychologists (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016) as well as a philosopher (Warnick 
2009, 6) in the relevant debate. Throughout the chapter I use imitative behavior as an 
umbrella term to refer both imitation and emulation.65 
 
65 Some philosophers propose, similarly, yet another distinction between imitation 
and emulation. They take emulation as including a strong cognitive component. 
Novices who emulate find the character(s) of the model attractive and hence 
motivated to act like her, while they can imitate people’s behavior without valuing their 
characters. Sanderse (2013) characterizes imitation as conditioning, while in 
emulations “first, there is the learner’s understanding of why the quality that is 
possessed by the model is worthy of being valued. Second, the learner will need some 
thinking about the ways in which he can alter himself in order to acquire the quality” 
(36). Kristjánsson also points out that blind copying is different from emulation, as 
emulating the exemplar should “help you to arrive at an articulate conception of what 
you value and want to strive towards and to help you find realistic means (‘fulfillable 
duties’) to that end” (Kristjánsson 2007, 40). I do not commit to a strongly cognitive 
interpretation of emulation like Sanderse and Kristjánsson in this thesis. Even in my 
weaker account, novices who emulate the model know the end state they are aiming 
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    Next, I will briefly address three philosophers’ formulations of emulation-based 
theory, from epistemology and also from virtue ethics: those of Zagzebski, 
Kristjánsson, and Battaly. By doing so, I aim to provide a better grasp of what kind of 
theory I mean by emulation-based virtue theory. Among many theorists, in recent 
years, Zagzebski has proposed an extensive emulation-based theory, now known as 
exemplarism (Zagzebski 2010, 2017): she takes it that an exemplar is a 
“paradigmatically good person” (2010, 54), such as a saint, hero, or sage. Such 
exemplars are most admirable people; we imitate exemplars through our emotion of 
admiration (Zagzebski 2010, 52-55).  
    Another emulation theorist, Kristján Kristjánsson, analyses emulation as having 
four elements: affective, conative, cognitive and behavioral. When we see a role-
model, we feel envy because we lack the desired quality of the model (affective) and 
are motivated to be like the model (conative), but by doing so, we also need to develop 
an understanding of why this quality is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued in 
 
to achieve; in this sense, there is a minimal cognitive element even in the concept of 
emulation. There is another reason why I do not hold the strong cognitive view: if 
knowing the value of the trait is necessary for emulating someone, it remains a 
mystery how emulation is initiated to begin with. At least in the initial stage of virtue 
cultivation, I see no way that emulation can occur without an understanding of why 
the trait of the model is worthy of being pursued. I believe such understanding can be 
obtained by the help of another means such as direct instruction on the nature of 
virtues (Porter 2015). I do believe virtue cultivation by emulation and imitation goes 
hand in hand with other means; however, I doubt they are necessary for the concept 
of emulation per se.  
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our own life (cognitive), and we must actually act to obtain such a quality (behavioral)  
(Kristjánsson 2007, 45).  
    How we obtain epistemic virtues through emulation and imitation are still an area 
that has not been fully developed by virtue epistemologists, yet Battaly (2016) recently 
provided the idea of rehabilitating our epistemic vice by emotional contagion. 
Emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process that enables us to catch 
emotions from other people (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). Battaly suggests, 
in brief, putting vicious people in a friendly environment with epistemic exemplars so 
that vicious people can ‘catch’ the virtuous emotions of exemplars via contagion. This 
is also, I believe, a type of emulation-based theory, because virtuous people in friendly 
environments are perceived as models in some respect by vicious agents, and vicious 
agents (are expected to) behave in the same way as the virtuous.66 
 
66 Related to the footnote 65, some people might argue that it is not clear whether 
vicious agents in a friendly environment are moved to genuine emulation by emotional 
contagion, because emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process by 
definition. It is contradictory to the Aristotelian-Kristjánsson’s analysis of the emotion 
of emulation (Kristjánsson 2007). Indeed, vicious agents might not consciously be 
able to access the value of the character exemplified by the exemplars in the situation. 
But how well novices can articulate the values of the character exemplified by 
exemplars seems to be a matter of degree. For instance, it is not hard to imagine a 
person who finds the virtue of humility exemplified by a model attractive, and yet not 
be able to explain why she feels so during the initial stage of her virtue cultivation. 
Denying the status of emulation entirely in such cases would amount to ignoring the 
rich developmental aspects of virtue acquisition and vice rehabilitations (Battaly, 
2016). However, settling this issue goes beyond the purview of this thesis. 
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    By addressing some basic concepts and representative views in the debate, I 
can offer a summary view that emulation-based virtue theories are virtue-
epistemological and virtue-ethical theories that endorse emulation and imitation of 
exemplars as an important way to cultivate virtue and correct vices: exemplars would 
serve as a guide for our moral and epistemic virtues. The distinct characteristic of 
emulation has been identified as the concreteness of the case and subsequent 
motivating power. By being exposed to exemplars, we can see “what the virtue looks 
like in action, and, because of this, the value of the virtue is more vivid, which 
increases the attractiveness of the virtue and therefore one’s desire to acquire the 
virtuous disposition” (Porter 2015, 222). Emulation thus affords us vivid, direct 
appreciation of virtues, going beyond abstract conceptual apprehension. Emulation-
based virtue theories do not hold that emulation is the exclusive way of undertaking 
virtue cultivation. Insofar as emulation plays an important role in our processes of 
education, it is sufficient to call such a view an emulation-based virtue theory and the 
argument I will propose in this chapter goes along with such an understanding.  
    Lastly, let me propose my potential concern for emulation-based virtue theories. 
In supporting virtue theories, those philosophers aim to make a claim that applies to 
all rational beings, regardless of person-related aspects and properties of our socio-
cultural background, such as gender, ethnicity, cultural background, and sexual 
orientation. Both women and men, people of color and whites, from East to West, are 
understood as proper candidates for epistemic virtue acquisition. In other words: 
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virtues can and should be sought after by these people, regardless of the subjective 
and contextual particularities of their identity and standpoint, ceteris paribus.67  
    With this in mind, if certain groups of people are shown to be marginalized in 
respect of this virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation, because of their person-related 
characteristics, there is a problem the theory needs to address. If, for instance, it turns 
out that in the current society, the emulation of exemplars is an effective way of 
cultivating virtues only in the white, male, English-speaking, heterosexual population, 
such a theory would need substantive modification.68 Let me call these assumptions, 
taken together, the impartiality assumption. If the impartiality assumption of virtues is 
correct, what can we say with regard to emulation-based virtue theories, more 
specifically? If it were shown that person A and person B’s imitative behaviors turn out 
to be systematically different, although both A and B are motivated to emulate, 
 
67 Imitative behaviors do not always occur for wide variety of reasons: we only imitate 
some actions, not all actions (Warnick 2009, Chapter 5), we sometimes fail to properly 
admire exemplars through distortion such as envy (Zagzebski 2017, Chapter 2). 
Some will have a better understanding of the virtue that is necessary for the 
acquisition of the virtue in question than others (Annas 2011, 19). Some may have 
personal preferences determining whom they will admire over others. I agree with 
their line of argument; however, I am chiefly concerned with variations in imitative 
behaviors that may exist, even when such factors are held fixed.  
68 For example, Zagzebski has given a detailed analysis of the nature of admiration 
(Zagzebski 2017, chapter 4), such as the possibility of mistakenly admiring non-
exemplary persons, as well as some cases where envy distorts our admiration. 
However, the cases I have in mind here: where, given the same feeling of admiration, 
two people admire an exemplary person in their society (e.g., a sage-like figure, such 
as a famous scientist), and yet imitate that person in different manners, has remained 
unexamined in her discussion. 
 197 
understand the importance of the virtue in question, and admire the same exemplar: 
emulation-based virtue theorists need to investigate why such differences exist, and, 
if such difference hinders one from pursuing virtues, how to mitigate such differences 
needs to be addressed. The question arises, then, whether there exists any case that 
supports the idea that our imitative behaviors may vary depending solely on who we 
are. I am going to argue that such cases exist in the next section. 
 
2. Emulation and imitation in construal-level theory 
My question is: is there any variety in our imitative behaviors and practices, and, if so, 
what impact does such variation have on the theories? I will address some empirical 
findings on our imitative behavior and distances: distance from the model with regards 
to the excellences, and distances among persons. The first kind of findings suggest 
that our emulative behaviors vary according to how close and attainable the models 
are to us in the relevant domain. However, and more importantly, our emulative 
behavior might be influenced by more subtle differences between the model and the 
self than attainability and relevance, namely, based on our person-related 
characteristics. I will address a psychological theory called construal-level theory 
(CLT) and its findings to demonstrate this point.  
    Since an early study conducted in the 1990s, perceived relevance between the 
model and the subject has explained differences of the imitability of the model. In 
Lockwood and Kunda’s experiment, first-year accounting students and fourth-year 
accounting students were exposed to a story of an outstandingly successful fourth-
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year accounting student. The first-year students were more inspired by such a model 
than the fourth-year students, and, moreover, the fourth-year students rated the target 
as less “relevant to them”. This finding was explained by the fact that the first-year 
students who had not yet tackled the course thought that the success of the superstar 
was attainable to them. For fourth-year students, superstar status was evidently not 
attainable; hence, they not only try to reduce their closeness to the model to reduce 
the model’s threat to them, they even denigrated the comparison process in the open-
ended explanations of their relevance ratings in the experiment (Lockwood and Kunda 
1997, 96–99).  
    More recently, Han and his colleagues conducted experiments on imitability in 
emulation. Students who read stories of attainable moral exemplars (e.g., a story 
about a student who helps disadvantaged kids for an hour per week) were more likely 
to increase voluntary service activity engagement than those who were exposed to 
stories of unattainable exemplars (e.g., a story about a student helps disadvantaged 
kids for 15 hours per week). The attainable group showed significantly increased 
engagement compared to the unattainable group. In another experiment, subjects in 
the peer exemplar group discussed and admired the exemplary behaviors of those 
who were close to them, such as family members, friends, or teachers; on the other 
hand, subjects in the historic moral figure group discussed and admired historical 
moral figures. The former group were shown to be more effectively motivated to 
service engagement compared with their counterpart (Han et al. 2017, 1–12). 
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    It is perhaps intuitive and very convincing that our emulative behaviors vary 
according to how close the model’s excellence is to the self, and also to the 
attainability of the model. Findings so far addressed are concerned with the difference 
of exemplarity between subjects: those who are emulated and those who emulate, in 
the relevant domain of excellence.69 But it is important to note this is not the only kind 
of distance that can explain variation of imitative behaviors. Our imitative behavior 
might be influenced by more subtle differences between the model and the self than 
those in attainability and relevance. This is exactly what I would like to draw my 
readers’ attention to. 
    Recent studies in psychology address how our imitating behaviors vary 
depending on our perceived ‘psychological distance’ from the model. Psychological 
distance involves temporal, spatial, and social distance, and hypotheticality between 
the self and objects. “Psychological distance is thus egocentric: Its reference point is 
to the self, here and now, and the different ways in which an object might be removed 
from that point” (Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and Liberman 2010, 440). The most 
important among these different factors in the current debate is social distance. Social 
distance is here defined as an interpersonal similarity, as Trope and Liberman put it: 
“the less similar someone is to oneself, the more socially distant they typically seem” 
 
69  Warnick’s philosophical analysis on imitation might help us understand these 
findings further. Imitation does not occur of every action, there must be a sorting 
mechanism, and he suggests people do not imitate when action is not congruent with 
their own self-narrative (Warnick 2008, Chapter 4). The model who we believe to be 
attainable might be easily consistent with our stories about ourselves, unlike models 
who threaten our self-narrative or are too far-fetched. 
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(Trope and Liberman 2012, 129). The authors of the following two studies were trying 
to uncover how perceived social distance influences our imitative behaviors. 
    In a study of temporal distance and spatial distance conducted by Hansen and 
his colleagues, students participated in a study on learning how to fold a dog made 
out of towels (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016). In the first study, students at Salzburg 
University (25 females, 11 males whose age ranged between 18 and 39) participated. 
A video was presented showing a person demonstrating how to create a dog out of 
towels. Participants in the distance condition were told that the video was recorded in 
the year 1990, while participants in the nearness condition were told that the video 
was recorded in the year in which the experiment was conducted, 2012. Their 
behavior was recorded and their movements were coded in relation to how they 
matched with the model’s movements. The participants performed more imitations 
than emulations in the near condition than in the distant condition. The result shown 
was that behavior that is framed as temporally close is imitated more literally than 
behavior that is framed as temporally distant. Similarly, in the second study, the 
participants were 46 students (35 females, 11 males) at New York University. The 
second task was to create a dog out of towels by observing a video model. Students 
were told that the video was made either in New York (near condition) or in Los 
Angeles (distant condition). The result was that the participants performed more exact 
literal imitations in the near condition than in the distant condition. 
    Similarly, Kalkstein and his colleagues conducted a series of experiments on 
social distance, in scenarios of social learning (Kalkstein et al. 2016). In their first 
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study, 67 undergraduates at New York University participated. The study was divided 
into two phases. In the first, learning, phase, participants saw two types of shape: 
global squares that were comprised of local triangles (Group A), and global triangles 
that were comprised of local squares (Group B). In the second, test, phase, novel 
shapes shown to the subjects could be categorized either by matching the global 
configuration of the original shape (high-level features), or by matching the local 
components of the original shape (low-level features). The subjects in this study were 
divided into two conditions: in the direct experience condition, subjects were told to 
categorize the shapes in front of the screen. In the social learning condition, the 
subjects were told that they would be learning from another participant. They watched 
a video of a previous participant conducting the categorization task, with a message 
indicating whether they had made a correct or incorrect categorization. Experimenters 
calculated the percentage of participants in each condition who categorized the shape 
on the basis of its global configuration in the test phase (high-level features). The 
results showed that a larger percentage of the subjects in the social learning condition 
(42%) categorized novel shapes based on their high-level global features than in the 
direct experience condition (19%).  
    In the second study by Kalkstein and his colleagues, 54 undergraduates at New 
York University participated in similar categorization tasks. Participants introduced to 
the model were either psychologically close (Psychology students from the same 
university), or psychologically distant (Psychology students from their rival university, 
Columbia University). Participants in the learning phase observed the model 
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categorizing the same set of shapes as in Study 1. They were explicitly told to learn 
as much as they could from the model because they would classify shapes into the 
two categories in the test phase. As in Study 1, subjects categorized novel shapes in 
the test phase. The results showed that a greater percentage of participants in the 
distant condition (54%) categorized the novel shapes according to their high-level, 
global features than did participants in the psychologically near condition (25%) 
(Kalkstein et al. 2016). 
    In the last section, I hinted that emulation-based virtue theorists have not 
considered a case where, given the appropriate sensitivity and feeling of admiration, 
two people might admire the correct person, but still might imitate her in different ways. 
The aforementioned studies on our imitation and learning seem to offer strong support 
for such cases. Hansen and his colleagues predict that when a model is temporally 
and geographically far from the subject, individuals emulate (achieving the end state 
with different means) more than imitate (copying the end state of an observed action 
by executing the same movements): namely, they are prone to imitate, they are less 
likely to execute the same movements as the model, compared to when the model is 
temporally and geographically close. Also, it is suggested by Kalkstein and his 
colleagues that when subjects are learning from a psychologically distant model, they 
are more prone to learn the global features of the task than they are when they learn 
from a socially close counterpart. What these findings imply is that when we facilitate 
emulation and imitation among subjects, the personal profile of the model might have 
an important role in determining and sorting how subjects direct their behaviors. 
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    Before moving on to my argument, let me briefly explain psychologists’ 
understanding regarding how psychological distance makes participants imitate and 
learn in different ways. These experiments are designed based on a psychological 
theory: CLT – the view that psychological distance increases the abstractness of our 
mental representation (e.g. Trope and Liberman 2010). Lower-level construal of 
events takes the form of “concrete, relatively unstructured, and contextualized 
representations that include subordinate and incidental features of events [while] 
higher-level construal are abstract, schematic, and decontextualized representations 
that extract the gist from the available information. They emphasize superordinate, 
core features of events, omitting specific features that may vary without significantly 
changing the meaning of events” (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016, 321). Hence, 
experimenters infer, based on their data on our copying and learning behaviors in the 
CLT framework, that our different levels of construal of the model’s performance lead 
to our different styles of copying and learning behavior. Those students who are 
engaged in the categorizing task following a psychologically distant model, construe 
the task at a higher level: a distant model’s behaviors will be learned and internalized 
at a higher level and, hence, emulated and reproduced in line with this higher-level 
representation (Kalkstein et al. 2016, 7).  
    So far, we have seen that the inclination to construe events in different ways 
based on social and psychological distance is widespread among us; so what 
implications does this have in virtue cultivation? The temporal and distal positions of 
the model, or the social affiliations of the model, such as university affiliation, are 
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understood to be epistemically irrelevant factors when we consider the cultivation of 
virtues (See Alfano 2013). Their epistemically praiseworthy characters seem to be the 
sole concern when virtue theorists look for models to inculcate admirable 
characteristics among people. It is a surprising fact that people’s imitative behavior or 
learning behavior changes based on how temporally and distantly close they are to 
the model, or on how socially close they are to the model. 
    First, such an inclination needs to be integrated into emulation-based virtue 
theories: for instance, in Zagzebski’s exemplarism, on the emulation of fictional 
characters, she maintains: “we learn through narratives of both fictional and 
nonfictional persons that some people are admirable and worth imitating” (Zagzebski 
2010, 51). It is perhaps true that both fictional characters and real-life figures can be 
exemplars, but they may induce our behavior in different ways. Caregivers are socially 
closer to children than fictional characters, for instance, and hence, even if both 
parties happen to be epistemically praiseworthy (for example, being intellectually 
courageous) to the very same extent, they might induce different styles of copying 
behavior among children because children may construe the virtue of caregivers more 
concretely (though this fact does not undermine the importance of fictional characters 
as exemplars). Children might be able to copy their caregivers’ intellectually 
courageous actions more literally, than those of fictional characters, when they are 
encouraged to do so. 
    Here I am not arguing that emulation-based virtue theories are wrong in any 
sense, but it seems to me that philosophical models of our imitative behaviors require 
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some refinement. According to recent studies in social psychology and CLT, variation 
exists in our imitating and learning behaviors, depending on the distances between 
who we are and who models are, and such variation is observed frequently, and with 
surprising variety. I now consider some potential amendments to emulation-based 
virtue theory that flow from this data.  
 
3. Diversification of exemplars  
In this section, I will suggest a pluralistic exemplar-based approach. My aim is to 
convince readers that we need to diversify our exemplars in society in order to 
effectively cultivate virtues through emulation and imitation.  
    A pluralistic exemplar-based approach has already been encouraged from a 
theoretical point of view (Croce and Silvia Vaccarezza 2017). But I believe the scope 
of this view needs widening. Croce and Vaccarezza point out that emulating heroes 
(who have both virtues and vices) is more fruitful than emulating saints (who are 
genuinely virtuous), as it helps to develop the novice’s moral imagination, the proper 
cultivation of which represents a fundamental educational task. On the imitability of 
heroes and saints, it is also suggested that the former is easier to handle than the 
latter, because when the traits an exemplar displays are not beyond our reach, it is 
easier for us to imitate them. On the other hand, when a novice is presented with 
moral sainthood, it is difficult for her to be attracted to the saint “due to her distance 
from the moral imperfection of ordinary people” (Croce and Vaccarezza 2017, 10). 
They further maintain: 
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As a matter of fact, it is easier to imitate someone, when we discover that her 
moral exemplarity is not beyond our reach […] in contrast, when presenting 
novices with exemplars of moral sainthood, the educator will often have to 
deal with their discouragement and put great effort into helping them be 
attracted to the saint, due to her distance from the moral imperfection of 
ordinary people. Thus, it seems evident that the hero constitutes a more 
imitable kind of exemplar than the saint does. (Croce and Vaccarezza 2017, 
10) 
 
Here there is an interesting suggestion regarding the imitability of the exemplar. They 
imply that, when the exemplar (e.g., a saint) is psychologically distant from the novice, 
it will be more difficult for her to imitate the exemplar than it is for those who are less 
distant (e.g., a hero). This is in line with the empirical research addressed in the first 
part of section 2. When senior students were confronted with the unattainable 
superstar, their perceived closeness to the model was reduced and they avoided 
being threatened. When novices admired exemplars close to them, their voluntary 
service activity engagement was promoted (Han et al. 2017; Lockwood and Kunda 
1997). Perceived relevance explained the difference between the imitability of the 
models. 70  Yet the scope of both such psychological findings, and Croce and 
 
70 Moreover, an exemplar who is very distant from the moral imperfection of ordinary 
people is known to facilitate a different kind of self-threat: self-threats that triggers 
defense mechanisms (moral inferiority), self-threats which makes us question the 
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Vaccarezza’s argument, apply only to the excellence of the model; the issue is to what 
extent exemplars have admirable traits and how emulators perceived their moral 
distance from the exemplar (e.g., how little we can achieve such traits, unlike the 
exemplars). However, it is not clear why this must be so. Against its apparent 
plausibility, remember that the moral we derived from the former section that even 
personal characteristics of the model irrelevant to virtues or excellences, such as the 
time and place where models are located, or to which institution the model is affiliated, 
and if the model is presented in a video or through direct instruction, elicited different 
imitative behaviors systematically. Such purportedly subtle psychological distances 
could influence a subject’s representation of the event and their subsequent copying 
and learning behaviors. Thus, emulation-based virtue theorists have a strong reason 
to broaden the scope of the psychological distance to take into consideration in virtue 
cultivation. According to the CLT framework, it is our mental representation of the 
relevant event and hence the exemplars which do this job of sorting different types of 
imitative and learning behaviors. These perceptions are always egocentric; hence, 
not only who the models are but also who the imitators are play an important role in 
this sorting process. Here I can summarize my view on imitative behaviors and 
distances as follows: when a novice is presented with an exemplar who is 
psychologically very distant from herself she may not copy the literal behavior of the 
 
ethical appropriateness of our own behavior (moral confusion), and self-threats which 
cause us to suspect that models are judging our morality (anticipated moral 
reproach)(Monin 2007, 57–61) With this in place, we can defend the principle of 
emulation on stronger grounds. 
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exemplar as closely as when imitating an exemplar who is psychologically closer to 
her.  
    When diverse novices exist in a society, yet exemplars remain less diverse, this 
fact would systematically influence novices’ imitative behaviors. But this would be 
problematic only if emulating but not imitating, or vice versa, turns out to be unjust in 
some sense. If this is the case, diversification of exemplars is called for. Is there any 
reason for us to believe that such an imbalance of emulation and imitation is unjust, 
making diversification of exemplars necessary? I think we have good reasons to think 
so, especially in virtue cultivation. It is often emphasized that virtue is not rule-
following, but moral decision-making: virtue cultivation is understood as learning how 
to become sensitive to circumstances (Fröding 2013, 45). What is required for such 
virtuous sensitivity? One answer is to learn how to act virtuously in a wide variety of 
virtue-eliciting circumstances. How is emulation and imitation helpful in this regard? 
Virtues are only attainable in acknowledging the moral complexity of the lives of us 
and of the exemplar. As Vos (2018) highlights, exemplars provide us with “holistic 
images that nevertheless remain concrete and are exemplary because and insofar as 
they appeal to our own life concerns” (Vos 2018, 26). Virtue cultivation requires an 
understanding of why a certain quality is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued 
in one’s own life (Kristjánsson 2007). Such a personalization of value through 
emulation requires creativity on the side of novices in cultivating virtues in their own 
life context.  
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    Traditionally, philosophers might have assumed that when we admire some 
virtuous exemplars, it does not matter whether such agents are women or men; dead 
or alive; seen at first hand or learned about from others or through reading a book. 
However, without being consciously aware of it, we are prone to imitate models who 
are psychologically close to ourselves, and we tend to emulate those who are 
psychologically far from ourselves. Imitation provides a clearer means to the end that 
you are trying to achieve: all you need to do to imitate is follow the sequence of actions 
of the model, hence imitation is more concrete. Imitation is however, highly 
contextualized; it is not clear that repeating the actions of the model would be helpful 
in achieving the same end in different situations. On the other hand, in emulation 
demands creativity in finding a means to achieve an end by yourself; hence, it is more 
abstract. It may also come with a risk that one might not be able to find the right means. 
We can and ought to manipulate these inclinations in the cultivation of virtues to have 
a better grasp of virtues and how virtues are to be pursued in one’s own life. In doing 
this, exposure to a wide variety of virtue-eliciting circumstances are necessary.  
    Hence, in order to cultivate virtues, we need a diversification of our exemplars. I 
hope to have shown that there is a strong case for emulation-based virtue theorists 
to take diversification of exemplars into serious consideration.  
 
4. Diversifying exemplars: educational implications 
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In this final section, I suggest an application of diversification of exemplars in 
academia, especially in academic philosophy. My idea is that it is the key to tackling 
the current demographic and inclusion problem we face in philosophy. 
    When we look at universities, we see students from a variety of backgrounds, in 
gender, race, culture, socio-economic background, and sexual orientation. Professors, 
lecturers, and teachers are often taken as epistemic models, based on their admirable 
intellectual character traits, their excellent epistemic skills or their prominent 
understanding of the subject matter, which are all necessary for obtaining epistemic 
virtues. On one hand, while students are diverse, our epistemic models, on the other, 
are not so diverse. If novices imitate and emulate epistemic models based on the 
psychological distance between students and professors qua our epistemic models, 
then, for instance, the current demographic and professional dominance of men in 
almost all areas of academia might hinder students from conducting a certain type of 
copying and learning behavior. Generally, put, male students might be more inclined 
to emulate female professors than to imitate male professors, and for female students 
we can expect it to work in the opposite way. Let me imagine some hypothetical 
scenarios in line with these thoughts: if an introductory logic class was designed to 
encourage novice students to engage in solving a logical formula step by step, just 
like a lecturer does, and if such a class was given by male professors and male tutors, 
female students might struggle more than their male counterparts to address the 
problems by learning concrete, lower-level features in the situation. By contrast, 
abstracted thoughts are often strongly associated with the discipline of academic 
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philosophy. If a male lecturer in an ethics class hopes to deliver abstract philosophical 
ideas to his pupils in his lectures, such as fairness or justice, male students might be 
inclined to pay more attention to the details of the argument compared to their female 
counterparts. The issue here is, granted that we already have students from diverse 
backgrounds, without diverse models, a part of our epistemic virtue cultivation 
remains far from optimal in such a situation. Quite to the contrary, such a project might 
be slowed down, and, eventually, hindered. Note that the diversification of exemplars 
here does not only help people from underrepresented groups, such as women, and 
students of color. Diversification in the context of virtue helps everyone, because in 
order to cultivate virtuous sensitivity, novices must learn from the model both in 
concrete and abstract ways. By diversifying models, novices will be placed in an 
environment where they are capable both of emulating and imitating models. Such an 
environment is more conducive to the cultivating of virtues and avoiding vices.  
    The problem of diversity is especially severe in academic philosophy. It is widely 
known that academic philosophy is extremely demographically homogeneous (Kidd 
2017, 118). Philosophy is dominated by white men; it suffers from the 
underrepresentation of various groups, most obviously women but also other groups 
(e.g., philosophers from certain ethnic backgrounds such as African or Asian, and 
people with disabilities). According to a 2018 report by the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency, among the non-SET subject areas, philosophy is the only subject that is 
notably gender imbalanced (70.3% men). In the same report, academic staff in 
philosophy in the UK were found to be 95.2% white (among the non-SET subjects, it 
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is the fourth biggest subject dominated by the white population, next to classics, sport, 
and history), and 93.9% are non-disabled (Advance HE 2018a). This problem relates 
to the underrepresentation and marginalization of philosophers from various groups 
including women, people of color, those from a non-Western background, people with 
disabilities and, perhaps, LGBTQ people.71 Let us continue to focus our attention on 
the gender imbalance in philosophy, for the sake of our argument In this chapter. 
According to a report by the British Philosophical Association in 2011, while 45% of 
 
71 The data supports my view on gender, ethnic group, and disability; however, 
underrepresentation of LGBTQ people in philosophy is waiting to be confirmed. The 
Equality Act 2010 extended protected characteristics in the UK to cover new areas: 
gender reassignment, religion and belief (or none), and sexual orientation. No 
information was available for philosophers specifically on their sexual orientation and 
gender reassignment in the report. Moreover, this information is optional: only 77.4% 
of British academic stuff gave their sexual orientation in the survey. Among the staff 
in the institutions returning data, 0.7% were bisexual, 1.2% were gay man, 0.6% were 
gay women, while 46.2% were heterosexual. On the other hand, 82.6% institution 
returned data on sexual orientation among students: 2% were bisexual, 1.1% were 
gay men, 0.6% were gay women, while 65.6% were heterosexual. It is true that the 
rate of gay staff members and students are roughly similar, but there is a striking 
difference between the number of staff who refused to give their sexual orientation 
(12.3%), and left it blank (38.5%) and that of students (7.8% refused to answer, 21.8% 
left blank); it is not clear how to interpret this data. Among the students in institutions 
returning data about gender reassignment, 3.2% had a gender identity different from 
that assigned at birth, while staff who had a gender identity different from that 
assigned at birth were 0.2% (Advance HE 2018b). It can be said that for bisexuals 
and transgender people in UK universities, there is some imbalance between staff 
and student populations (Advance HE 2018a). These data speak to my idea that there 
is a demographic imbalance among academic staff members (model) and students 
(novices) in the protected characteristics generally; however, whether this is truly the 
case for philosophers specifically is yet to be confirmed by further investigation. 
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philosophy students at undergraduate level are female, only 20% of professional 
philosophers in the UK are women. The largest drops occur between undergraduate 
and master’s level (9 percentage points), and between master’s and PhD level (6 
percentage points). The data seem to suggest that something discouraging to female 
philosophers is taking place in the university (Beebee and Saul 2011).  
    Grounded on such data, I propose that a diversification of our exemplars is 
important in counteracting the demographically challenged nature of contemporary 
academic philosophy. If students are to become genuinely intellectually virtuous, by 
obtaining the proper sensitivity to situations through both emulation and imitation, 
hence by learning concretely and learning abstractly, demographic homogeneity in 
philosophy is a genuine problem for all, not only for female philosophers, but also for 
our male colleagues. In a situation where students are expected to act with intellectual 
virtue by emulating exemplars, depending on the social distance between students 
and professors, they will be likely to systematically exhibit different types of copying 
and learning behavior. If philosophy departments employ more female professors, 
postdocs, and tutors, compared to homogenous departments, both female and male 
undergraduate students can be expected to respond in slightly different ways in the 
class when they are encouraged to imitate the epistemically praiseworthy character 
of the model. If this were the case, I predict that demographic diversity in the 
philosophy department will be likely to foster intellectual skills, deeper understanding 
of the subject, and, finally, intellectual virtues among students. If this happens, the 
opportunities for a socially diverse student community to develop epistemic virtues 
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will be improved, more so than for those whose formation unfortunately proceeds 
within a demographically challenged socio-epistemic environment.  
    The same argument should apply to facilitating the diversification of philosophy 
reading lists.72 Philosophers might uncritically assume that their reading lists should 
be selected based purely on the academic excellence of the content, and they might 
also believe that current homogenous reading lists are superb in this regard. First of 
all, it is a highly dubious assumption that the current reading lists reflect purely the 
excellence of the material. However, this point goes beyond our discussion. Secondly, 
consideration, in selection of reading materials, of the factors we know to influence 
our learning behavior, such as time and place, and by whom it is written, does not 
necessarily contradict our excellence criteria (properly construed) in selecting 
materials, anyway. More importantly, if part of the aim of the education of philosophy 
is to make students excellent inquirers, our reading list should pay proper attention 
not only to excellence but also to the pragmatic factors that actually help foster 
students’ intellectual excellence, such as time and place, author, and in what language 
the reading material was written. If we have a list of readings consisting of books 
written in the ancient period and up to the present, written by both female and male 
writers, from East to West, written in ancient Chinese and modern Spanish, students 
will be exposed to opportunities for learning and exhibiting different ways of emulating 
and imitating the model. Hence, we could expect them to be more sensitive to 
epistemic virtue-eliciting circumstances in their philosophical inquiry.  
 
72 For instance, see https://diversityreadinglist.org. 
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    In order to illustrate how my argument for the diversification of philosophers is on 
the right track, let me briefly touch upon an insightful experiment conducted at the 
University of Oklahoma. Though the target of this study is not directly related to 
tackling virtue cultivation, it indirectly tells us about how similarity in respect of 
exemplars matters in philosophy education. Heather Demarest and her colleagues 
(Demarest et al. 2017) conducted research on the continuation of undergraduates 
studying philosophy. They carried out two short surveys with students in an 
introductory philosophy course in 2015, at both the beginning and the end of the 
semester. In this survey, students were asked to agree or disagree with 16 statements, 
including ones asking about their continuation in philosophy (e.g. “I have seriously 
considered a philosophy major or minor”). The experiment suggested that for female 
students in introductory philosophy, what predicts their continuation in philosophy is 
whether or not they feel similar to the philosophers. Demarest et al. maintain,  
 
It would be hard to overstate the importance of [S7], “I feel similar to the kinds 
of people who become philosophers”, as it has a correlation value of 0.80 
(p¼0.0001) with Continuation for women (0.62 for men). No other statement 
is a better predictor of Continuation. (Demarest et al. 2017, 528)  
 
The experimenters are hesitant to recommend direct interventions, such as increasing 
“the number of women instructors for introductory courses, directly exposing students 
to professional women philosophers” (529) as they consider this “putting the cart 
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before the horse” (529). But is this so? Important intellectual abilities, such as critical 
thinking and logical thinking, are often associated with philosophers. Such cognitive 
skills are necessary, if not sufficient, for the intellectually virtuous character traits virtue 
epistemologists aim to foster in society. As I implied earlier, if certain groups of people 
are shown to be marginalized in regard to virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation, 
something is going wrong in such a practice from a virtue-epistemological perspective. 
The diversification of philosophers is hence vitally important for philosophy and, 
especially, for emulation-based virtue epistemologists. It is important to repeat that 
my suggestion of diversifying exemplars where they are highly demographically 
unbalanced is expected to benefit all in the context of virtue cultivation: not only the 
underrepresented population, but also the dominant party; and diversification is not 
 217 
affirmative action but rather a correction to combat the injustice that is prevalent in the 
domain.7374  
    In this section, I have argued that the diversification of exemplars is a necessary 
move for emulation-based virtue theorists who are concerned with maximizing the 
 
73 Some people might worry that my view represents a type of nudge strategy, and 
would thus suffer from objections that these attract. There are two points to make in 
reply. First, I am happy to see my view as being in line with nudging. According to 
Thaler and Sunstein (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, Engelen et al. 2018) any aspect of 
the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives’ are nudges. 
A deliberate intervention in choosing exemplars is, then, compatible with such a 
strategy. Secondly, however, the well known objection to nudge theory is that it is too 
paternalistic, and against human autonomy. In line with Engelen’s (Engelen et al. 
2018) argument, I have limited my nudges as strategies for epistemic virtues among 
those who explicitly endorse emulation-based virtue epistemology. For theorists who 
believe that virtues ought to be pursued by everyone, via imitation and emulation of 
models, diversification of exemplars helps to fulfill their goal rather than hinder their 
autonomous choice, so I can avoid the most problematic type of objection to nudge 
theory. It is beyond the purview of this thesis to address other issues with nudge 
theories; however, it will be worth examining them in my future work. I thank my 
anonymous reviewer for this constructive comment. 
74 People might ask what existing staff members can do to become better models by 
getting acquainted with the results from the psychological literature. We might be able 
to infer from CLT that a model can be perceived differently, to some extent, depending 
on the way the person is framed. In teaching logic as a white male philosopher, 
making sure that students from underrepresented groups follow inferences step by 
step might be helpful. In teaching history of philosophy (those philosophers are not 
only temporally and spatially distant, but also, perhaps, not attainable), offering more 
information about their personal lives and characters in detail might help students see 
the exemplar as less disturbing, or more relatable. Such a strategy might or might not 
be helpful to mitigate the problem arising from the imbalance of emulation and 
imitation. All of these needs further investigation. 
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prospects for the edification of a socially diverse student body. Considering that the 
demographic problem is an urgent and pressing issue in philosophy, the 
diversification of exemplars is a highly attractive option, especially in academic 
philosophy, from a virtue-epistemological point of view. Those who believe that 
emulation is a viable strategy for moral and epistemic character education ought to 
take this diversification turn seriously and they should implement and support relevant 
policies and initiatives. 
 
5. Conclusion  
A body of research on our copying and learning behavior conducted in recent years 
under the CLT framework indicates that “who we are” and “who our exemplars are” 
systematically influence our imitative behaviors. Emulation-based virtue theorists 
have failed to notice this point. I have suggested the diversification of exemplars in 
education, and especially in academic philosophy, where we are facing a 
demographic problem. By having diverse epistemic exemplars in a department, such 
as female philosophy professors, it is suggested that not only female students, but all 
students, might develop a variety of imitative strategies toward models, and, hence, 
the development of epistemic virtues by gaining sensitivity to the virtue-eliciting 
environment might become more viable. The same argument applies to the 
diversification of our reading list in philosophy. I hope my thesis has provided hints 
toward an improvement both of emulation-based virtue epistemology and a practical 
response to our demographic problems in philosophy.  
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Conclusions 
In my thesis, I have addressed the following questions lurking in virtue epistemology: 
can we really acquire an admirable intellectual disposition flown from our love of 
knowledge as virtue epistemologists portray (Chapter 1)? Can we cultivate such 
intellectual virtues solely by our efforts? If not, to what extent are environmental helps 
compatible with our intellectual virtue acquisition and treatment of intellectual vices 
(Chapter 2)? If intellectual virtue cultivations are systematically in conflict with the 
pursuit of other values, what can virtue epistemologists say about such conflicts 
(Chapter 3)? Intellectual autonomy is demonstratively an epistemic value, yet, the 
majority of our epistemic pursuits are socially embedded. In our testimonial 
exchanges, what kind of epistemic value are we promoting (Chapter 4)? Are some of 
our vices primarily constructed by social oppressions, and if so, do we need any 
different treatments to the vices of the socially oppressed from the non-oppressed 
(Chapter 5)? Theorists believe we can cultivate intellectual virtues by emulating 
exemplars in society but do we all feel motivated to emulate exemplars in a similar 
way (Chapter 6)? In each chapter of my thesis, I addressed these issues one by one. 
    In the first chapter, I have addressed the situationist critique of virtues. Although 
situationists criticized virtue theory for its empirical inadequacy in combination with 
the commitment to psychological realism, the nature of this criticism has been 
ambiguous. This is due to their misunderstanding of the hard core of the virtue theory 
and their stipulation of theoretical commitments of virtue theory. While situationists 
have assumed that social psychological studies undermine the empirical adequacy of 
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virtue theory, such studies show, at most, that not many of us are genuinely virtuous. 
The studies on the orientation of our motivation indicates how the dynamics of our 
motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: a good 
life. The motivation components of intellectual virtues correspond well with the way 
people are motivated when they engage in important activities in such studies. I hope 
to have shown that virtue theory and being a psychological realist are compatible. 
    In the second chapter, I criticized the personalist account of intellectual virtue. 
While constructing a friendly environment is vitally important, however, contra 
personalism, I still believe self-cultivation i.e., efforts on the side of the agent, is a 
necessary component of virtue acquisition. Personalism faces a few issues: first, 
personalism cannot make sense of the success (i.e., achievement) component of 
virtue. Second, personalist relies on attributability responsibility. Nonetheless, 
attributability responsibility is not compatible with some transformation machine cases, 
as personalist initially assumed. Third, I have argued that the self in the form of 
narrative are underlying the concept of intellectual virtue, when they say intellectual 
virtue reflects who we are as a thinker. Seen from the narrative point of view, there 
are some essential differences between the agent transformed by the machine, and 
the genuinely virtuous agent. 
    In the third section, the problem of the epistemic partiality of friendship was 
addressed. We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, and given that good 
friendship is a care relation, epistemic partiality of friendship exists and rightly so. But 
the initiation and termination of friendship indicates that there is also a sense in which 
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our friendships track evidence (via our epistemic partisan affiliations). The proponents 
of the epistemic partiality of friendship relied on the idea that friendship is necessary 
for a good life, but the exact same thing can be said of any of the important values in 
life, such as justice. Conflicts of multiple values lead to a few interpretations: a clash 
of subjective and objective values, moral imperfectionism, or irresolvable tragic 
dilemmas. Virtue epistemology might be able to help mitigate the side effect of 
epistemic partiality of friendship by promoting intellectual virtues in the early stage of 
our life. Nevertheless, such virtue cultivation processes would be predominantly 
environmental routes rather than self-cultivation.    
    In the fourth chapter, the value of intellectual receptivity was introduced. There 
are some senses in which first-hand knowledge is more desirable than the testimonial 
knowledge, such as only the former is promoting the value of intellectual autonomy. 
Considering that knowing something is a social activity, we defer to others’ opinions 
and are rightly doing so. I’ve introduced the value of intellectual receptivity derived 
from receptivity in the realm of morality: having a positive attitude towards epistemic 
goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such things as they are, and 
integrating them into our epistemic self. This value helps us explain why an excessive 
desire for the first-hand knowledge can be harmful. It also helps explain why some 
intellectual virtues are worthwhile pursuing.   
    In the fifth chapter, my aim was to incorporate standpoint theory into virtue 
epistemology. According to standpoint theory, systematic social oppression creates 
standpoints. The oppressed have first-hand privileged knowledge about their 
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oppressed life that the non-oppressed would find hard to grasp, yet a part of the 
oppression they suffer is epistemic in form: they lack tools and sufficient education to 
communicate their privileged knowledge to the non-oppressed. Social oppression 
systematically contributes to our vice formation: it systematically fosters intellectual 
vices in a distinct way for the oppressed compared to the non-oppressed. Not treating 
their vice is unjust and prevents their privileged knowledge being transmitted in the 
society further. When our vices are formed primarily by a social oppression, such 
vices should be addressed institutionally. The same consideration may apply to 
institutional interventions to cure vices and foster virtues, such as nudging.  
    In chapter six, we have seen a body of research on our copying and learning 
behaviors called construal level theory. They indicate that “who we are” and “who our 
exemplars are” systematically influence our imitative behaviors. Emulation-based 
virtue theorists have failed to notice this point. I have suggested the diversification of 
exemplars in education, and especially in academic philosophy, where we are facing 
a demographic problem. It is suggested that having diverse epistemic exemplars in 
society help all students develop a variety of imitative strategies toward models, and, 
hence, the development of epistemic virtues by gaining sensitivity to the virtue-
eliciting environment might become more viable. 
    Finally, I will propose my future research direction. The starting point of my inquiry 
was to admit the following predicament: intellectual virtues are hard to come by, and 
we are easily fallen for intellectual vices. In this vein, I have emphasized the 
importance of environmental scaffoldings in cultivating intellectual virtues and 
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avoiding intellectual vices throughout my thesis. Environmental help can take a variety 
of forms: I have addressed a few in my thesis: e.g., education, nudging, and 
technological enhancements. These may not be an exhaustive list of environmental 
routes to intellectual virtues. In future research, virtue epistemologists need to expand 
this list of environmental scaffoldings so that we are less inclined to fall prey to vicious 
minds, and consider to what extent such environmental helps are compatible with the 
acquisition condition of virtues (In my thesis, I have shown that the most extreme 
case: Nozick’s transformation machine was not compatible with the acquisition 
condition of intellectual virtues). The consideration for our responsibility (both 
accountability and attributability senses) and for the concept of self (narrative or 
otherwise) might help us address such a question. If I am on the right track of 
promoting the value of intellectual receptivity in virtue epistemology, some 
interventions that can potentially fundamentally changes what we can know (i.e., 
changes on our epistemic human nature), therefore such as some cognitive 
enhancements need to be handled with care. Virtue epistemologists must have the 
right balance between the transhumanistic tendency of overcoming our cognitive 
shortcomings and becoming a more self-reliant epistemic agent by cognitive 
enhancements, and the bio-conservatistic tendency of accepting and appreciating 
what we cannot know as they are (i.e., they go against the epistemic perfection). 
These cases of cognitive enhancements which directly change our cognitive make-
up are thus theoretically important for virtue epistemology. Yet, the issue is still, far-
fetched. The more pressing issue for virtue epistemologists is perhaps, how to think 
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of the oppressive social structures currently influencing our intellectual dispositions. 
As I hinted in my thesis, societies we live in comes with a variety of forms of social 
oppressions along with our social identities (some of which are widely in common 
across cultures but others are more culturally distinct). If I am right in that the vices 
that are primarily socially constructed often takes different forms between the 
oppressed and the non-oppressed: we need differential remedial approaches to such 
vices. Virtue epistemologists first need to sort out such socially constructed vices from 
more individualistic ones. Then, we must consider how to institutionally intervene in 
such socially constructed vices (especially, those vices that the marginalized 
population in the society are suffering). Virtue epistemology may need to pay more 
attention to feminist philosophy, I hope my thesis help convince my readers that the 
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Fröding, Barbro. 2011. “Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life.” 
Neuroethics 4 (3): 223–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2. 
———. 2013. Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement. SpringerBriefs in Ethics. 
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4. 
Furnham, Adrian, Tatsuro Hosoe, Thomas Li, and -Ping Tang. 2001. “Male Hubris 
and Female Humility? A Cross-Cultural Study of Ratings of Self, Parental, and 






Garry, Ann. 2011. “Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender.” 
Hypatia 26 (4): 826–50. https://about.jstor.org/terms. 
 232 
Gibson, Donald E. 2004. “Role Models in Career Development: New Directions for 
Theory and Research.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 65 (1): 134–56. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0001-8791(03)00051-4. 
Goldberg, Sanford C. 2018. “Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value-
Reflecting Reasons.” Philosophical Studies, May, 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1123-6. 
Greco, John. 1999. “Agent Reliabilism.” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 273–96. 
———. 2003. “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.” In Intellectual Virtue: 
Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, edited by Michael DePaul and 
Linda Zagzebski, 111–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic 
Normativity. Combridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2012. “A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 1–26. 
Guay, Frédéric, Catherine F. Ratelle, and Julien Chanal. 2008. “Optimal Learning in 
Optimal Contexts: The Role of Self-Determination in Education.” Canadian 
Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne 49 (3): 233–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012758. 
Guay, Frédéric, and Robert J Vallerand. 1996. “Social Context, Student’s 
Motivation, and Academic Achievement: Toward a Process Model.” Social 
Psychology of Education 1 (3): 211–33. 
 233 
Han, Hyemin, Jeongmin Kim, Changwoo Jeong, and Geoffrey L. Cohen. 2017. 
“Attainable and Relevant Moral Exemplars Are More Effective than 
Extraordinary Exemplars in Promoting Voluntary Service Engagement.” 
Frontiers in Psychology 8 (March): 283. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00283. 
Hansen, Jochim, Hans Alves, and Yaacov Trope. 2016. “Psychological Distance 
Reduces Literal Imitation: Evidence from an Imitation-Learning Paradigm.” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 42 
(3): 320–30. https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000150. 
Harman, Gilbert. 1999. “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics 
and the Fundamental Attribution Error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
99 (1): 315–332. 
Hartshorne, Hugh, and Mark May. 1928. Studies in the Nature of Character, Studies 
in Deceit (Vol. I). New York: Macmillan. 
Hatfield, Elaine., John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson. 1994. Emotional 
Contagion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hawley, Katherine. 2014. “Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting.” Synthese 191: 2029–
45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0129-4. 
Hennessey, Beth A, and Teresa M Amabile. 2010. “Creativity.” Annual Review of 
Psychology 61 (1): 569–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100416. 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 234 
Iizuka, Rie. 2018. “Situationism, Virtue Epistemology, and Self-Determination 
Theory.” Synthese, March, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1750-7. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2019. “Women in National Parliaments.” 2019. 
http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. 
Isen, Alice M, Kimberly A Daubman, and Gary P Nowicki. 1987. “Positive Affect 
Facilitates Creative Problem Solving.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 52 (6): 1122–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1122. 
Isen, Alice M, and Paula F Levin. 1972. “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies 
and Kindness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 (3): 384. 
Judge, Timothy A, Chad A Higgins, Carl J Thoresen, and Murray R Barrick. 1999. 
“The Big Five Personality Traits, General Mental Ability, and Career Success 
across the Life Span.” Personnel Psychology 52 (3): 621–52. 
Kalkstein, David A, Tali Kleiman, Cheryl J Wakslak, Nira Liberman, and Yaacov 
Trope. 2016. “Social Learning across Psychological Distance.” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 110 (1): 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000042. 
Kasof, Joseph, Chuansheng Chen, Amy Himsel, and Ellen Greenberger. 2007. 
“Values and Creativity.” Creativity Research Journal 19 (2–3): 105–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10400410701397164. 
Kasser, Tim, Richard M Ryan, Melvin Zax, and Arnold J Sameroff. 1995. “The 
Relations of Maternal and Social Environments to Late Adolescents’ 
Materialistic and Prosocial Values.” Developmental Psychology 31 (6): 907. 
 235 
Kawall, Jason. 2009. “Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the Supererogatory.” 
Philosophical Studies 146 (2): 179–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-
9250-0. 
———. 2013. “Friendship and Epistemic Norms.” Source: Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 165 (2): 349–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/sl. 
Keller, Simon. 2004. “Friendship and Belief.” Philosophical Papers 33 (3): 329–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640409485146. 
Kidd, Ian, James. 2017. “Resisters, Diversity in Philosophy, and the Demographic 
Problem.” Rivista Di Estetica, no. 64 (April): 118–33. 
https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.2071. 
King, Nathan L. 2014. “Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology: A Reply to the 
Situationist Challenge.” The Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255): 243–53. 
Knobe, Joshua. 2003. “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language.” 
Edited by Joshua Knobe. Analysis 63 (3): 190–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.3.190. 
Kristjánsson, Kristján. 2007. “Emulation and the Use of Role Models in Moral 
Education.” Journal of Moral Education 35 (1): 37–49. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240500495278. 
Kusch, Martin, and Robin McKenna. 2018. “The Genealogical Method in 
Epistemology.” Synthese, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1675-1. 
 236 
Latané, Bibb, and Judith Rodin. 1969. “A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of 
Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention.” Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology 5 (2): 189–202. 
Liberman, Nira, and Yaacov Trope. 2008. “The Psychology of Transcending the 
Here and Now.” Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1161958. 
Lockwood, Penelope, and Ziva Kunda. 1997. “Superstars and Me: Predicting the 
Impact of Role Models on the Self.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 73 (1): 91–103. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.91. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: 
Duckworth. 
Mackie, John L. 1965. “Causes and Conditions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 
(4): 245–64. 
Mageau, Geneviève A, and Robert J Vallerand. 2003. “The Coach–Athlete 
Relationship: A Motivational Model.” Journal of Sports Sciences 21 (11): 883–
904. https://doi.org/10.1080/0264041031000140374. 
Mageau, Geneviève A, Robert J Vallerand, Julie Charest, Sarah‐Jeanne Salvy, 
Nathalie Lacaille, Thérese Bouffard, and Richard Koestner. 2009. “On the 
Development of Harmonious and Obsessive Passion: The Role of Autonomy 
Support, Activity Specialization, and Identification with the Activity.” Journal of 
Personality 77 (3): 601–46. 
 237 
Matheson, Benjamin. 2018. “Towards a Structural Ownership Condition on Moral 
Responsibility.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, June, 1–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1480853. 
Mckinnon, Rachel. 2017. “Allies Behaving Badly: Gaslighting as Epistemic Injustice.” 
In The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by Ian James Kidd 
and José Medina. London: Routledge. 
Mele, Alfred R. 2013. “Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.” Journal 
of Ethics 17 (3): 167–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-013-9147-9. 
Mendiburo‐Seguel, Andrés, Darío Páez, and Francisco Martínez‐Sánchez. 2015. 
“Humor Styles and Personality: A Meta‐analysis of the Relation between 
Humor Styles and the Big Five Personality Traits.” Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology 56 (3): 335–40. 
Merritt, Maria. 2000. “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology.” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4): 365–83. 
Milgram, Stanley. 1963. “Behavioral Study of Obedience.” The Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology 67 (4): 371–78. 
Miller, Christian. 2014. “Moral Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, and the Big Five.” In 
Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, 92–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Montmarquet, James. 1992. “Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4): 331–41. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014428. 
 238 
Narayan, Uma. 1988. “Working Together Across Difference: Some Considerations 
on Emotions and Political Practice.” Hypatia 3 (2): 31–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1988.tb00067.x. 
Nettle, Daniel. 2006. “The Evolution of Personality Variation in Humans and Other 
Animals.” American Psychologist 61 (6): 622–31. 
———. 2007. Personality: What Makes You the Way You Are. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Niemiec, Christopher P, and Richard M Ryan. 2009. “Autonomy, Competence, and 
Relatedness in the Classroom: Applying Self-Determination Theory to 
Educational Practice.” Theory and Research in Education 7 (2): 133–44. 




Northcott, Robert. 2008. “Causation and Contrast Classes.” Philosophical Studies 
139 (1): 111–23. 
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
Oswald, Debra L. 2016. “Maintaining Long-Lasting Friendships.” In The Psychology 
of Friendship, edited by Mahzad Hojjat and Anne Moyer, 267–282. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190222024.003.0016. 
 239 
Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2012. Unfit for the Future: The Need for 
Moral Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Piccinini, Gualtiero. 2003a. “Data from Introspective Reports: Upgrading from 
Common Sense to Science.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9–10): 
141–56. 
———. 2003b. “Epistemic Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods.” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (3): 597–612. 
———. 2010. “How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement 
Methodology of First-Person Data.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3–
4): 84–106. 
Porter, Steven. 2015. “A Therapeutic Approach to Intellectual Virtue Formation in 
the Classroom.” In Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue 
Epistemology, edited by Jason Baehr, 221–39. New York: Routledge. 
Priest, Maura. 2017. “Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory.” Ergo, an Open 
Access Journal of Philosophy 4 (September): 463–80. 
https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.016. 
Pritchard, Duncan. 2010a. “Achievements, Luck and Value.” Think 9 (25): 19–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175610000035. 
———. 2010b. “Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis.” Synthese 175 
(1): 133–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y. 
———. 2013. “Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education.” Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 47 (2): 236–47. 
 240 
———. 2015. “Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of 
Education.” In Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology, edited by Jason Baehr, 
113–27. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315714127-7. 
———. 2016. “Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and 
Intellectual Autonomy.” Episteme 13 (1): 29–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.59. 
———. 2018. “Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement.” 
Synthese, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5. 
Railton, Peter. 1984. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 134–71. 
Ratelle, Catherine F, Frédéric Guay, Robert J Vallerand, Simon Larose, and 
Caroline Senécal. 2007. “Autonomous, Controlled, and Amotivated Types of 
Academic Motivation: A Person-Oriented Analysis.” Journal of Educational 
Psychology 99 (4): 734. 
Riggs, Wayne. 2010. “Open-Mindedness.” Metaphilosophy 41 (1/2): 172–88. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439880. 
Rini, Regina. 2017. “Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.” Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 27 (2S): E-43-E-64. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2017.0025. 
Roberts, Robert C, and W Jay Wood. 2007. Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in 
Regulative Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, Sam G.B., and Robin I.M. Dunbar. 2011. “The Costs of Family and 
Friends: An 18-Month Longitudinal Study of Relationship Maintenance and 
 241 
Decay.” Evolution and Human Behavior 32 (3): 186–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.005. 
Ryan, Richard M, and Edward L Deci. 2000. “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: 
Classic Definitions and New Directions.” Contemporary Educational 
Psychology 25 (1): 54–67. 
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1020. 
Ryan, Richard M, Veronika Huta, and Edward L Deci. 2008. “Living Well: A Self-
Determination Theory Perspective on Eudaimonia.” Journal of Happiness 
Studies 9 (1): 139–70. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-006-9023-4. 
Sandel, Michael J. 2007. The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic 
Engineering. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Sanderse, Wouter. 2013. “The Meaning of Role Modelling in Moral and Character 
Education.” Journal of Moral Education 42 (1): 28–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2012.690727. 
Schechtman, Marya. 1996. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- 
sity Press. 
———. 2007. “Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the 
Narrative View.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 (May): 155–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000082. 
———. 2011. “The Narrative Self.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Self, edited by 
Shaun Gallagher. Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0018. 
 242 
Sher, George. 2005. In Praise of Blame. New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0195187423.001.0001. 
Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 
(3): 229–43. 
Slote, Michael. 2013. From Enlightenment to Receptivity: Rethinking Our Values. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970704.001.0001. 
Sommers, Tamler. 2013. “Partial Desert.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and 
Responsibility, Volume 1, edited by David Shoemaker. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0011. 
Sosa, Ernest. 1980. “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in 
the Theory of Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 3–26. 
———. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Vol. I). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 2010. Knowing Full Well. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2015. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sreenivasan, Gopal. 2002. “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution.” 
Mind 111 (441): 47–68. 
———. 2008. “Character and Consistency: Still More Errors.” Mind 117 (467): 603–
12. 
———. 2009. “Disunity of Virtue.” The Journal of Ethics 13 (2–3): 195–212. 
 243 
———. 2013. “The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Virtue Ethics (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), edited by 
Daniel C. Russell, 290–314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stocker, Michael. 1976. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The 
Journal of Philosophy 73 (14): 453–66. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2025782.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae510162a1
cfd051396b3f612f5dd7a38. 
Stroud, Sarah. 2006. “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.” Ethics 116 (3): 498–524. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/500337. 
Tanesini, Alessandra. 2016. “‘Calm down, Dear’: Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing 
and Ignorance.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume, 90:71–92. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw011. 
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge : Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Trope, Yaacov, and Nira Liberman. 2010. “Construal-Level Theory of Psychological 
Distance.” Psychological Review 117 (2): 440–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018963. 
———. 2012. “Construal Level Theory.” In Handbook of Theories of Social 
Psychology: Volume 1, edited by P. A. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, and E. T. 
 244 
Higgins, 118–34. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249215.n7. 
Upton, Candace L. 2009. “The Structure of Character.” The Journal of Ethics 13 (2–
3): 175–93. 
Vallerand, Robert J. 2012. “From Motivation to Passion: In Search of the 
Motivational Processes Involved in a Meaningful Life.” Canadian 
Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne 53 (1): 42–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026377. 
Vallerand, Robert J., Céline Blanchard, Geneviève A. Mageau, Richard Koestner, 
Catherine Ratelle, Maude Léonard, Marylène Gagné, and Josée Marsolais. 
2003. “Les Passions de l’âme: On Obsessive and Harmonious Passion.” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (4): 756–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.756. 
Vallerand, Robert J., and Robert Blssonnette. 1992. “Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and 
Amotivational Styles as Predictors of Behavior: A Prospective Study.” Journal 
of Personality 60 (3): 599–620. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1992.tb00922.x. 
Vallerand, Robert J., Michelle S. Fortier, and Frédéric Guay. 1997. “Self-
Determination and Persistence in a Real-Life Setting: Toward a Motivational 
Model of High School Dropout.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
72 (5): 1161–76. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.1161. 
 245 
Vallerand, Robert J, Geneviève A Mageau, Andrew J Elliot, Alexandre Dumais, 
Marc-André Demers, and François Rousseau. 2008. “Passion and 
Performance Attainment in Sport.” Psychology of Sport and Exercise 9 (3): 
373–92. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2007.05.003. 
Velleman, J. David. 2009. “The Self as Narrator.” In Self to Self, 203–23. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498862.009. 
Vos, Pieter H. 2018. “Learning from Exemplars: Emulation, Character Formation 
and the Complexities of Ordinary Life.” Journal of Beliefs & Values 39 (1): 17–
28. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2017.1393295. 
Warnick, Bryan R. 2009. Imitation and Education: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Learning by Example. New York: SUNY Press. 
Watson, Gary. 1996. “Two Faces of Responsibility.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 
227–48. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199624222. 
Webber, Jonathan. 2006. “Character, Consistency, and Classification.” Mind 115 
(459): 651–58. 
Whitcomb, Dennis, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder. 
2017. “Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 509–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12228. 
White, Roger. 2005. “Epistemic Permissiveness.” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 
445–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x. 
 246 
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Wylie, Alison. 2013. “Why Standpoint Matters.” In Science and Other Cultures: 
Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Sandra Harding 
and Robert Figueroa, 26–48. New York: Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315881010. 
Yamagishi, Toshio, Hirofumi Hashimoto, Karen S. Cook, Toko Kiyonari, Mizuho 
Shinada, Nobuhiro Mifune, Keigo Inukai, Haruto Takagishi, Yutaka Horita, and 
Yang Li. 2012. “Modesty in Self-Presentation: A Comparison between the USA 
and Japan.” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 15 (1): 60–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2011.01362.x. 
Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind : An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and 
the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
———. 2010. “Exemplarist Virtue Theory.” Metaphilosophy 41 (1‐2): 41–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01627.x. 
———. 2017. Exemplarist Moral Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190655846.001.0001. 
Zimbardo, Philip G, Craig Haney, W Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe. 1973. “A 
Pirandellian Prison: The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer.” New York Times 
Magazine 8 (1973): 38–60. 
 
